This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`


NYPL RESEARCH LIBRARIES
3 3433 06730492 7

ESSAYS

AND

DISSERTATIONS

ON

VARIOUS SUBJECTS,

RELATING TO

HUMAN LIFE AND HAPPINESS.

In Two Volumes.

VOL. II.

Ὥστε ὅστις ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ὀρεγέσθαι ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ἐκκλίνειν, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ εὐσεβείας επιμελεῖται. EPICTET. ENCHIRID.

EDINBURGH:

Printed for A. KINCAID and J. BELL; and E. and C. DILLY, London.

M,DCC,LXX.

THE NEW YORK
PUBLIC LIBRARY
ASTOR, LENOX AND
TILDEN FOUNDATIONS.

DISSERTATION IV.

ON HAPPINESS.

PART I.

Man's true Happineſs *aſcertained from an Eſtimate and Compariſon of his various Enjoyments.*

IF HAPPINESS be a ſubject that I can throw any light on, it is fit that my preamble be as ſhort as poſſible. The ſubject is ſo intereſting to every reader, that he may be excuſed for being impatient to know how it is to be managed, or what can be added to the many treatiſes, ancient and modern, that have been wrote upon it. To give an account of all theſe would be enough to make a treatiſe by itſelf, entertaining, perhaps, to ſome, but not very ſatisfying. Others will poſſibly make the ſame remark on what I now write: All I can ſay for it therefore is, that the view I am to give of the ſubject ſhall be ſuch as beſt ſuits my own experience. I have found the benefit of it in many varieties of life; and if (by the Divine Bleſſing)

others ſhall reap the ſame benefit, I ſhall have
my end in the following diſquiſition.

IT is too general and imperfect a definition
of Happineſs, to ſay that it conſiſts in the
enjoyment of *Pleaſure**; for ſome degree of
Perfection, as well as *Pleaſure*, goes to conſti-
tute our idea of any kind of Happineſs, and
it bears proportion to the capacity of the be-
ing, who is poſſeſſed of it. Thus the happi-
neſs of a *Brute* is ſuited to its nature, and
requires only the perfection and ſatisfaction
of ſenſe; but that happineſs which is ſuitable
to the nature of *Man*, muſt be ſuperior, as it
implies the rectitude and perfection of his
rational powers, with their exerciſe on ob
jects agreeable to them. *Improvement* as well
as *Enjoyment*, is here implied; nor is it or
to a few acts or exerciſes that they have
ſpect, but to the habitual frame and tem
of the mind, and the objects beſt ſuite
adminiſter to it that kind of pleaſure, wh
goes to conſtitute the higheſt happineſs
being conſtituted and connected as man

I ſhall therefore ſuppoſe any man ſi
down coolly and deliberately, to co
what objects, exerciſes, and enjoyments
moſt conducive to his higheſt happineſ

* Who thus define it, ſay they more or l
Than this, that Happineſs is Happine

he might make his election, and regulate his conduct accordingly in the purſuit of it. What to me appears the moſt natural and diſtinct way for him to proceed, is as follows:

I. To conſider the different ENJOYMENTS in which men commonly place their Happineſs.

II. To lay down ſome MAXIMS, by which we may judge of the value of any Enjoyments, and compare them one with another. And,

III. To *apply* theſe to the above Enjoyments for determining their value, and in which of them true happineſs lies.

I. The ENJOYMENTS in which men do commonly place their happineſs, are to be enumerated.

What is meant by *Pleaſure* and *Pain* in the general, every one's conſciouſneſs will beſt inform him. They ariſe from ſuch perceptions as are either agreeable or diſagreeable to our nature; and, according as any objects contribute to procure us either of theſe, they fall under the general denomination of Good or Evil: The *Enjoyment* of theſe objects, therefore, that is, the exerciſe of our

faculties on them, according as they give ſuch grateful or ungrateful perceptions, we call *Happineſs* and *Miſery* in the abſtract; ſo that, as their eſſential conſtitution lies in an agreeableneſs or diſagreeableneſs to our *Nature*, the manner of diſtinguiſhing them into different ſpecieſes or branches, depends upon the light in which human *Nature* is conſidered. If we conſider it with ſome moraliſts, as having ſo many diſtinct powers of perception implanted in it, to be the inlets of pleaſure and pain, and reſembling in their exerciſe what are called the five external ſenſes; in this view theſe objects, which, by giving pleaſure or pain, are conſtituted good or evil, come to be diſtinguiſhed into different claſſes, according to theſe different *Senſes* or powers of perceiving them, ſuch as the *publick* Senſe, the *moral* Senſe, the Senſe of *Honour*, and the like.

FOR diſtinguiſhing the enjoyments in which men commonly place their happineſs, others only conſider human nature in the general as *Rational* or *Senſitive*; the firſt depending peculiarly on the *Mind*; the ſecond on the union of *Body* with it; and intermediate betwixt theſe is the faculty of *Imagination*, receiving Impreſſions from both, and forming them to images. In this view, as happineſs lies the enjoyment of objects agreeable to na it is either *Rational*, belonging to the ra

and purely mental part of our frame, or *Senſual* to the Senſitive; to which a third ſpecies may be added, under the name of *Imaginative* Happineſs, as being founded in the imagination, aſſociating the forms of mental Happineſs with thoſe of ſenſual.

To the firſt of theſe belong more peculiarly all ſuch enjoyments as are *Internal* or *Spiritual*, of which we ſhall have occaſion to ſay more afterwards. To the ſecond, ſuch as are *External* and *Corporeal*; which are commonly divided into four kinds, viz. *Pleaſure*, from the objects of ſenſe and appetite; *Power* and authority over others; *Wealth* or Riches, to procure both the former, or perhaps even on their own account; and *Fame* or diſtinction in the world. According as one or other of theſe is the chief object of mens deſire and purſuit, four different characters are formed, and their prevailing affections take the names of *Senſuality*, *Ambition*, *Avarice*, and *Emulation*; to which a fifth character might be added, of thoſe in whom *Indolence* prevails, or love of eaſe, as the principal ingredient of their Happineſs, were it not that their enjoyments are ſo near a-kin to the *Senſual*.

THE third kind of Happineſs mentioned we called *Imaginative*, as it ariſes from the imagination or fancy, aſſociating the ideas of *Mental* Good, ſuch as Generoſity, Publick Spirit, Dignity, and the like, with thoſe of

External, ſo as to make the one more inviting and alluring, by a mixture of the other. Thus, that *Pleaſure* which lies in gratifying the appetites, has joined to it the moral ideas of ſociality and friendſhip, by receiving others to ſhare in it, Generoſity, and perhaps Charity, in ſupporting thoſe who are not ſo received, by the expence at which ſuch pleaſure is purchaſed, and the like. *Riches* have aſſociated with them, the ideas of that eſteem they appear often attended with, and of all that publick good they may be the means of procuring; though, when the means are attained, the end is oft times forgot. *Power*, in the ſame way, is accompanied with the ideas of Dignity, Grandeur, and Worth, which belong to it only when well applied; *Fame* and Diſtinction with thoſe of publick eſteem, ſuperior merit, and the like. Such are the deluſive forms under which *External Good* is painted by the imagination, aſſociating with it the ideas of ſomething higher and more excellent, 'till by conſtant indulgence and repetition, the aſſociations are ſo ſtrengthened as to continue, even when we are convinced that they are wrong. Thus, though the *Miſer* cannot anſwer for the folly of his conduct, he will not alter it: He has all the ideas of Good, of Excellence, of Merit, of Importance, and Enjoyment in life, confounded with his coffers, as the *Luxurious* man

ha-

has with his table, and the romantick *Lover* with his miſtreſs.

BUT, for enumerating the different enjoyments in which men commonly place their Happineſs, inſtead of any *philoſophical* diviſion of them, we may do as well to ſubſtitute a *practical* one, or to conſult Experience, by looking around us to ſee what it is that men are generally moſt intent upon purſuing, and by enumerating the different objects of their purſuit, according to the degree of excellence commonly aſcribed to them. Theſe, therefore, will probably be found as follows:

1. *Senſual Pleaſure*, or the gratification of thoſe deſires that reſpect the external ſenſes and appetites, and avoiding whatever is offenſive to them.

2. *Riches*, either for their own ſake, or that of procuring other enjoyments.

3. *Honour* and Preferment, or what is called making a figure in the world.

4. *Fame* and Diſtinction, or the applauſe and notice of all we converſe with.

5. *Speculative* Pleaſures, from the acquiſition of knowledge, and diſcovery of truth.

6. The *Social* Pleaſures of friendſhip, company, and mutual intercourſe.

7. The Pleaſures of the *Imagination*, entertained with the works of nature or art.

8. The godlike Pleaſures of *doing good* to all

all around us, by the offices of juſtice, charity, and improvement of their minds.

9. The reſemblance of the *Deity*, in reſpect of his moral perfections, and that enjoyment of him which ariſes from a conſciouſneſs of devout affection towards him, a conformity to his will, and conſequent *Senſe* of his *Favour*.

THESE are the different *Objects* and *Enjoyments* in which men do commonly place their happineſs, and which, though thus diſtinguiſhed, and differing very much in their value, (as will ſoon be made appear) we are not to ſuppoſe entirely inconſiſtent with one another. There is indeed one kind of them ſuperior to all in excellence, and in which we ſhall find that the ſupreme happineſs of man conſiſts. But ſome of the other kinds mentioned have likewiſe their excellence; nor is there any of them which may not, in a proper degree, be purſued lawfully and innocently. Our *higheſt happineſs*, however, is what we are now in ſearch of, that we may ſee in what ſpecies of enjoyment and improvement it conſiſts. In order to this, therefore, we proceed.

II. To lay down ſome MAXIMS, by which we may judge of the value of any enjoyments, and compare them one with another. The

1. We

1. We ſhall mention is one very commonly taken notice of, that all *Pleaſure* is to be judged of by its *Intenſeneſs* and *Duration*; and ſo, on the contrary, of *Pain*.

2. No *Pleaſure* deſerves regard that muſt be followed by the *Loſs* of a greater one, or a *ſuperior Pain*; nor does any *Pain* deſerve regard that muſt be followed by a much *Superior Pleaſure*.

3. That *Pleaſure* muſt be always *Superior*, which belongs to the *ſuperior part* of our nature.—Hence it follows,

4. That the true happineſs of man muſt be ſuch as is ſuited to the *Nature* of *Man*, and not to the nature of brutes; nor are we to judge of the nature of man in general, from what appears to be that of ſome, who may be ſaid to have debaſed their nature, by giving way too much to the exerciſe and gratification of inferior principles and deſires, but from what appears beſt ſuited to thoſe principles which are acknowledged ſuperior in our nature, viz. *Reaſon* and *Intellect*: And, as perfection, as well as pleaſure, goes to conſtitute happineſs.

5. It follows alſo, that the higheſt happineſs of man muſt conſiſt in ſuch enjoyments as are moſt *perfective* of his nature, or moſt conſonant to his hopes of higher happineſs and perfection *hereafter*, and, as it were, *progreſſive* towards it, ſo that its value will be increaſing, and

and not diminiſhing in our eye, the nearer that we approach to the verge of life. But,

6. True Happineſs muſt be ſomething level even to thoſe of the *meaneſt* ability or capacity; that is, it muſt conſiſt in ſome kind of enjoyments adapted to all, and attainable by them.

7. It muſt alſo be accommodated to all times, places and circumſtances, not affected by the various changes and conditions of human life, nor ſuch as will appear to us taſteleſs and inſipid in the immediate view of death, when every falſe and fugitive ſpecies of happineſs will vaniſh, or ſink into that inſignificancy which belongs to it.

8. It muſt conſiſt in ſomething very *ſimple*, always acceſſible, eaſily comprehended at once, and made preſent to the mind, yet ſo *diffuſive* or extenſive, that there can be no oppoſition of one to another in the purſuit of it, but the contrary.

Such are the *Maxims*, by which we may judge of the value of the different kinds of enjoyment formerly mentioned, and the *Characters*, by which that kind is diſtinguiſhed in which our higheſt happineſs conſiſts.—Let us now

III. APPLY theſe *Maxims* and *Characters* to our different enjoyments, in order to jud

of their value, and which of them chiefly deſerves our preference and purſuit.

This application may ſo eaſily be made by every one for himſelf, that we need not be particular in going over the various enjoyments formerly mentioned with this view, further than to obſerve in general,

1. That, as all of them are, in ſome degree, ſuited to our nature; all of them are, in a *proper degree*, juſtifiable in their purſuit: But

2. None of them can go to conſtitute our higheſt happineſs, whoſe object is *external*, and not perfective of the ſoul, ſo that, by all the preceeding maxims, the four kinds of Pleaſure firſt mentioned, are ſecluded.

3. It is eaſy to ſee, that the three kinds of Enjoyment next mentioned, *viz.* thoſe from acquiſitions of *Knowledge*, from *Society*, and from the entertainments of the *Imagination*, though all more refined, and more nearly allied to mental happineſs than what went before, yet, being eaſily interrupted and impaired, and not being adapted to all capacities, nor accommodated to all times, places, and circumſtances, they are, by theſe laſt mentioned maxims or characters, excluded from being *eſſential* ingredients of our chief happineſs: They are, however, ſo conſiſtent with, and conducive to it, that they deſerve very much of our attention.

A ſearch

A ſearch after knowledge, and inquiry into truth, phyſical and moral, as well as religious, is not only allowable, but highly commendable, eſpecially when it is ſuch as does not reſt in ſpeculation, but extends to practice; by this the improvement of the mind is promoted, its faculties exerciſed and ſtrengthened, its veneration and gratitude to God, when contemplating his works increaſed, and the accommodation of the preſent life in many ways advanced. There can be no doubt, therefore, that exerciſes of this kind, when rightly conducted, are conducive to our higheſt happineſs, though from Maxim 6. it is plain that they do not conſtitute it; and much more may ſuch a favourable teſtimony be given of the pleaſures of ſociety, or ſocial intercourſe, in the way of receiving and communicating mutual improvement and entertainment. Put all other outward enjoyments together, and they will no make up for the want of this. We may and do differ very much as to the choice thoſe whoſe company or ſociety we reliſ but there is no man alive, unleſs the princip of his nature be ſome way vitiated, who pals his life comfortably without ſome ſo ty or other; and without it indeed t would not be ſcope for the exerciſe of n virtues which adorn and perfect our nat To ſuppoſe, however, that our ſupreme pineſs depended upon this, would be reſt

on a very mutable foundation, and is particularly contrary to the ſeventh maxim mentioned. This objection lies much ſtronger againſt the entertainments of the imagination, whether ariſing from the beauties of nature, or the imitations of art, in the way of reſemblance, refinement, expreſſion, deſcription. Theſe are ſources of pleaſure, both innocent and ornamental, but they are neither ſuited to all capacities, nor to all circumſtances, and therefore come not up to what we mentioned in the ſixth and ſeventh maxims, as preconceptions of the ſovereign good.

4. The eighth ſpecies of pleaſure mentioned, is indeed eſſentially *neceſſary* to the purſuit and attainment of our chief happineſs, but not what *conſtitutes* it. An eminent modern writer * on this ſubject has ſaid a great deal to prove, that happineſs conſiſts in *rectitude* of *conduct*; but there are many reaſons for conſidering this rather as a mean or qualification neceſſary to happineſs, than as happineſs itſelf. A rectitude of *temper* or diſpoſition is ſtill more neceſſary, but who can ſay that he ever fully attained either of theſe, however much he endeavoured it; and, though they may well be called god-like pleaſures, which ariſe from doing good to all around us by the offices of juſtice, charity, and improvement

* Harris's Treatiſe on Happineſs.

their minds. yet how many are there, whose ſphere of doing good is too narrow and depreſſed to admit of their having much enjoyment in this way? Acts of ſtrict juſtice and duty they may endeavour to practiſe, but, in reſpect of charity and mental improvement, they muſt rather be indebted to others, than hope to communicate; and though, amidſt many blemiſhes and imperfections, ſome may attain a higher degree of that conſciouſneſs of rectitude which ſome ſuppoſe ſufficient for happineſs; yet, beſides that thoſe who have the beſt title to it, may often, through their humility and ſelf-denial, be more backward than others in taking merit or comfort from it, there are caſes of calamity and diſtreſs, to which the very beſt of men are liable, in which the mind of man requires ſomething more to ſupport it, than what depends on its own natural ſtrength, rectitude, or fortitude. From all this we may infer,

5. That, either there is no ſuch thing as true happineſs to be expected and attained (a ſuppoſition which both reaſon and experience condemn) or elſe that it muſt lie in the laſt ſpecies mentioned, *viz.* the reſemblance of the Deity in reſpect of his moral perfections, and that enjoyment of him which ariſes from a conſciouſneſs of devout affection towards him, conformity to his will, and conſequent *ſenſe of his favour.*

The

The nature of this happineſs, therefore, and means of attaining it, muſt be conſidered as the moſt important ſubject our inquiry can extend to, and we ſhall ſoon enter upon it: But here it may be fit to take notice, how fully all the characters or eſſential properties of true happineſs belong to it. Take its intenſeneſs, its duration, its conſequences into the account, and, in all theſe reſpects, it will be found ſuperior to every other ſpecies of enjoyment that takes the name of happineſs; it is ſuited to the ſuperior part of our nature, is perfective of it, corrects every inferior principle, is conducive to higher happineſs and perfection hereafter, adapted to the capacities of all, and attainable by them, accommodated to all times, places, and circumſtances, yet not affected by the various changes and conditions of human life, nor confined, as all external enjoyments are, ſo as to occaſion any oppoſition of intereſts in the purſuit of it.—On the contrary, the more it is purſued and attained, it will be ſtill the more diffuſive in its influence on all around, as a heart properly regulated and diſpoſed with reſpect to God, will moſt certainly be ſo as to men, upon the ſureſt foundation, namely, *a regard to the will of* GOD, which will operate more uniformly, and produce benevolent diſpoſitions and actions with reſpect to men, more effectually

than any regard to their merit, approbation, or ſubſerviency to our intereſt.

The character which ſome will probably think leaſt applicable to this ſpecies of happineſs, is that of its being ſimple, always acceſſible, eaſily comprehended at once, and made preſent to the mind. Inſtead of this ſome will ſay, that the happineſs we now ſpeak of, as ſuperior to every other enjoyment, is ſomething ſo abſtract and refined, that they can form no idea of it. Abſtracted from ſenſe indeed it is; refined alſo and ſpiritual in its nature; but its appearing diſtant and difficult to be attained, is what may reaſonably be expected from its ſuperior value, and that indiſpoſition for ſuch enjoyments which ariſes from the mind's being either too much engroſſed or polluted by ſenſible objects. But, lay aſide all immoderate attachments to theſe and you'll find that no idea more eaſily enters the mind, or ſeems more congenial with it, than ſuch an impreſſion of the divine preſence and favour, as, however imperfect and incommenſurate to its object, will be ſufficient to fill the whole capacity of the human ſoul, and, in an ineffable manner, diffuſe its influence through every faculty, at the ſame time that it is accommodated to all circumſtances, conditions, and capacities; as the ſupreme Author and immediate object of this

happineſs

happineſs muſt always have the neareſt acceſs to our minds, be always intimately preſent with them, and know how to communicate or withdraw that *ſenſe of his favour*, which gives happineſs to the ſoul, according as it advances in purity, conformity to his will, and reſemblance of his moral perfections; the nature of which, ſo far as they are to be comprehended by us, ſhall be afterwards conſidered.

6. One inference more that may be drawn from the application we have made of the maxims formerly laid down to the different kinds of enjoyment mentioned, is, That, if our higheſt happineſs lies in the laſt of theſe, it ought to be conſidered as our *chief good*, as the ultimate end of our life and actions, and the intrinſic value of all the other enjoyments, eſtimated according to their tendency or relation to this. Hence it will follow, that, though ſome of them may be purſued in an entire conſiſtence with it, yet, as others of them lead us off to ſenſual and external objects, a *diſengagement* from theſe muſt be cultivated and attained, before the mind can be properly diſpoſed for the ſpiritual exerciſes and enjoyments which have reſpect to our ſupreme good. Such a diſengagement is, indeed, the firſt ſtep towards it, but, as to the *degree* of this, no rule can be laid down, that

will ſuit every ſituation in life, further than that, the more compleat it is, in a conſiſtence with the neceſſary offices and engagements of life, or, the more that the mind is abſtracted from every thing ſenſible and corporeal, the diſpoſition for the higheſt mental enjoyments will be the more compleat, and, whatever is renounced on account of them, amply compenſated.

PART

PART II.

The plain way of attaining that which appears to be Man's true and ultimate Happineſs.

THE firſt part of our inquiry is now finiſhed, and the various enjoyments, from which happineſs is commonly ſought or expected, have been enumerated, eſtimated, and compared. The reſult of all is, that the *higheſt happineſs of man* conſiſts in the *reſemblance* and *favour*, or *enjoyment* of GOD. He has, in this reſpect, put all men more upon a level than is commonly imagined, as he has not left their true happineſs depending upon any external circumſtances or advantages, in reſpect of which they differ very much from one another; but, be their ſtations, talents, and outward circumſtances what they will, this happineſs is put within their reach. If they attain it, they will not regret the want of any thing elſe: If they attain it not, no other advantage can compenſate it. Our next inquiry therefore, ſhall be, How that reſemblance and enjoyment of God is to be attained, in which our higheſt happineſs conſiſts?

Meaning

Meaning by his *reſemblance*, a conformity of heart and life to his will, in reſpect of purity, rectitude, and participation of all moral or ſpiritual perfection; and by his *enjoyment*, a ſenſe of his love and favour, communicated by him to the ſoul, and always conſequent upon the former. So that the important *queſtion* now before us is, How theſe may be attained to ſuch a degree as is conſiſtent with the preſent infant ſtate of our being and faculties? the full attainment of them being reſerved to a future period of our exiſtence, a ſtate of higher purity and perfection.

HAPPINESS, in the light in which we have conſidered it, is ſo perfective of our nature, that it may be ſaid to be the great end of our being, *to make ourſelves and all around us happy*. Our own happineſs and that of others have a mutual influence on one another. It all centers in GOD; the very *eſſence* of it lying in that *ſenſe* or *perſuaſion* of his *favour*, which ariſes from the *reſemblance* of him mentioned, and *conformity* to his *will*. The main ſcope, therefore, of our preſent diſquiſition muſt be, to take as clear and ſuccinct a view as poſſible of the conduct we are to obſerve with reſpect to the DEITY, in order to obtain his favour and enjoyment, in which lies our *chief* HAPPINESS, or the ultimate end of our being, as now ſet forth.

The

The great importance of ſetting this point, in ſuch a manner as that the mind may have it, *i. e.* the impreſſion of it, always preſent, may be kept from fluctuating, and the whole of our life uniformly regulated by it, will now be evident; ſo that all poſſible accuracy and perſpicuity is neceſſary. It muſt be done agreeably to the dictates of reaſon, and diſcoveries of revelation; and, if it is ſo done, to the beſt of our knowledge and ability, we ſhould reſt ſatisfied with the iſſue of our inquiry, without any uneaſy doubts or anxious fears to embitter our lives, while conſcious that we do our beſt, in the preſent imperfect ſtate of human nature, as to what concerns either knowledge or practice. Even when we endeavour this, indeed it muſt be acknowledged, that we are in many reſpects defective as to both; but this our merciful Creator foreſaw, and made ſuch proviſion for redreſſing, as that, in conſiſtence with his juſtice and authority, he may receive us into *favour*, in the way that ſhall afterwards be mentioned.

The order, in which it is now moſt natural for us to proceed, in our way to that *happineſs* which has been deſcribed, is by conſidering attentively the three following particulars.

1. What

I. What *ideas* or *conceptions* we are led both by reaſon and revelation, to have of GOD.

II. What *ideas* or *conceptions* they give us of *ourſelves*, and of the *relation* in which we ſtand to the DEITY.

III. The *duties* and *diſpoſitions* with reſpect to him which *reſult* from *theſe*, and are neceſſary in order to our being *approved* by him.

I. We begin with laying down theſe *notions* or *conceptions*, which we are led both by reaſon and revelation, to have of the DEITY. And theſe are as follows.

1. That he is an intelligent immaterial Being, who exiſted from all eternity of himſelf, without limitation or dependence on any thing external to himſelf, for his *being*, *happineſs*, and *perfection*; and that from him all being, happineſs, and perfection are derived.

2. That he being thus ſelf-exiſtent, independent and intelligent, his happineſs conſiſts in *ſelf-enjoyment*, i. e. in the enjoyment and contemplation of his own nature and operations, regulated and approved of by the *reaſon* * of his own all-perfect and eternal mind.

3. That

* From this *eternal reaſon*, every inferior intelligent being

3. That this *ſelf-exiſtent, infinitely-happy* Being muſt poſſeſs in the higheſt degree all the perfections that are to be found in created beings, and can be excelled in them by none.

(1.) He muſt have all poſſible *natural perfection*, viz. the moſt perfect power, knowledge, and wiſdom. And,

(2.) The higheſt *moral perfection*, in reſpect of, 1. Goodneſs and benevolence, or a natural inclination to communicate his happineſs and perfection. 2. Holineſs and purity, or a diſpoſition to be pleaſed with the reſemblance of his perfections in ſuch beings as he has made capable of them, and diſpleaſed with the contrary. 3. Juſtice and righteouſneſs, or a diſpoſition to reward and puniſh ſuch beings accordingly.

4. Reaſon informs us, that, as this *ſupreme, ſelf-exiſtent, infinitely happy* and *perfect* Being has created inferior intelligent beings, of different orders and capacities, but all in ſome meaſure

ing derives ſuch a meaſure of *reaſon* as is neceſſary for the direction of his conduct, according to his order and ſphere in nature: This is what we commonly call the *light of nature*, in a conformity to which lies the *law of nature*; and the unprejudiced teſtimony of *reaſon*, when thus exerted or applied for the direction of our own *conduct*, is what goes by the name of *conſcience*; which impartially and unavoidably paſſes judgment on all our actions and affections, approving or diſapproving of them at firſt ſight, even, before any deliberate reflection on them interveens; but, with much more violence, when this takes place, and gives leiſure for bringing them more nearly to the teſt of reaſon.

meaſure capable of the above reſemblance, of whom the only beings that fall under our notice are thoſe called *men*; the end of his creating them muſt have been to *communicate* to them of his happineſs and perfection, to which (as was obſerved) his goodneſs inclines him.

5. From his goodneſs, and the end of his creating men, reaſon concludes, that, though he has allotted them different capacities, ſpheres and circumſtances in life, he muſt have afforded every one of them *originally*, ſufficient powers of attaining a degree of happineſs and perfection ſuited to his capacity; and, though every one has ſo much freedom in the uſe of theſe powers, that he may make himſelf miſerable, yet the perfections of God are not thereby ſullied, nor the general good of his creation impaired.

6. By reaſon we are further aſſured, that this SUPREME BEING, who exerted his perfections in creating mankind, that he might communicate to them happineſs and perfection, and who has allotted them the capacities mentioned, and circumſtances of being, with free powers of action to improve all for this end, muſt continue ſtill to exerciſe theſe his perfections, by *ſuperintending* them, in the way of his *providence*, for their preſervation and direction in order to this end, ſo far as is conſiſtent

conſiſtent with the original free powers and conſtitution he gave them.

Thus, 1. He muſt be in all times and places intimately *preſent* with every one of them, and acquainted with their moſt ſecret thoughts and actions, and the uſe they make of their ſeveral powers and advantages. 2. His *power* is always exerciſed in ordering circumſtances, and what we call ſecond cauſes, for their behoof, in a way agreeable to their natural liberty, ſo far as he ſees that they are proper objects of his favour. 3. His *goodneſs*, or benevolence, muſt be continually exerted, for contributing to their happineſs and perfection in the way juſt now mentioned, as long as they carry on the order and end of nature, and retain any of thoſe reſemblances of his moral perfections which he enabled them to acquire. 4. His *Holineſs* muſt be manifeſted in a continual complacency and ſatisfaction with ſuch of his rational creatures as, in the uſe of their free powers and capacities, carry on the order and end of nature, by cultivating a reſemblance of his moral perfections; and in a diſpleaſure with ſuch as counteract or deviate from all theſe. 5. His *Juſtice* muſt be diſplayed by rewarding or puniſhing, either in the preſent or in a future period of their being, ſuch as thus ſtudy to pleaſe or diſpleaſe him; nor can we imagine it agreeable to his perfect holineſs,

and to the juſtice of his moral government and adminiſtration of the world, to paſs over the ſmalleſt tranſgreſſion of his law, without a *ſatisfaction* proportioned to the demerit of the offence.

As therefore all men muſt be conſcious to themſelves of many failures, treſpaſſes and offences againſt God, and of their coming far ſhort of that rectitude, purity, and conformity to the divine will neceſſary to happineſs; (whatever has been the original cauſe of this impotency and depravity,) notwithſtanding which, we cannot ſuppoſe it agreeable to God's goodneſs to make us all unavoidably miſerable: In this caſe, I ſay, our *reaſon* is at a ſtand, and unable to diſcover how God's goodneſs can be exerciſed towards us, in a conſiſtence with his juſtice and the order of his government. A particular *revelation* from himſelf is the only thing that can ſatisfy us here, nor is there any other *revelation* but the CHRISTIAN that does it effectually. The light, therefore, which it gives us, in this intricate caſe, is as follows:

1. That God created mankind with powers ſufficient for obtaining that happineſs and perfection which were the end of their being; but that theſe powers were diſabled by a great and *univerſal depravation* in the perſons of our primogenitors, the influence of which, both by natural

natural and poſitive appointment, reaches all their poſterity.

2. That, to repair this *breach* in the moral world, occaſioned by the abuſe of the original free powers with which GOD endowed mankind, and to enable them, on their preſent footing, to obtain that happineſs and perfection, which are the end of their being, without counteracting the order and juſtice of his government; He ſent his SON, the *ſecond Perſon* of the adorable GODHEAD, to appear among us, that, by ſubmitting even to a painful and ignominious death in our nature, he might give him ſatisfaction for our offences, and us an example of a holy and unblameable life, with a clear, diſtinct, and forcible account of our duty and way to happineſs through him, ſetting before us the *terms* on which we are to have an intereſt in his ſatisfaction for our undeniable offences againſt God, and tranſgreſſions of his law. Theſe *terms* are as follows,

(1.) *Humility*, or a due ſenſe of our own inability, in the preſent ſtate of our nature, to obtain happineſs in the favour and enjoyment of God; acknowledging our many deficiencies, and even our wilful, deliberate diſobedience and neglect of what we know, or may know to be his will. In conſequence of our having a ſenſe of all this, *chriſtian humility*

implies our not relying, for the attainment of the ends mentioned, on any *merit** or abilities of our own.

(2.) *Sorrow* and *contrition*, or a hearty concern for this our diſobedience and offences, in conſequence of the ſenſe and acknowledgment of them now mentioned.

(3.) A *ſenſe* of our *need* of God's interpoſition in an extraordinary way, for rectifying the depravity of our nature in its preſent ſtate, providing an atonement or ſatisfaction to his juſtice for our diſobedience; and ſo, in fine, enabling us, notwithſtanding all our deficiencies and offences, to obtain happineſs in his favour and enjoyment.

(4.) A full belief and perſuaſion, that the *extraordinary perſon*, who appeared in the Jewiſh nation near eighteen centuries ago, under the name of JESUS, who led a virtuous, devout, and unblameable life himſelf, publickly taught and enjoined the ſame to others, profeſſed himſelf to be CHRIST, the MESSIAH, (long before propheſied of, and then expected by the Jews) the SON OF GOD, coeternal

* The moſt perfect and innocent creature can *merit* nothing at the hand of God, from whom its faculties and perfections are all derived; much leſs can a ſinner *merit* his *favour*, ſo that, when any conduct or duties are mentioned as neceſſary in order to it, they are to be conſidered as qualifications or conditions of obtaining it, and not as giving any claim of right to what is much more free and unmerited than ever any *act of grace* was from an earthly ſovereign.

eternal, and co-exiſting with the Father, and appearing in the nature of man, that therein he might ſatisfy God's juſtice for the offences of mankind, make them reconcileable to him, notwithſtanding their tranſgreſſions of his law, and give them an example of a virtuous and holy life, with precepts for cultivating it; who wrought many undeniable miracles to prove his miſſion, and finally died and roſe again, in completion and confirmation of it: We are, I ſay, to have a full belief and perſuaſion of his divine miſſion, as the SON of GOD and SAVIOUR of MEN. But to have only heard of theſe *Terms* of Salvation thro' him, and to have no objection to them, is not ſufficient (as ſome would ſeem to ſuppoſe) for recommending us to the favour of God; there muſt alſo be a cordial acceptance or application of theſe terms, and compliance with them.—We muſt therefore

5. *Acquieſce in*, and *rely* upon the atonement and ſatisfaction he has made to God's juſtice, and his conſequent mediation or interceſſion for us; as without this the effect of it can never be applied to us in particular.

6. All this muſt be accompanied with a conſtant, uniform, and ſincere reſolution of *Obedience* and *Amendment*, in conformity to his doctrine and example, (both in what reſpects the *Precepts* of his law, and the *Inſtitutions* of

his goſpel) to the utmoſt of our power, tho' we are not to rely on ſuch obedience for attaining the favour and enjoyment of God.

3. By the *Chriſtian Revelation* we are further taught, that, as there is but *one Godhead*, or Divine Nature and Eſſence, in this there are *three Perſons*, to whom all the perfections already mentioned belong; but that they have different offices or relations with reſpect to mankind: The 1ſt, that of their common *Father*, *Creator*, and Preſerver: The 2d, that of their *Redeemer* (as formerly explained): The 3d, that of their *Sanctifier*, applying to them all the effects or benefits of Redemption, and recovering their nature from its preſent depraved ſtate, to a reſemblance of the divine, in moral rectitude, and evangelical purity.

To theſe peculiar doctrines of the Chriſtian Revelation, we might likewiſe add (in the ſenſe that ſhall be explained in our laſt Diſſertation) the aſſurances we have not only of the *Immortality* of the ſoul, but likewiſe of the *Reſurrection* of the body, with a more particular account of the nature and manner of our future *Judgment*, and the different events or conditions of good and bad men, in conſequence of it.

II. The notions which reaſon and experience, as well as revelation, give us of OURSELVES, and our *Relation* to the DEITY, are as follows:

1. We

1. We are conſcious to ourſelves that we are beings endowed with certain *Powers* or *Faculties* of perceiving, thinking, acting, reaſoning, diſcerning, diſtinguiſhing betwixt actions and diſpoſitions, and reckoning ſome of them good, and others evil, both in a natural and moral view; alſo chuſing or refuſing, purſuing or avoiding them accordingly.

2. We are convinced that our being and faculties mentioned, had a *Beginning*, and muſt have a higher original than any ſeries of ſecond cauſes we can trace, ſo that they muſt be derived from that FIRT CAUSE, or ſupreme, infinitely perfect Being, whom we have deſcribed, and likewiſe continually preſerved and ſuperintended by him, in all their circumſtances and operations, in ſuch a way as that (tho' we cannot conceive the manner of it) his regard and direction does not encroach upon the free powers of action he has given us, as neceſſary for the ends of trial, improvement, and government, in our preſent ſtate; hence then it follows, that we depend on him for all that we have and hope for, and that, in ourſelves, we are utterly weak and deſtitute, inſufficient for our own ſupport, happineſs and perfection.

3. From the ideas or conceptions we have of the ſupreme Being (as formerly mentioned) it appears that the *end* of his *creating* us, with ſuch powers and faculties, muſt be to communicate

communicate to us his own happineſs and perfection in different degrees, according to the different capacities he thought fit to endow us with, or the rank he gave us in his creation, and thereby to make the glory of his attributes, natural and moral, the more conſpicuous: So that, from the account given of the divine nature and will, it appears,

4. That the great *End* we ſhould have in view, above every thing elſe, is, to *pleaſe or ſerve God*, by ſuch an employment and improvement of the faculties he has given us, as appears moſt agreeable to him, moſt perfective of our natures, and of that ſyſtem he has placed us in, and moſt conducive to that happineſs which lies in his favour and approbation; the ſenſe of which, or that reflex pleaſure from it, neceſſary to the enjoyment of him, does, in this ſtate, reſult from the impreſſions or intimations made of his favour, through his influence on our own *Reaſon and Conſcience*, giving teſtimony, as to the ſtate of our minds, that they are properly affected, or diſpoſed with reſpect to God and man, and our conduct regulated accordingly, in an entire conformity and ſubmiſſion to his will; but, ſo far as, in the preſent ſtate, we are wanting in this conformity, ſo far our happineſs muſt be incompleat, and therefore the completion of it is reſerved for a future period of our exiſtence.

5. From

5. From theſe natural notions of our being and faculties, of the Author of them, and his end in giving them, it follows, that we muſt ſuppoſe every man to be endowed by him *originally* with thoſe powers and capacities that are *ſuited* to his *State*, according to his order and ſphere in nature, however much he may differ from other men, or from ſuperior intelligent beings in the extent of theſe. The powers, by which men are diſtinguiſhed from inferior beings, go under the common name of *Reaſon*; this every man is endowed with, and has a natural impreſſion of its right to direct him, and ſuperiority over his other principles of action; nor can we doubt of its dictates (when fairly and impartially exerciſed) being agreeable to the will of our Creator who imparted it to us. The *other principles* implanted in us are called Senſes, Appetites, Affections, and Paſſions, which have all their uſefulneſs in our preſent frame and ſtate, for diſcerning the qualities of objects, or exciting to action, but ſo as they muſt be kept under the government of reaſon, improved and exalted by religion; that is, by the regard due to God in the whole of our conduct, agreeably to the manifeſtations he has made to us of his nature and will.

6. From our ideas of God's juſtice, and the order of his government, we cannot but conclude ourſelves to be *accountable* to him for the manner

manner in which we uſe thoſe powers and advantages we derive from him, for the ends for which they were given; ſo that he muſt *reward* or *puniſh* us accordingly, which, as he does not in this, he muſt do in a future period of our being.

7. Thus far man has been conſidered as to his MIND or SOUL only, and its powers; from a view of which, and their operations, we muſt conclude, that the intelligent principle they belong to, muſt be of a different ſubſtance from thoſe material beings we ſee around us, and in its nature permanent and immortal; but we find it intimately connected with, and as it were, infuſed into a material compoſition, of a changeable, periſhing, and corruptible nature, which we call a *Body*; by whoſe organs and members, it perceives and operates upon *outward* material objects, and, from the uſe of them, can derive *inward* moral improvement, but which is, of itſelf alone, incapable of thoſe moral habits that conſtitute true happineſs; adventitious, as it were, to us, and not what we properly call *ourſelves*; nor can we, for one moment, be ſecure againſt its change or diſſolution.

8. Tho' we cannot pretend to aſſign all the *reaſons*, for which our Creator thus united rational and immortal ſouls, to groſs material and corruptible bodies, for a certain time; one

one of them, that concerns us moſt, is obvious, *namely*, that having, by this *union*, ſenſes for diſcerning, with appetites and propenſities for purſuing things external, all tending (if not properly regulated) to lead us off from our ſupreme and ultimate good; our reaſon, or ſuperior mental powers, might be put to the *trial* and exerciſed, in governing aright theſe inferior principles, and turning our attention to thoſe moral habits and exerciſes, in which true happineſs lies; in diſengaging us from external ſenſible things, with which we are connected only by our *Bodies*, and directing us how to value and purſue them, in ſubſerviency to the happineſs and perfection of our *Souls*.

9. Whatever the condition of human nature was, when firſt formed by its Creator, in reſpect of the rectitude of all its powers and principles, and their proper ſubordination one to another; it is plain that now the authority of the governing faculty *Reaſon*, for the direction of our conduct, is ſo much impaired, that compleat happineſs, in the preſent ſtate, is unattainable; nor can we, without a ſupernatural interpoſition of the DEITY himſelf, for the renovation of our minds, and expiation of our offences, expect to arrive at it in a future ſtate; from which, therefore, appears the neceſſity

ceſſity of the *Goſpel Revelation*, and compliance with the terms of it, as formerly ſet forth.

III. Thus far we have been only endeavouring to inveſtigate the nature of true happineſs, and to clear the way to it, by conſidering what ideas or conceptions we are, by Reaſon and Revelation, taught to have both of God and of *ourſelves*, and the conſequent *relation* in which we ſtand to the *Deity*: But we muſt now come ſomewhat cloſer to the point, and conſider what duties and diſpoſitions, with reſpect to him, reſult from this relation, as are neceſſary to be attended to and cultivated by us, if we would be approved of by him or obtain that ſenſe of his favour*, in which true happineſs conſiſts.

The duties which have reſpect to our fellow creatures, ſhall alſo be conſidered, as having the divine ſanction to eſtabliſh them, and the diſcharge of them never better ſecured and encouraged, than when a regard to the divine will influences to them.

1. Then, what deſerves to be recommended here, as a proper preparative for every duty that has reſpect to God, is, our maintai-

* Not as meritorius of his favour, or giving any title to it, but as conditions or qualifications neceſſary for enjoying it.

raining an habitual VENERATION, Reverence, and Regard for him, and every thing that concerns his worſhip and ſervice, giving him that eſteem and adoration, due to the ſupreme Lord and Sovereign of the Univerſe, ſupreme (as we ſaw) in perfection, as well as in authority, and laying inſtantly aſide all ſuch regard to any of his creatures, as interferes with what is due to him.

2. HUMILITY is neceſſary, or a juſt ſenſe of our own meanneſs, weakneſs, and utter inſufficiency for what reſpects either our own being, ſupport or happineſs, without the aſſiſtance and influence of the Deity, on whom we depend for all we have and hope for: Such a ſenſe of this as, tho' it does not lead to any thing mean and debaſing of our nature, yet hinders the overvaluing, or thinking highly of ourſelves, for any advantages we may be thought to enjoy above others of our fellow-creatures, in reſpect of natural endowments of mind or body, birth, fortune, honour, and the like; as conſidering, that we owe none of them to ourſelves, but to the unmerited goodneſs of our Creator; and that, whatever ſhare of theſe we have received from him, there are others to whom he has given more, and yet we do not think they have any merit by this, but rather the more to ac-

count for, in reſpect of its application to the great end of their being.

This *Humility* becomes man in his moſt perfect ſtate, and ſo differs from that kind of Humility formerly deſcribed, which becomes us as *Sinners*, in conſequence of our offending God, is previous to repentance, and attended with ſhame and ſorrow, not here implied. The Humility here deſcribed, is one of the moſt natural and becoming diſpoſitions any limited being can be poſſeſſed of, and moſt neceſſary to his happineſs, as being an excellent foundation for every devout diſpoſition and duty, particularly theſe we are next to mention, as

3. CONTENTMENT, or an intire complacency and ſatisfaction with that rank or ſphere of exiſtence which God has thought fit to aſſign us in his boundleſs creation, the natural powers and capacities he has given each of us for acting in it, and all theſe outward circumſtances of life, pleaſant or painful, which he ſees fit to allot us, being convinced that he orders every thing for the beſt, in reſpect of the whole, and in reſpect likewiſe of ourſelves in particular, if we endeavour to uſe aright the powers and advantages we have, which, however ſmall they may ſeem, are intirely unmerited, and might, we muſt own, have been ſmaller.

This

This *Contentment* lies chiefly in the reſtraint of our *deſires* after every kind of outward good, and the difficulty of practiſing it ariſes either, on the one hand, from the want of that humility formerly mentioned; or, on the other, from the difficulty of moderating ſuch deſires, without abating the diligence neceſſary in the way of duty; but this will be ſufficiently ſecured, if the happineſs formerly deſcribed, becomes the chief object of deſire, and conſequently a regard to God, and deſire of pleaſing him, the chief motive to action.

As contentment has its foundation in humility, it leads to

4. TRUST in GOD: His preſence, his providence, his perfections, (as formerly repreſented) all concur to make him the proper object of our higheſt truſt, without that danger of diſappointment which we often meet with from weak, changeable, and limited beings like ourſelves; from theſe, therefore, it muſt be withdrawn, if we would place it aright upon God, and look, in every thing, to his over-ruling hand and inviſible influence, repoſing ourſelves (as it were) intirely on him, and reſting ſatisfied, not in clear caſes only, (for here it is an eaſy matter) but alſo in ſuch as are dark and intricate, of his attention to our intereſts, by ordering every thing that

reſpects us for the beſt, in the way formerly mentioned.

This truſt in God will lead us to baniſh all unneceſſary cares, and moderate theſe that are neceſſary, to fix our attention on the great end of our being, and lay aſide anxiety about inferior and temporary intereſts, as what will moſt certainly be provided for, ſo far as is conſiſtent with this end; ſo that, even when duty calls us to the uſe of means for our own relief or ſupply, we ſhould truſt in providence for the event, and be prepared for, and reconciled to it, whether ſeemingly favourable or not, as in all temporal purſuits we are uncertain which of the two may, in the event or iſſue, be beſt for us, *ſucceſs* or *diſappointment*; but an entire reliance on God for this, and firm perſuaſion of his knowing and appointing always, what will, in the iſſue, be beſt for us, leads us to

5. RESIGNATION, or *Submiſſion* to his will, in all the appointments of his providence with reſpect to us, acquieſcing in them as always wiſeſt and beſt, and exerciſing *Patience* and *pious Fortitude*, under all the ſeeming evils, diſadvantages, and diſtreſſes we ſuffer, or are liable to; as being perſuaded, that the all-wiſe and merciful Ruler of the world, knows beſt, and purſues moſt ſteadily what is for the general good, and for the intereſt of each individual;

vidual; that the happineſs of a good man, will be ſecured in all events, and theſe incidental evils compenſated, and made means of promoting it; chearful *Reſignation* to them is, therefore, both our intereſt and duty; as, on the other hand, the conſideration of our deliverance from them, and of all the comforts we derive from God, ſhould engage us to

6. GRATITUDE, or a ſenſe of the divine goodneſs, manifeſted in *giving* us the being and faculties we have, alſo, in *preſerving* and ſupporting them, and ſtill more in adminiſtring what is neceſſary for our happineſs and perfection, without any merit that can be pleaded on our part for engaging to it.

Such are the diſtreſſes, which many labour under in this life, and which all are liable to, that our grounds of gratitude to God muſt be extended beyond the mutable objects of the preſent life, and muſt have reſpect to mental or ſpiritual enjoyments, preſent and future, before this gratitude can be ſteady, uninterrupted, and well founded; but when it is thus founded, and affectionately exerciſed, it is a motive to obedience, moſt amiable in the ſight of God, and moſt delightful to ourſelves, for it leads to, and is inſeparable from that principle, habit, or diſpoſition, which is, of all, the moſt conducive to our reſemblance and

enjoyment of God, and union with him, and that is,

7. LOVE to GOD, operating in the way of deſire, delight, complacency, and acquieſcence in him as our ſupreme good and portion, and ariſing from the conſideration of his unbounded and unmerited goodneſs, which is ſo diffuſive in its influence, and communicative of happineſs and perfection to all intelligent beings; ariſing alſo from the devout conſideration of his other amiable moral perfections formerly mentioned, and the expreſſions or manifeſtations of them in his works, as diſtinguiſhed into thoſe of *Nature*, of *Providence*, and of *Grace*; the laſt of which, having reſpect to our ſouls, and the recovery of their happineſs and perfection, through the mediation of the SON of GOD, and influence of his SPIRIT, it muſt, of all, be the moſt worthy of our attention, and the importance of all the reſt to us muſt depend upon their ſubſerviency to this.

From the due contemplation therefore, of all theſe, and their effects, as extending to each of us in particular, that *love* to God ariſes, which engages, unites, and aſſimilates the ſoul to him, diſpoſes for obeying, and qualifies for enjoying him; that is, for enjoying that happineſs, which ariſes from a ſenſe of his favour, or reciprocal evidences of his love,

love, impreſſed upon and manifeſted to the ſoul: But in order to its being thus engaged and devoted to God, and an aſcendency given to his love, there muſt be

8. A devout *diſengagement* * from the *world*, that is, from all theſe outward ſenſible and tranſient enjoyments, whoſe influence extends not to our future happineſs or miſery, and which, even at preſent, are not ſatisfying to the ſoul, nor perfective of it; yea and alſo a diſengagement from, and ſuperiority over, all thoſe pains and calamities, which are of an outward nature, have reſpect only to this life, and can neither hurt nor pollute our ſouls. It is not by ſtarts, nor from ſome particular objects, (which perhaps lie not much in our way) that this diſengagement is to be practiſed, but it muſt be rational, habitual, and unreſerved, not ſo as to forbid any attention to the neceſſary offices, or even innocent amuſements of this life, but to raiſe our minds above it, to make us look down, with a kind of indifference, on every thing external to the mind, with which we are connected only by its union with the body, and the paſſions and appetites that have reſpect to it; and from which conſequently we muſt be ſeparated by our

* The nature of this religious diſengagement from the world, is treated of more particularly in the ſixth Diſſertation.

our diſunion from the body, ſo that all thoſe pleaſures and pains which extend no farther, ſcarcely deſerve any regard, while our ſupreme happineſs in the favour and enjoyment of God, is not affected by them.

In this habitual *diſengagement* from external things, as ſenſual pleaſure, wealth, power, fame, and every falſe ſpecies of happineſs formerly mentioned, ſo as not to indulge the deſires after them, nor be elevated by the acquiſition, or diſquieted by the loſs of them. In being thus, as it were, ſuperior to all outward pleaſures and pains, conſiſts the two cardinal virtues of Temperance and Fortitude, or the juſt government of thoſe appetites and paſſions, pleaſant or painful, here given us for exciting to action; but which are ſafe and uſeful only ſo far as they are thus governed by reaſon and conſcience. Hence then we come to mention another duty, which is of particular conſequence to happineſs, and on which all the reſt depend, *viz.*

9. The right uſe of our ſuperior powers or REASON, in regulating all our actions, and affections, or motives to action. This is the voice of God within us, and obedience to it is obedience to him who gave us it, and who will require no more of us than it requires and diſcovers (either by itſelf, or through the light of revelation) to be agreeable to his will.

will. The proper exerciſe of it lies in inquiring into, and being well acquainted with our own *nature**, and the Author, and end of our being, (as above traced) examining fairly the nature of every object of purſuit, and its tendency to this end, ſo as to purſue or reject it accordingly. Thus, for inſtance, we ſhall find, upon ſuch a rational examination or inſpection, that external good and evil have no intrinſic value, and deſerve no regard, further than as the improvement and true happineſs of the mind is affected by them.

How reaſon is to be exerciſed, in all the particular occurrences of life, needs not, nor can it be ſpecified, but its dictates will always be obvious, if attended to, even with that deliberation which is conſiſtent with action; and when it is exerciſed with reſpect to the morality of our own actions, it takes the name

* This implies knowing the end of our creation, and, not only the nature and powers we have in order to this, in *common* with others, but likewiſe that *particular* character, conſtitution, and temper of mind in which we differ from them; it being, perhaps, as rare to find two perſons agreeing in this, as two plants or trees, or any two natural bodies of the ſame form and magnitude. Our infinitely wiſe Creator has given every one of us his peculiar talents and capacities in life; theſe we have reaſon given us to find out, occupy, and be ſatisfied with, and though they ſhould ſeem to be inferior to thoſe of others, yet, when properly applied, they may lead equally to that happineſs, which conſiſts in the *favour* of God who gave us them, and who never will call any man to account for a talent that was not given him.

name of *Conſcience*, without the approbation of which there can be no happineſs.

Notwithſtanding, however, theſe *occaſional* dictates of reaſon and conſcience, it would be of no ſmall uſe for the rational and conſiſtent conduct of life, to lay down ſome fixed principles of conduct for yourſelf; either more general, running through the whole of life, or particular, reſpecting particular parts of it, eaſily deducible from the former, and adapted to particular circumſtances and conditions in which you may be placed. He that does not thus act from fixed principles of reaſon, or according to its uniform, and even occaſional dictates, but is determined by variable motives of humour, fancy, paſſion, or caprice, can never depend upon himſelf, nor be depended on by others; being, as it were, the ſport of every temptation. But the acting thus habitually, ſteadily, and uniformly, from a regard to reaſon and conſcience, requires,

10. Reſolution and ſteadineſs, for adhering firmly to their dictates, in every action and circumſtance of life: Without ſuch reſolution and ſteadineſs, neither the beſt laid ſchemes, nor the beſt natural diſpoſitions will be of uſe to us; and a man may make himſelf very unhappy, even in this life, from an immoderate deſire or averſion to things, which reaſon

reaſon would teach him to deſpiſe. The beſt way of acquiring ſuch reſolution for acting rationally, conſcientiouſly, and conſiſtently, is by frequent reflection on the ſuperiority of reaſon to every other principle of action. *Faith*, indeed, riſes higher, but muſt be founded on it. We may alſo reflect on the ſuperiority ofthat happineſs, which ariſes from the approbation of reaſon, to that which ariſes from the gratification of paſſion, fancy or appetite, when leading off from it, or even to that which ariſes from the approbation of the world; for it ſpeaks the teſtimony of GOD himſelf in our favour, and is a kind of participation or reſemblance of his own happineſs, which conſiſts (as was formerly deſcribed) in the contemplation of his own perfections and operations, regulated and approved of by the reaſon of his own all-perfect and eternal mind.

In theſe two, *reaſon* and *reſolution*, accompanied with a nice and quick diſcernment of the propriety of actions and characters, lies the whole art and conduct of life, and particularly, that *ſelf-command*, which conſiſts in giving reaſon the command of all our thoughts and actions, and which, where the diſcernment or ſagacity above mentioned has reſpect to common life, conſtitutes the cardinal virtue of PRUDENCE.

MOST

MOST of the duties above mentioned have a more immediate reſpect to the DEITY *; but thoſe that reſpect our *fellow-creatures* in ſociety, are equally required by him, and conſequent on the former. They may be all comprehended in the general term of BENEVOLENCE † to all around us, or a conſtant deſire and endeavour to promote their happineſs. If this god-like diſpoſition, this true reſemblance of the divine goodneſs prevails, it will not fail to exert itſelf in the following acts.

1. JUSTICE in giving every one his due, or what he has a right to, and ſhunning every thing that has the leaſt appearance of unfair dealing or injuſtice.

This comprehends *equity*, or doing to others as we think it would be reaſonable they ſhould do to us in like circumſtances, whether law obliges to it or not; alſo *ſincerity*, a virtue that has chiefly reſpect to men, and requires a conformity betwixt our ſentiments and the outward expreſſions of them, ſo far as others have a right to their being communicated, without deſiring to impoſe upon others, in reſpect of our own character and conduct, even where faulty or blameable. The practice of this ſincerity is alſo recommended with reſpect

* See more of all theſe Duties in the firſt Diſſertation.

† Loving our neighbours as ourſelves, as our Saviour expreſſes it.

ſpect to God, becauſe that, though it is evident to all that nothing can be diſguiſed or concealed from him, yet when inſincerity grows into a habit, it will inſinuate itſelf even into our conduct towards God. Under the head of juſtice we might further mention *veracity*, or a regard to truth, *i. e.* to what we believe to be truth; alſo *Integrity* and *Honeſty*, which have reſpect to rectitude of intention in general. As for what is commonly called *Honour* *, it ſeems to conſiſt in a regard to Character, rather than Conſcience, Law or Intereſt, and is a virtue only ſo far as it falls in with our ideas of juſtice in any of the other forms mentioned. Next to juſtice we may mention,

2. CHARITY, as implying not only a diſpoſition to relieve the indigent and diſtreſſed, but likewiſe the being kindly affected and diſpoſed with reſpect to all men in general, rather favourable than harſh in judging of them, and ready to communicate to them according to our ability and their neceſſity. Thus under the head of charity, we may comprehend

* The dictates of *conſcience* (when rightly informed) are fixed and immutable, the laws of honour fluctuating and variable. Baron de Monteſquieu's idea of theſe laws, and of the importance of this principle in monarchical forms of government, deſerves attention and further examination; it does not however fall much under our preſent notice, but the nature and office of *conſcience* is of ſuch importance, that we have made it the ſubject of our firſt Diſſertation.

ſympathy with the afflicted, *compaſſion* to the miſerable, *meekneſs* and *forbearance* towards the injurious, *good-will* and *humanity* to all without exception. Theſe have all reſpect to ſuch duties, as, though not ſtrictly binding on us, yet are natural, becoming, and neceſſary to make human life comfortable. Of the ſame nature, though in a leſs degree of obligation, is *generoſity*, when we go further than even juſtice or charity requires in communicating; or, in diſpenſing ſometimes even with our own rights in favour of others; in which may be comprehended *liberality* and *bounty*, and to which may be added that diſpoſition to pay others all the reſpect due to them according to their diſtinctions of rank or merit, and their relations to us, which ſome expreſs by the name of *courteſy*, and which, in this view, may be conſidered among the offices of juſtice due to others, though the right to it is not ſo perfect as to amount to a moral obligation.

When mention is made of *communicating* to others, as a part of the offices either of juſtice or charity, we muſt always conſider it as comprehending whatever has reſpect to the *improvement* of the mind, as well as to the outward accommodation of life, it being no leſs acceptable to God, and conducive to the real intereſt and happineſs of men.

The

The duties which reſult from the various relations natural or incidental, in which we ſtand to others, are evidently comprehended under ſome of the heads or branches already mentioned, and their obligation plainly founded in the will of God, who placed us in theſe relations, and has therefore made a regard to them neceſſary, in order to our having that enjoyment of him, or ſenſe of his favour, in which true happineſs conſiſts.

After thus enumerating the duties and diſpoſitions, which do moſt naturally reſult from thoſe notions of God and of ourſelves formerly laid down, and a regard to which is neceſſary to our being happy in his favour; the following *conſiderations* will be found of no ſmall importance, in order to our obtaining the happineſs mentioned in conſequence of them.

1. In order to the uniform diſcharge of our duty or regulation of our conduct, it is neceſſary for us to have ſome *one rule* or *principle* always preſent with us, for directing and exciting to action, in ſuch a way as appears moſt conducive to our attaining that ſenſe of God's favour, in which we ſaw that the true happineſs of all his intelligent creatures conſiſts; and that principle, which of all, ſeems moſt effectual and conducive to this, and which we may always, upon the ſmalleſt reflection, call to our aid, and have preſent with us, is an

uniform deſire of *pleaſing* GOD, or a regard to his will, as always intimated to us, by the reaſon of our own minds, or conſcience, aſſiſted and enlightned by revelation: While we have the teſtimony of this in our favour, it ſhould be our endeavour, to have our happineſs as independent as poſſible on all outward circumſtances, events, or advantages, and particularly on the opinions of men, which, tho' a reſtraint very uſeful to ſociety, where no higher principle takes place, is, by no means, a moral or virtuous tie, or a proper foundation of happineſs.

2. Another conſideration, of the higheſt importance to happineſs, is, that as, after all our endeavours of conforming our hearts and lives to the divine will, by ſuch a regulation of our temper and conduct as has been deſcribed, we muſt all be ſenſible of many ſhortcomings and offences againſt God; there muſt therefore be a humble and inceſſant application to him for *pardon*, in the manner formerly mentioned, as ſet forth to us in the *chriſtian revelation*; and, upon ſuch an application for pardon, and conſequent return to our duty, and reconciliation to God through the merciful offices of our Redeemer, we ſhould beware of queſtioning his favour, and thereby impairing or interrupting that happineſs which ariſes from the ſenſe of it.

3. As

3. As the higheſt perfection of an intelligent being conſiſts in the conformity, chiefly of its moral powers; *i. e.* the will and affections, to the *will* of GOD, the ſenſe of whoſe favour thereupon, conſtitutes its happineſs; it is neceſſary to obſerve, that this conformity has a reſpect, not only to the *doing* but likewiſe to the *ſuffering his will;* for there may be caſes aſſigned, of ſuch depreſſion and diſtreſs, as ſcarcely to leave room or ability, for the exerciſe of any active virtue, with reſpect to others, and yet, we cannot ſuppoſe, that, even in theſe caſes, true happineſs is unattainable; it muſt therefore here ariſe, from that conformity to the divine Will, which may be called *Paſſive; i. e.* in the way of ſuffering or ſubmitting to it, with that patience, reſignation, and dutiful acquieſcence in the Will of GOD, which becomes his reaſonable creatures,—and which, we may be aſſured of his beholding with an eye of favour and regard.

PART III.

Means of forming the Temper *for Happineſs, and avoiding theſe* occaſional Diſquietudes, *by which it is often impaired or interrupted.*

WHAT we have to ſuggeſt on this head, ſhall be in the way of *Directions* drawn from *Experience* and *Obſervation*: for more of which, we beg leave to refer, not only to the *Sacred Writings*, but even to ſome ancient moraliſts, particularly *Epictetus* and *Seneca*, and to what every one may gather from his own experiences in life, if carefully digeſted and reflected on.

As much of our happineſs, or unhappineſs in life, depends upon the *government* of the *Paſſions*; we have, in *another Treatiſe**, of a different form, endeavoured to bring all that is material on this ſubject, into one connected ſcheme or ſyſtem; and have likewiſe ſubjoined a *Diſſertation*† on ſuch of them

* A view of the Human Faculties and Paſſions, entitled, The Heart Diſplayed, &c.

† See the following Diſſertation on Deſire, &c.

them as have moſt connection with the ſubject of this.

In the view in which we conſidered the *ſupreme happineſs* and perfection of Man, as all centering in the DEITY, *i. e.* in reſemblance and obedience to him, and conſequent impreſſions of his favour, it ſeems abundantly evident, that true happineſs is, in this light, more accommodated to men of all circumſtances and capacities, than in any other light in which it can be conſidered; it does not depend upon the number or ſuperiority of our talents, but on the proper exerciſe and improvement of them; it is therefore within every man's reach, it is attainable by all; but, from this we muſt not conclude, that there is no difficulty in the attainment; the more valuable any object is, there is commonly the more difficulty in this; let us ſee therefore by what means this *difficulty* may be ſurmounted, in the purſuit of an object, which is, of all others, the moſt valuable.—The

1. Mean which we ſhall mention, and which is indeed of all the moſt effectual for this purpoſe, is PRAYER, or humble, ſincere, and devout applications for the influence of that merciful BEING, from whom all happineſs and perfection are derived, who is always intimately preſent with us, knows the various avenues to our hearts, can, in an ineffable manner,

ner, diffuſe into them happineſs or miſery, has compaſſion on the weak, takes vengeance on the wicked, offers pardon to the penitent, ſees and encourages every motion in our ſouls towards him, and requires our making ſuch applications to him, but communicates his aid in ſuch a manner, as not to ſuperſede our endeavours by doing violence to our mental faculties. Doubt not therefore the efficacy of *Prayer*, through the mediation of your Redeemer; ſcripture declares, reaſon teſtifies, and experience confirms it.

Not that we can inform God of any thing he knew not before, or move him to act otherwiſe than he has determined, and ſees agreeable to the eternal rules of right and equity, but as it evidences the feelings of our own minds, and tends to eſtabliſh them in a humble and firm dependence on his providence, conformity to his will, and reſemblance of thoſe perfections we adore, ſo far as they are communicable to us.

It is not, therefore, any outward poſture or expreſſion of devotion, however becoming in their own place, or any long ſtretches of ſpiritual contemplation, (which ſome perhaps may be incapable of) much leſs a repetition of certain forms, however elaborate, which we here diſtinguiſh by the name of *Prayer*, but every effort of the ſoul to maintain a *ſpiritual*

ritual intercourſe with its Creator, in the way of humble proſtration before him, adoring his perfections, contemplating his works, acknowledging his mercies, confeſſing and lamenting every act of undutifulneſs to him even in our thoughts, ſtudying an habitual regard and conformity to his will, and imploring his pardon, direction, aſſiſtance, and acceptance, through the mediation of our adorable Redeemer, (in the manner formerly explained) even the eternal Son of God, and Saviour of the world.

It may, however, not be improper to obſerve, that, even with a firm belief of three perſons in the GODHEAD, we ſhould carefully maintain ſuch an idea of *Unity* in the object of our worſhip, as may prevent its being divided, weakened, or corrupted.

Next to that frequent, humble, and habitual intercourſe with God, now ſpoken of, in acts of mental or verbal devotion, by which ſome prelibation (I may ſay) of the joys of Heaven is poured into the ſoul; a

2. Mean of elevating it towards God, and forming it for that happineſs, which ariſes from the ſenſe of his favour, is MEDITATION, not ſuch as requires always retirement from the world and its occupations, (tho' this alſo may ſometimes be neceſſary) but the accuſtoming ourſelves to think rationally, ſeriouſly, and devoutly, on the various objects or events

events that occur to us, particularly ſuch occurrences as reſpect ourſelves, ſo as to draw from them ſome mental improvement, or ſuch habits and impreſſions as may be any way conducive to the due regulation, the comfort, and happineſs of our ſouls.

Let reaſon be never ſo much convinced of the importance of any object, yet till it is often viewed or dwelt upon, ſo as to make an impreſſion on the mind, it will never have any practical influence, in the way of forming the heart, or regulating the life. That theſe truths, therefore, which we all acknowledge, may make ſuch an impreſſion, and have ſuch influence, every reflection muſt be indulged that caſts up for this purpoſe, either from your preſent courſe of thoughts, or the objects you happen to be converſant with.

Thus, there is ſeldom any thing you can be employed about, or converſation you can be engaged in, but will afford you an opportunity (if you attend to the light in which right reaſon repreſents them) of reflecting on the ſhortneſs and inconſtancy of all that can be enjoyed or ſuffered in this life, on the blindneſs, folly, and weakneſs of the wiſeſt men, and their need of a firm and habitual dependence upon God, on the corrupt ſtate of mankind in general, and their partial, imperfect, and often unjuſt views of things, ariſing

ſing from the prevalency of ungoverned paſſions, wrong habits, and corrupt inclinations, and their attending to the light in which theſe repreſent objects, rather than to the dictates of right reaſon and revelation, with reſpect to them.

Take all occaſions of reflecting on what is the real ſtate of your own mind, and eſtabliſhing it in a right temper, avoiding what may unſettle it, and taking care that ſelf-partiality or paſſion, prevent not your having a juſt view of yourſelf, of what needs to be corrected, and what to be confirmed, and bringing your temper, affections, principles, and motives of action, to the teſt of reaſon and religion; conſider how your time and thoughts are generally employed, in what light your preſent employments and purſuits will appear to yourſelf at any future period? how they would now appear to others whom you eſteem, and, above all, whether they are pleaſing or diſpleaſing to God? For on this depends your happineſs; and what avails even the ſucceſs of your purſuits, if it does not increaſe your happineſs here or hereafter: Or what think you, are the purſuits and attainments that do now moſt avail thoſe who were once your fellow ſojourners in life, and are now removed before you?

However

However enthuſiaſtick it may appear to thoſe who are much immerſed in ſenſe, yet it is certain that reaſon itſelf, and much more revelation, will juſtify your looking to the divine interpoſition in all that concerns you, paſt, preſent, and future; that is, your looking above all ſecond cauſes or inſtruments, to that ſupreme, intelligent over-ruling cauſe, by whom they are all regulated and influenced, (in an intire conſiſtence with the laws he has eſtabliſhed, and the powers he has given his creatures) maintaining an habitual ſenſe of his preſence and providence; *feeling*, as it were, his *Divinity*; taking, aſking, and hoping every thing from him, aiming at nothing ſo much as a conformity to his will, and conſequent ſenſe of his favour, and making no account of any other object of Love, of Truſt, of Hope, or Fear, in compariſon of him.

Improve every opportunity of impreſſing your mind with juſt notions or apprehenſions of God, and your relation to him, with the duties flowing from theſe, (as formerly ſet forth) think often on the nature and condition of your life here, its end, value, and importance with reſpect to a future and eternal ſtate, for which you are deſigned; on the powers, capacities, and circumſtances God has ſeen fit to allot you, for acting your part in this life; how much it is your duty and intereſt

to

to be contented with them, and make the beſt uſe of them, which is all that falls to your ſhare, God having ordered the reſt as he ſaw for the general good.

For eſtabliſhing your mind in a right habit, it may be of uſe even to extend your reflections to the inviſible world, the certainty of your removal to it, and the different conditions of men there. Reflect on the ſcripture repreſentations of all theſe, as being not only agreeable to reaſon, but likewiſe the language, as it were, of God himſelf to us, explaining what reaſon was at a loſs for, *viz.* the nature of his kingdom, government, laws preſent and future, dealings with mankind, and the manner of being reconciled to him, through the mediation of his Son.

Much might be ſaid on each of theſe particulars, but it is not our preſent deſign to enlarge on them, but to ſuggeſt them as inſtances of what ſubjects it may be proper for the mind often to reflect on, till they make a due impreſſion upon it, give you right apprehenſions of things, and raiſe affections ſuitable to theſe; and if once the proper affections prevail habitually in your mind, you need not fear their influencing practice, and you will have that reflex enjoyment of them which ariſes from a conſciouſneſs of right affections,

and conſequent approbation of God and your own mind.

We may further obſerve, as to theſe, and the like ſubjects of reflection, which are moſt improving to the mind, and form its temper for true happineſs, that no refined ſpeculations, no bright efforts of genius, much leſs any outward diſtinctions or advantages are neceſſary to our having the proper apprehenſion and impreſſion of them; they are rather the ſubjects of ſentiment than ſpeculation, and are level to all conditions and capacities.

Nor will the indulging ſuch reflections encroach ſo much on your time and neceſſary engagements in life, as may at firſt be imagined, if you only keep your mind ever open for entertaining them. Attend to whatever may ſuggeſt them, and dwell on them, when any way ſuggeſted, till they become more familiar to the mind, make ſome impreſſion on it, and have more eaſy acceſs to it afterwards. For this purpoſe, you may at leaſt allow them the ſeveral intervals of time, in which you will be ſenſible that the common concerns of life do not require your immediate attention, or give much employment to your thoughts, (which you will always eaſily judge of) and if, to make way for them, and allow them proper time, place, and influence, you endeavour to baniſh all the trifling, vain, uſe-

leſs

leſs thoughts and reflections, that offer to intrude themſelves, and to ſuppreſs immediately ſuch as your own mind condemns as diſpleaſing to God. How theſe are ſuggeſted it is not our preſent buſineſs to enquire; but experience ſufficiently teſtifies how liable the unwatchful mind is to them, and how much time and thought are thus thrown away to its ruin, which, if rightly beſtowed, might make us wiſe, virtuous, and happy.

After all that has been ſaid upon the ſubject of Happineſs, and our endeavour to bring it, as much as poſſible, into one point of view, clear and comprehenſible to all, founded in reaſon, and eſtabliſhed by ſcripture and experience; yet, as there may be ſome, to whom our method of proceeding hitherto may appear too formal and ſyſtematick for a ſubject of this kind; and who, having no doubt of the truth of all that has been ſaid on it, want, not ſo much to have their reaſon further ſatisfied, as to have ſomething ſuggeſted in the way of advice or direction, and ſuited to allay, tho' not every diſquietude and diſorder in life, yet at leaſt ſome of them to which they are more habitually liable, or which may ſtand more particularly in the way of their improvement and happineſs;

For the ſatisfaction of this claſs, therefore, we ſhall now depart a little from the methodical way of proceeding, and, what may be further offered, ſhall be in the way of

MISCELLANEOUS *Obſervations and Directions, reſpecting the comfortable and conſiſtent Conduct of Life, with practical Concluſions and Reſolutions in relation to it.*

IN this way of proceeding no further connection is neceſſary, than that whatever is ſuggeſted have ſome relation to the principal ſubject in our view, to *Happineſs*, as our ultimate end; and that it be juſtified by experience, without having recourſe to any nice deductions of reaſon with reſpect to it; what has been advanced in the firſt and ſecond parts of this Diſſertation, being ſufficient in the argumentative way.

Here we may add further, that, as much of our comfort or diſquietude in life ariſes from our intercourſe, in the way of converſation and ſociety, with one another, it may be expected, that a good many of the following obſervations ſhall have particular reſpect to this. But we ſhall offer any thing that occurs in

in the way of advice or direction promiſcuouſly, tho' thereby the ſame ſubject may ſometimes ſeem to be repeated, or repreſented in different points of view, according as in one or other of theſe, it may ſeem moſt likely to ſtrike or impreſs the mind.

1. LEARN never to conſider any thing that has reſpect to *this life alone*, as *eſſential* to your happineſs, not even *life itſelf*, if a higher end requires your reſigning it, and ſo you will never be uneaſy in the want, or tranſported with the poſſeſſion of any thing in it. But

2. When, after all, any thing in this life is like to diſturb, delude, or enſnare you; reflect on the ſhortneſs and uncertainty of its continuance, and the infinitely ſmall proportion it bears to the whole of your duration.

3. Allow nothing to diſturb your quiet, while your own *Conſcience** approves you, for this is God's teſtimony in your favour, and it is he only who can make you happy.

4. When you enjoy moſt of outward *Proſperity*, you are in moſt danger of miſplacing your happineſs; but, if even then you give

* ——— ——— Hic murus ahæneus eſto,
Nil conſcire ſibi, nulla palleſcere culpa.
HOR.

Be this thy brazen bulwark of defence,
Still to preſerve thy conſcious innocence,
Nor e'er turn pale with guilt.
FRANCIS.

GOD the preference, you will have the more eaſy acceſs to him, and confidence of his favour in your diſtreſs.

5. It is of unſpeakable conſequence to your happineſs, improvement, and the proper regulation of your conduct, to form juſt ideas of the SUPREME BEING: Some think their natural notions of him are ſo refined and exalted, as to have no need of any aſſiſtance from Revelation; but it is remarkable, that, whatever ideas might have been attained of his other perfections by the light of nature, it never led, even the wiſeſt philoſophers, to form juſt notions of his *purity* and *holineſs*. Infidels may now refine as they pleaſe, and inveigh againſt any thing that looks like a limitation of the divine mercy, nor indeed ought we to limit what the moſt innocent and perfect of mankind have ſo much dependence on; but it is certain, that whoever believes that the eternal SON of GOD underwent the moſt grievous ſufferings, for which no ſufficient reaſon can be aſſigned but that it was to expiate the ſins of mankind, muſt be convinced, that there is in *Sin*, or *moral evil*, ſomething of *malignity* and contrariety to the divine nature, will, and government, beyond what the refined moraliſts we mentioned, are at preſent willing to admit, and which behoved to be removed, before way could be made

for

for the exerciſe of mercy to the tranſgreſſors of God's law.

6. As we cannot account for what we feel in ourſelves, or, the exiſtence of what we ſee around us, without ſuppoſing the exiſtence of GOD as the cauſe or author of all, no more can we account for the exiſtence of the *Chriſtian revelation* and its effects, without ſuppoſing that the author of it exiſted, and did many extraordinary things for eſtabliſhing it; if this therefore be a fact paſt diſpute, and, if any one of theſe things, much more if the whole of them be admitted, How can his teſtimony be rejected, or what need we go about to argue, whether ſuch a revelation be neceſſary and fit to be ſubmitted to? unleſs we ſuppoſe that God did what was unneceſſary, and what deſerved no regard or ſubmiſſion to it.

7. True religion does not conſiſt ſo much in abſtract reaſoning, as in ſentiment and feeling, not in ſpeculation, but in affection, in the impreſſions and emotions of the heart. The leaſt grain weight of *improvement* as to the *heart*, is of more value and conſequence to happineſs, than the higheſt attainments in ſcience, honour, reputation, or any worldly acquiſitions.

8. The beſt ſupport under the ſeeming evils or afflictions of life, is to conſider that they are

are from God, and moſt certainly deſigned by him for wiſe and good ends.

9. If you would have your eaſe and happineſs in this life durable and ſteady, you muſt build it upon a durable and ſteady foundation, ſuch as you are ſure God has put always in your own power, and enabled you to ſecure. It cannot therefore be any outward attainments, ſuch as power, wealth, and human applauſe, nor even any perſonal advantages of health, ſtrength, wit, beauty, and the like; for theſe are all precarious, and may fail you, after you have done your utmoſt to ſecure them; but the only ſure foundation of happineſs and joy, is to have God approving you, through your own conſcience, or the reaſon of your own mind, calmly and impartially reviewing itſelf, and teſtifying that you are rightly affected or diſpoſed with reſpect to God and man, and have endeavoured to regulate your life accordingly, in the uſe of theſe advantages, abilities, and opportunities, which God has given you, or ſeriouſly repented and implored his pardon through Chriſt, where you came ſhort.

10. The reſolution, therefore, which you ſhould lay down to yourſelf, for the direction of your conduct in life, is to have always a ſteady attention to the *great end* of your life, that end for which your Creator gave you the being

being, faculties, and advantages you have, and which you muſt be carrying on through infinite ages; of this you may now poſſibly have but a very imperfect conception, but you have all that is neceſſary in your preſent ſtate; you know that it requires your loving, honouring, and ſerving God, conforming in every thing to his will, and ſtudying to promote his wiſe and merciful deſigns among men, to *do* them all the *good* you can according to your abilities and opportunities; in a word, to endeavour the making yourſelf and all around you happy in the juſteſt ſenſe; and, for this purpoſe, conſulting and ſtrictly obeying reaſon and conſcience, as the informer of what is good on all occaſions or emergencies, and what not; and, in fine, truſting in God's pardoning mercy through Chriſt amidſt your many deficiencies and offences.

Some of the following reflections are founded on this; for,

II. If *doing and being good* be the end of your life, and you do your beſt in purſuit of it; Why ſhould any diſappointments, as to other things, that have no connection with this, (ſuch as power, fame, health, riches, honours, and the like) give you uneaſineſs? God knows beſt in what ſtation and circumſtances you can *get moſt good* done to yourſelf and others, and will infallibly place you in them, and diſtinguiſh

guiſh you finally, not according to your preſent circumſtances, but your behaviour in them; nor according to your preſent talents, but your improvement of them. For the ſame reaſon,

12. You need give yourſelf no uneaſineſs on account of any defects or diſadvantages that are conſiſtent with innocence, and which you cannot remove. Every one has the ſame in ſome ſhape or other; perhaps they are neceſſary to your higher improvement or accompliſhment, and that God gave them for that end.

13. *If doing and becoming good* be the great end of your life, and you want to have your attention ſteadily fixed on it, learn to keep your mind diſengaged from every thing that either draws off from this, or has no relation to it, and let tranſient incidental events and purſuits have only a tranſient attention given to them.

14. You may depend upon it, that no criminal pleaſure will ever balance the pain, even of remorſe that ſucceeds it, eſpecially in times of future diſtreſs and affliction, when the dark ſide of every thing caſts up.

15. If you be ſenſible of your improving in the habits of virtue and goodneſs, formerly mentioned, let not the want of inferior attainments

tainments (for which perhaps you are not naturally fitted) give you any pain.

16. If you be ſenſible a thing is right, and that you can and ought to do it, what a ſhame and weakneſs is it to let any paſſion, indolence or want of reſolution hinder you from doing it? But,

17. When you have *done your beſt* in this or any other way, never be uneaſy that you could *not do more*.

18. No man can help his natural diſadvantages, but he may make the beſt of them, and for encouraging to this, it may be warrantably aſſerted that,

19. Inſtruction, induſtry, and good management have (by the divine bleſſing) oft-times been more ſucceſsful than great natural abilities and advantages, both in what reſpects the improvement of the mind, and the accommodation of life.

20. Truſt in God, and fear nothing but ſin.

21. Follow reaſon, if you would be thought a rational being.

22. *Lay your account* with many diſappointments and inconveniencies, eſpecially in what depends on the humours of others, and they will the leſs diſcompoſe you.

23. It is a miſerable thing to have your eaſe and happineſs in the power of others.

24. Trivial

24. Trivial events are often readier to diſcompoſe the mind, than thoſe of greater importance, becauſe it is generally at leſs pains to prevent or avoid diſcompoſure from them; but,

25. The mind is always in danger when unſettled, hurried, or diſcompoſed, and it is much eaſier to prevent this than to remedy it, eaſier to keep the heart in a right frame, than to recover it when loſt.

26. The *love of* GOD, and regard to his will, are the beſt and ſteadieſt foundations for all the ſocial and amiable affections towards men; for, even in doing good to others, an apprehenſion of merit or returns of ſervice, gratitude, and approbation on their part (which are all uncertain) will never be a conſtant and invariable motive of action, unleſs there be a *regard* to GOD, and our common relation to him.

27. Cultivate an entire inſenſibility or indifference to the praiſe or diſpraiſe of any but God and your own mind.

28. If ever you would pleaſe God, or have acceſs to him, baniſh theſe three, pride, inſincerity and impurity.

29. *Humility* is one of the moſt neceſſary qualifications for true happineſs, and for every kind of improvement: We are not however to underſtand by it, any thing mean or abject,

abject, but ſuch a ſenſe of our own weakneſſes and imperfections, as may make us bear with thoſe of others, and view ourſelves in the ſame impartial light that we do them.

30. *Humility* is likewiſe one of the beſt ſupports under afflictions or diſappointments.

31. Cultivate an habitual good-will, complacency, and kind affection to all around you, and, if to this you join humility and diſintereſtedneſs, you'll not probably fail of gaining their affection and regard, as all duties are reciprocal. But,

32. Be noways concerned about the opinions of others, while you are conſcious to yourſelf that you do what appears to you right, or follow reaſon; ſo that, whether they approve of you or not, they *ought* to do it.

33. Let not even your *miſcarriages* diſcourage you from renewing your endeavours after higher improvement and happineſs; a *partial* reformation will rather lay a foundation for more diſquiet, by one paſſion ſucceeding another, and often reviving it, and rendering former reſolutions abortive.

34. Expect not to attain *ſelf-government* without *ſelf-denial*; this is that *moral averſion* or reſtraint of the vicious paſſions, recommended by the antient moraliſts, as neceſſary to clear the foundation for virtuous affections

and diſpoſitions, and that pleaſure which ariſes from their exerciſe.

35. An *equal temper* of mind is neceſſary for leading life quietly, comfortably, and conſiſtently; it lies in having your mind ever ſteady, compoſed, and maſter of itſelf, its thoughts, deſires, paſſions, and purſuits; regulating them all by reaſon.

36. If you can get rid of your paſſion for *praiſe* and diſtinction, you'll get rid of moſt of the uneaſineſſes and diſquietudes of life, without leſſening your ability for acting your part in it, or really leſſening your ſhare of eſteem and affection from others: This paſſion may be allayed, by conſidering how ignorant, inconſiderate, and changeable they often are, whoſe favour and regard is thus courted, and how little even their unmerited neglect deſerves to be minded, if the approbation of God and your own conſcience be ſecured.

37. No deſire is more univerſal than that of *pleaſing others*, and yet too great an anxiety in this way very often counteracts its own purpoſe; for no man ever appeared to advantage, who was over ſollicitous about it. But,

38. The more you ſeem *pleaſed* and happy *yourſelf*, on rational grounds, you are the more likely to *pleaſe others*; but if you are not in good humour with yourſelf, you cannot

not eaſily be ſo with others, nor will they be much gained by any compliances that ſeem forced and unwilling.

39. No man is always in the humour of pleaſing others, or conforming to their humour; but, ſo far as he can do it innocently, he ſhews a ſuperiority over them.

40. The more favourably you are diſpoſed to think and ſpeak of others, it is the more likely that they will do the ſame as to you.

41. Be not too fond of yourſelf, your own poſſeſſions, pretenſions, *&c.* and you'll the more eaſily bring yourſelf to any reaſonable compliance with the humours or intereſts of others.

42. Conſider every paſſion as *unnatural*, which would make your happineſs ariſe from the miſery of others, ſuch as envy, malice, *&c.* which, like unnatural tumours of the body, ought to be extirpated: How much more natural and amiable is it to have the happineſs of others contributing to yours? If thoſe whom you envy or hate have good qualities, they are proper objects of your love; if not, (which is ſeldom the caſe) they are objects of your pity; before you uſe them as you think they deſerve, conſider what would become of yourſelf, if God ſhould deal with you as you deſerve.

43. Be attentive to the *beginnings* of any affection or paſſion: Various affectionate emotions ſeem ſometimes to ariſe ſpontaneouſly, or at leaſt a tendency to them, when their cauſe or occaſion cannot eaſily be traced; care ſhould be taken therefore, to cheriſh the firſt motions of any virtuous affection, and immediately to check the contrary, in whatever way they ariſe, or when there ſeems to be any diſpoſition or tendency towards them, for the work may become much more difficult afterwards.

44. Virtuous principles and affections have this advantage, among many others, over vicious, that a conſciouſneſs of the former (even when diſappointed of their aim or effect) is ſo agreeable as to make them their own reward, and that of the latter makes them their own puniſhment.

45. The fewer paſſions or intereſts you have of your own to gratify, you'll interfere the leſs with thoſe of others, and are the more likely to pleaſe them.

46. Vanity, conceit, and immoderate ſelf-love, are the moſt univerſal paſſions, and yet the moſt condemned by one in another; theſe therefore you muſt neither betray nor entertain, if you would be eaſy in yourſelf, and agreeable to others.

47. It

47. It is dangerous both to yourſelf and others, to endeavour ſtopping the torrent of any paſſion too ſuddenly; even when unreaſonable and extravagant, it is ſafer, and more effectual to juſtify it in ſome meaſure, ſo far as it will, in any light, admit of this, before you poſitively croſs or condemn it; for the extremes of any paſſion are to be raiſed or moderated by degrees.

48. Beware of the returns of any paſſion that has foiled you formerly, but be not diſcouraged from renewing or continuing your efforts againſt it, by its revival, after being ſeemingly maſtered, or by an apprehenſion of your coming far ſhort of the attainments of others in this way; for perfection, in any valuable improvement, is not eaſily or quickly to be attained.

49 Study to know exactly the real temper, character, and views of thoſe you are moſt connected with, as well as your own, their good and bad qualities, perfections, and weakneſſes; what there is in them to imitate or avoid, approve or condemn, and regulate your conduct to them accordingly, making, however, all the favourable allowances poſſible, as you would with them to make for you.

50. Beware of judging raſhly with reſpect to characters, national or perſonal, from ſingle

acts or habits, for there muſt be a ſeries or combination of theſe to conſtitute a character.

51. Beware of *ſelf-deceit*, and *partiality* in judging of your own actions and character, for the judgment is apt to lean to any ſide on which the paſſions are engaged; and they generally are ſo in our own favour: This makes frequent ſelf examination neceſſary, and our conſidering in what light actions will appear to enemies, as well as friends. In order to judge impartially of our own actions, it will alſo be neceſſary, not only to put others ſometimes in our place, and conſider what we would think right for them to do, but likewiſe to put ourſelves in the place of others, and conſider how we would feel or be affected by it.

52. Chearfulneſs, contentment, and benevolence, flowing from a good conſcience in yourſelf, and charitable opinion of the affections and actions of others, will always make you eaſy in yourſelf, and agreeable to others; but

53. Your chearfulneſs will never be well founded unleſs you have a conſciouſneſs of your higheſt intereſt being ſecured, and the divine favour obtained; without ſome reaſonable hope of this all chearfulneſs is fooliſhneſs, and mirth is nothing but madneſs.

54. Generally

54. Generally ſpeaking, young people are moſt diſpoſed to pleaſe others, old people to pleaſe themſelves. Both theſe diſpoſitions (if properly regulated) have their foundation in nature and reaſon: The young have their character, and perhaps their fortune to acquire, and have thereby the more dependence on others, and muſt conform the more to their humour, but it is at an age when their own is more eaſily moulded. The old, on the other hand, are weary of this taſk, and have leſs occaſion for it.

55. The deſire of pleaſing is a very uſeful and amiable principle, when it is properly regulated, but, when not, may be a very corrupt and pernicious one. You may ſacrifice your own humour, and even your intereſt, to others, but beware of ſacrificing to them the intereſts of religion and virtue.

56. Endeavour to be really what you would have others think you to be, and ſenſible of your deficiencies where you come ſhort. Theſe two particulars will recommend you more than the moſt plauſible and artful maſk you can wear.

57. While you court the favour of the fooliſh, the vicious, or corrupt, beware of becoming ſo yourſelf.

58. Moſt men are generally ſeen in ſome diſguiſe; but there are times when they are apt

apt to forget it or lay it aſide, it is then that their real characters are to be diſcerned; and hence ſome adviſe the examining or obſerving them over a glaſs, when there is moſt of unguarded freedom imagined in dependence, and ſecurity from the conſequences of a diſcovery: How to make a proper uſe of ſuch opportunities as theſe, let the men of the world, the men of art and dexterity, determine: I would only obſerve, that there is no way in which ſuch information will beſt be obtained, as may give light into mens real characters, than, after a more numerous company breaks up, by aſſociating yourſelf with one or two of the moſt intelligent and ſagacious among them; reckoning themſelves to be then in a manner alone; after leaving the crowd, they will be apt to diſcloſe their real ſentiments of the actions and characters of thoſe in whoſe company they had been.

59 Laſt night your midnight ſlumbers were diſturbed by the city watchman's* rap at your door, followed by the diſagreeable call of *twelve o'clock in a cold cloudy night;* your blood thrilled at the ſound, and any pleaſure it gave was from the thoughts of your not being expoſed, as he was, to the inclemency of the ſeaſon: What a different ſenſation did you feel,

* This refers to the nightly call of the watchmen in London, and ſome other cities of England.

feel, when, a few hours after, you heard him paſs in the ſame way, and, with a voice ſeemingly enlivened, notify to you the approach of *three o'clock in a ſweet May morning*. If you are not formed for contemplation, you will not think of connecting or moralizing on theſe nocturnal intimations, ſo different from one another; if you are, you will naturally think on their quick ſucceſſion, and conſider them as emblems of the varieties of providence.

60. The ſeeds of *virtue* and *vice* are originally in every mind, and its being determined towards the *former* rather than the *latter*, ſeems to depend upon a vigorous effort of *reaſon*, divinely, as it were, influenced, and puſhing it to the ſummit of virtue; where, the longer it maintains its ground, it ſtands the eaſier and firmer.

61. There ſeems to be, as it were one, and but one, particular point or ſtation, from which our view of human life, through all its windings and viciſſitudes, together with the propriety of conduct ſuited to theſe, appears always uniform and conſiſtent. This may be called the ſtation or ſummit of *truth*, elevated, clear, and ſerene, from which you may, calmly and ſafely, take a proſpect of the wanderings, miſts, and tempeſts, in the vale of *error* below.

62. It

62. It argues a noble mind, to diſdain low artifices in proſecuting your deſigns.

63. The gains of falſehood will never compenſate the meanneſs of ſoul contracted by ſtooping to it; it is like alloy in coin, may make the metal work the better, but embaſeth it.

64. To bear ſudden and unexpected ſhocks, without ſeeming to be ſtartled or diſcompoſed, indicates a ſtayedneſs and firmneſs of mind, fit to be cultivated and admired.

65. Nothing tends more to cramp and corrupt the mind, than the idea of a ſervile dependence on the humours and paſſions of others; where ſuperiority of underſtanding, or real merit appears, ſuch dependence on it, and ſubmiſſion to it, is a great mean of improvement; but an impreſſion of dependence, that has reſpect only to things external, to favour, power, or profit, debaſes the mind into a mean compliance with even the falſe views, and corrupt ſentiments of others, and naturally throws an air of mean ſlavish conſtraint and dependence on the outward behaviour; there is no avoiding all this, if a great value be put upon theſe external acquiſitions or proſpects now mentioned; as no man, however elevated in ſtation, can avoid ſome dependence on others for ſuch objects as theſe; ſo that, the only way to prevent the above

conſequence

conſequence effectually, is to baniſh all ideas of the importance of outward things, unleſs ſo far as the uſe of, or attention to them, contributes to the improvement of the mind, and conforming it to the will of God.

66. The man who flatters himſelf with the hopes of drawing a prize, when there are ten blanks againſt him, has almoſt as much reaſon to expect ſucceſs, as the writer or public ſpeaker, who expects univerſal, or even general applauſe, as the reward of his labours; for, beſides the different views and intereſts that may be againſt him, a few imagined inaccuracies or inelegancies of expreſſion, or even a few inſtances of uncouth pronunciation, will be enough to draw cenſure from many, and take away the merit of all he has done. What then? you will ſay, Should I never attempt to write or ſpeak, with a view to the benefit of others, or my own? Yes, ſure, when duty calls, but ſeek only the approbation of God and your own mind; and if, in a conſiſtence with this, you can have any approbation from the ſober, the virtuous and intelligent, let it not be deſpiſed.

67. To that religion, in the way of which I expect eternal ſalvation, there is not at preſent one objection in my view, to which I have not ſuch an anſwer as it admits of, or at leaſt ſuch as ſatisfies me, after all the enquiry I could

greater probability that you would not? and, if I ſhould not, you may reply, Is a man to curſe his father, becauſe he did not acquire an eſtate for him? No, ſure! in this you are not miſtaken; but, if you ſhould ſquander the eſtate he has left you, in hopes of making up another, if you ſhould deſpiſe and abuſe it, becauſe you came ſo eaſily by it, I would pronounce you a fool. Whatever way, therefore, you have come by the evidences of *Chriſtianity*, in its purity, if you thus deſpiſe and reject it, I pronounce the ſame ſentence on you.

68. One night you ſurveyed the moon, when moving in nocturnal majeſty, you ſaw the heavens beautifully beſpangled, with innumerable ſhining orbs around, to the utmoſt extent of your view, your heart ſeemed to exult at the proſpect, you adored the hand that formed them, and felt ſerenity and peace.

Next morning you ſaw the ſun, riſing as it were from his chambers in the waters, clad in all his radiant glories, and ſhedding his bright enlivening influence on the inferior world; you found yourſelf ſtill more tranſported by this, no thought remained but of happineſs and joy: You know, indeed, that it is, in itſelf, but a lifeleſs maſs; and what you admire and celebrate, is the Almighty

hand that formed it for your uſe, and adorned it in all its gorgeous array.

Another night ſoon ſucceeds, and brings with it a cruel fit of the cholick or aſthma, the day comes on apace, and finds you labouring for life; the moon moved, and the ſun riſes as formerly, but they are no more to you than if they did not exiſt, in reſpect of the tranſports of viewing them What are you to learn from this? many things, particularly three:

1. That true happineſs is within, and the influence of every thing outward various and fluctuating.

2. That God is to be bleſſed for having made us capable of deriving intellectual enjoyment, with innocence, from outward objects; and, ſtill more, when he prevents or removes whatever may mar our reliſh for them.

3. That tho' even the pleaſures of fancy, properly governed, may be innocent and tranſporting, yet there muſt be ſuppoſed a happineſs beyond them, leſs liable to interruption.

69. 'Twixt meanly ſinking into a level with the brutes, by ſubjection to every appetite, and emulating the angels by a ſuperiority over them. 'Twixt taking the ſide of the infernal ſpirits, by yielding to every diabolical paſſion, and cheriſhing the beginnings of heaven

ven in your ſoul; the original difference lies only in this, To which ſide is it your *will* to turn? One vigorous beginning, one act or effort of your *will*, divinely, as it were, influenced, caſts the balance in favour of all that is God-like, virtuous and glorious. There is no doubt but this act of the will muſt be reiterated, and the divine aid implored, till habits of virtue and true goodneſs are formed, yet let one manly effort be thus made to emancipate yourſelf, and every repetition of it will make the work eaſier.

70. Many fall into more blunders and miſtakes in the conduct of their affairs than others, not ſo much for want of foreſight and knowledge, as for want of a quickneſs and firmneſs of reſolution in regulating their conduct according to the foreſight and knowledge they have. I thought ſo, ſay they, from firſt; true! but you acted as if you had no ſuch thought.

71. For pleaſing in converſation ſcarce any general directions will much avail: The doing and ſaying every thing naturally and eaſily, without either affectation, preſumption, or diffidence, never fails of ſucceſs; but for directing to this, your own judgment and diſcretion, or a certain natural taſte of what is decent, becoming, and agreeable, in even the minuteſt circumſtances of your converſation

and behaviour, is the beſt guide you can get, and will direct to what ſuits your own character and humour, and thoſe of others, according to the difference of times and circumſtances; but there muſt be a quickneſs in exerciſing this, and ſteadineſs in conforming to it; for an opportunity loſt cannot be recalled, or an impropriety in conduct eaſily forgot *.

72. *Diffidence* of *yourſelf* may be as hurtful to you, tho' not ſo intolerable, as *Contempt* of *others*. The *former* may be prevented, by thinking on the failings of others, the *latter* by reflecting on your own.

73. The *knowledge* of the *world* conſiſts in a nice diſcernment of different characters, and ſuitable management of them, chiefly in the way of obſerving what it is that you approve or diſapprove in others, and either cultivating or avoiding the ſame yourſelf.

74. When another throws out any reflections againſt you that give you uneaſineſs, conſider fairly, whether they be juſt or not; if they are juſt and well founded, why ſhould you blame the perſon who makes them? Perhaps he exaggerates, or at leaſt your ſelf-partiality may make you think ſo; but ſtill, if

* Nothing is a greater hindrance to our behaving with that eaſe and propriety now mentioned, in all caſes, than a ſervile imitation of others, whoſe manner of ſpeaking or acting may be natural to themſelves, but not to us.

if you have a conſciouſneſs of ſome foundation for them, apply yourſelf firſt to remove this; or, if it is rather your misfortune than fault, and what you cannot remedy, learn to bear it with patience and equanimity, drawing from it all the moral improvement poſſible to compenſate it; and, if it is an error in conduct, reſolve to retrieve, rectify, or repair it, when future opportunities offer: But, if you are conſcious of no juſt foundation for the reflections thrown out againſt you, the approbation of your own conſcience ſhould prevent their giving you any pain; and if it prevents this, your enemy will be diſappointed, and your ſuperiority over him teſtified by forgiving and diſregarding, though not always deſpiſing him.

75. While you are conſcious to yourſelf of exerciſing fairly and honeſtly that ſhare of *reaſon* and *common ſenſe* God has given you, for the direction of your common behaviour in life, you need never doubt of their ſuggeſtions being agreeable to the *common reaſon* and *ſenſe* of mankind in general; nor allow any diffidence of this, or fear of the event, to hinder your venturing to act agreeably to them, and enjoying that ſatisfaction you may have in *ſelf-approbation*, even when you are not ſucceſsful, or encouragement when you are; for,

76. There is a certain *conſcience* (as it were)

or faculty of diſcerning what is fit and unfit to be done in the *common conduct of life*, which is given every one for directing him even in the ſmalleſt offices or concerns of it, whoſe ſuggeſtions ſeem as it were intuitive, which can be always eaſily conſulted, and ought to be ſo, and whoſe approbation ſhould ſatisfy him, as much, in the management of theſe *leſſer* concerns, as that of his *higher* conſcience (if I may ſo call it) ſhould do, in thoſe of higher and moral importance. But,

77. Beware of ſuch *long deliberation about leſſer* matters as may draw off your attention from *higher*, and, where conſcience plainly oppoſes you, all *deliberation* is dangerous *.

78. Though a proper confidence in your own reaſon and judgment be neceſſary, and may prevent your loſing *opportunity* by waiting for advice from others, yet neglect not any occaſion of receiving proper information and advice from *others*, reſolving at the ſame time to judge and act for yourſelf, as you can ſcarcely expect, that another will enter in to your views, or have ſufficient attention to your character and intereſt where his own are in no way concerned.

79. If

* It is the obſervation of an ingenious and elegant Poet.
'The Woman that *deliberates* is loſt.'
This obſervation may, in many important caſes, be extended to all perſons, without exception of ſex or ſtation.

79. If you are conſcious to yourſelf of your having the proper *affections* towards thoſe with whom you have any intercourſe or connection, you need be in no pain about your *actions*, nor fear their correſponding with theſe affections that moſt prevail in you, and diſcovering them to others, who will rather be ſuſpicious of your not having them, if you appear too attentive to the outward expreſſions of them, and will ſeldom approve or diſapprove of you for any action, but according as it appears to indicate your affection: Thus, if you are conſcious to yourſelf of *benevolence* and *good-will* to all around you, never mind what you do, in the way of anxiety about its acceptableneſs to others; you may depend upon it, the affection itſelf will lead you to ſuch actions as are the indications of it. Thus it is with chearfulneſs, contentment, complaiſance (or a deſire of obliging in the moſt minute things) eſteem, deference, gratitude, and the like; when any of theſe poſſeſs the mind, they will lead to ſuitable actions and expreſſions of them; but when they do not, it is vain for you to expect that you'll be thought to have them, or be judged of from what you *are not*, but from what you *really are*; nor have you a title to any more. On the other hand, if the odious paſſions or affections, as pride, ill-will, ſourneſs, peeviſhneſs, diſcontent, and the like, prevail,

prevail, you may be aſſured, they cannot long be concealed or diſguiſed, your very looks, geſtures, and expreſſions will betray them.

80. When you want to meditate on what is *ſpiritual*, abſtract your thoughts, as much as poſſible, from every thing *ſenſible*; I had almoſt ſaid, endeavour to conſider yourſelf as a *pure ſpirit*.

81. Whatever derives its importance to you only from its connection with the *body*, deſerves little attention unleſs ſo far as the *mind* may be either corrupted or improved by it. In any other reſpect,

82. Let it be an eſtabliſhed maxim with you, in what reſpects your *body*, to give yourſelf no manner of pain about the management of it, further than to be conſcious to yourſelf, that you have, in every particular inſtance, done what appeared to you beſt (or, at leaſt, the beſt you could) to keep it in a proper ſtate for executing the commands of the *mind*, or making it ſubſervient thereto. In every other reſpect, reſolve firmly never to entertain an uneaſy reflection on what is *paſt*, or an uneaſy apprehenſion of what is *to come* in relation to it.

83. Upon a proper eſtimate of the real importance of outward things, it may be ſaid, that tho' one muſt often comply, in ſome meaſure, with

with the apprehenſions commonly entertained of them, yet there are ſome objects and events which attract much the *temporary* attention, and even admiration of many; and yet, being of no laſting value or real moment and importance, they ſhould rather be conſidered by a wiſe man as objects of *amuſement* than of *ſerious regard*. Some entertainments of the *imagination* and *political* projects, or purſuits are of this kind.

84. Beware of arguing *ſeriouſly* about *trivial* things, or *trivially* about theſe that ought to be always *ſerious*, as where the intereſts of religion and virtue, and the ſupreme happineſs of men are concerned. If you attempt to argue with *triflers*, let it be about *trifling* things; for, when once engaged, you muſt either fall inſenſibly into their way, or draw them over forcibly to yours; the laſt of which, however honourable, is too difficult to be often expected.

85. The mention of *faith*, *grace*, and *love to God* will appear ſtrange to ſome, that of *virtue* and *morality* to others, but a candid inquirer into truth will uſe ſuch expreſſions as appear to be moſt proper for illuſtrating and unfolding it.

86. If any work be uſeful and practicable, never let the view of its taking a *long time* hinder your attempting it; for this is an obſtacle

ſtacle that will be always leſſening and removing.

87. As our dependence is on GOD for the the diſpoſitions and feelings of the *ſoul*, as well as for our outward circumſtances; a humble and conſtant ſenſe of this dependence on him, an entire devotion to his will, and ſincere application for his *grace*, or the aids of his *ſpirit* to regulate the temper of the *mind*, is the beſt way of improving in every good habit.

88. It is only in the way of God's free *grace* and mercy through a mediaior, that a ſinner can expect any of theſe bleſſings he ſtands in need of; but they may, upon proper application for them in this way, be as firmly depended upon, or more ſo, than even what we call *natural endowments*.

89. Men's *humours* and *views* are *variable*, but the qualities of actions and objects invariable; that your view of them therefore may be uniform and conſiſtent, let it be taken at ſuch times as you are moſt diſengaged for this purpoſe, or when you are ſenſible that you are moſt likely to judge coolly, clearly, and impartially: At ſuch times, therefore, accuſtom yourſelf to write down the deliberate deductions of your reaſon, and your obſervations on theſe ſubjects that are moſt important to your happineſs in general, and to the proper diſcharge of the duties of any particular

lar office or ſtation you are placed in; ſuch remarks, though they will not always have the authority of rules for your conduct, yet will help to give you always juſt views of perſons and things, and lead you to act accordingly.

What is here recommended might be exemplified as it ſuits a variety of conditions and offices in life, but one *example* will ſuffice for rules, which thoſe who are in the *miniſterial office*, and who have its great ends ſincerely at heart, will be naturally led to collect, and they will find the benefit of them.

As the proper regulation of the *affections* is what we have all along had chiefly in view, what we are now firſt to adduce for illuſtrating and exemplifying our laſt obſervation, is the *affections* and *views*, which one who is engaged in the ſacred and important office now mentioned, will, upon mature and ſerious deliberation, be led to conſider as ſuited to him, particularly in his *publick miniſtrations*, and fit to be cultivated accordingly.

Your own mind, if you are thus engaged, will approve or ſuggeſt to you ſuch as theſe.

An *ardent zeal* for the honour and glory of that God, in whoſe name you are called to ſpeak, and whoſe will you declare, your adorable Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier,

A *fervent love* for your hearers, and deſire of inſtructing and converting them, rather than getting honour or applauſe to yourſelf.

An intire *diſregard to yourſelf*, and your own glory or intereſt, in compariſon of the above exalted aims.

A *conſciouſneſs* of your having ſomething to ſay, that is truly of the higheſt conſequence to your hearers.

A *conſciouſneſs* of your practiſing, or ſincerely reſolving and endeavouring to practiſe, yourſelf, what you recommend to them.

A *conſciouſneſs* that you have done your utmoſt to *prepare* yourſelf for this important exerciſe.

An *ingenuous candour* and openneſs in all your ſentiments, principles, and behaviour, ſo as you would not be aſhamed or afraid to lay open your heart and conduct before all who hear you.

A ſtrict *attention* to every minute particular you proceed to ſpeak of, and *affections* anſwerable to it.

A *fearleſs indifference* ariſing from no vain conceit of yourſelf, or contempt of your hearers, but from the firm perſuaſion of God's *preſence* and *aſſiſtance* in his own work, after you have done your beſt to prepare for it, and from your regard to the *cenſures* or *applauſe*

plauſe of *men* being intirely ſwallowed up in your regard for the honour and glory of GOD.

Other *affections* might be mentioned as fit to be cultivated by a preacher of righteouſneſs, upon goſpel principles, according to the various *publick exerciſes* in which he is engaged, but the above (with what we had formerly occaſion to ſuggeſt) will ſuffice, as *examples* of what every one may for himſelf collect and digeſt, putting together in the ſame manner ſuch particulars in the way of direction as are ſuited to the above exerciſes; a few of which may likewiſe be here added, as follows,

Spare no pains neceſſary in preparation, but in all your preparations, let *prayer* be your chief reſource; let every word flow from your *heart*, and your heart be committed to GOD. Thus,

Conſcious of having done all you could in the way of *preparation*, repoſe yourſelf intirely on him, and ſeek only to approve yourſelf to him.

Let all the burden or toil of *preparation* be ended in ſuch *time* as that your mind may be quite eaſy, free, and diſengaged, when you come to deliver your ſentiments and inſtructions.

Deliver your mind on the ſubjects propoſed, as if you had never *wrote* on them, but had

only conſidered them thoroughly, was much *impreſſed* with their importance to yourſelf and hearers, and left it to the affections and ſentiments of your heart to dictate ſuitable *expreſſions*. Beware of ſuffering your *thoughts* to *wander*, or your *attention* to be in the leaſt diſſipated, or drawn off, by any thing foreign to the work you are about.

Never, if poſſible, allow yourſelf to be in the leaſt *hurried* or *diſcompoſed*, whatever ſhould happen, but while you are in the way of *duty*, be aſſured of the *divine aid* and protection. Never proceed one ſtep farther, on any point, than as you ſee the way *clear* before you; nor think that, *by many words*, you can illuſtrate to *others* that of which you have no *clear ideas yourſelf*.

As little can you expect to bring *others* to the practice of what they ſee *yourſelf* diſregard.

Throw off all other *regard* to *men* except the ſincere deſire of doing them *good*.

Let a ſenſe of the *divine preſence* leſſen the importance of every other object in your eye.

Give the glory of any *ſucceſs* you have intirely to GOD.

If you would be in a *right frame* or diſpoſition for preaching or any religious exerciſe, endeavour to keep in a good frame at other times. 1. Let nothing engage you to do what may in the leaſt wound your conſcience.

2. Suppreſs

2. Suppreſs and reſiſt even every thought that ſeems to have a tendency this way. 3. Be watchful over your *ſenſes* or the avenues to the ſoul, leſt any thing enter that may deface good impreſſions or communicate bad. 4. Let no worldly thing have any more than a *tranſient* reception or admittance to your heart, and (if poſſible) be intirely indifferent about the event of it, only, when you are called to act any part in relation to it, conſider and do what appears to you beſt. 5. Let GOD be in all your thoughts and an *union of ſoul* with him maintained. 6. Let all your addreſſes to GOD and expectations from him be through CHRIST your REDEEMER.

90. What *principles* or *rules of conduct* you have once thoroughly eſtabliſhed, and approved of, in a clear, compoſed, and unprejudiced ſtate of mind, and are conſcious to yourſelf that you have exerciſed your reaſon fairly and impartially in conſidering; never, if poſſible, allow yourſelf to *doubt* or deliberate further about, but let them be ſteadily adhered to and followed, without calling them in queſtion at any time, much leſs when your mind is not in the ſame cool diſengagedſt ate.

You cannot begin too ſoon to form your temper and conduct in this way, for it will be infinitely eaſier to do it before bad habits are acquired, or indolence and irregularity

indulged, than afterwards; nor can you be too careful, after gaining ſome ground in this religious and moral improvement, to maintain it, it being unſpeakably eaſier to go on equally and uniformly, than to recover, when fallen from your former diligence and ſtedfaſtneſs.

You ſhould alſo endeavour to enjoy the *comfort* of thoſe reaſonable principles and rules which you lay down and follow, by being (as indeed you have cauſe) perfectly *eaſy* in yourſelf, when you act or think according to them, (be your outward ſucceſs as it will) or, with penitence, reſolve on immediate reformation, when you have at any time neglected it.

Nor ſhould you be in the leaſt uneaſy, tho' your method and rules ſhould not be univerſally proper and agreeable, or always approved of by others, if you be but conſcious to yourſelf, that to you they appear moſt ſuitable to your particular circumſtances and condition. You muſt however reſolve, not to content yourſelf with barely *thinking* over theſe principles, but you muſt, in the different circumſtances that occur, reſolutely perſiſt in *impreſſing* them on your *heart*, and, by ſteady practice, confirming them, and making them, as it were, *natural*, which will not be ſo difficult as may at firſt be imagined; for the

the outward circumſtances and inward ſtate of mind, to which theſe principles are ſuited, do often recur, and point out the ſame meaſures of conduct to be often practiſed or repeated. It may however not be improper, on ſome occaſions, to bring them into as narrow a compaſs as poſſible, and form ſuch *practical reſolutions* thereupon, as appear of moſt importance to your happineſs here and hereafter. For *exemplifying* this likewiſe, we ſhall conclude this *miſcellaneous* part of our diſſertation (as was promiſed in the beginning of it) with collecting the

SUM, *&c.* of the *religion, faith,* and *practical reſolutions* which any ſerious inquirer may draw from the whole, and digeſt for himſelf as the *deliberate deductions* or concluſions of his reaſon on theſe important points mentioned, in manner following:

I am firmly perſuaded that I *exiſt* and *act*, and have an inward principle of *thinking* and reaſoning given me for the direction of my conduct.

If I follow the direction of my *reaſon* (aſſiſted by the *revelation* given me of God's will) in believing and acting, I can do no more, and know that there will be no more required of me.

Upon examining how I myſelf and every thing around me came to *exiſt* and *act*, I muſt, according to the faireſt exerciſe of reaſon I

am capable of, conclude, that there is a *ſupreme*, intelligent, infinitely powerful, wiſe, juſt, and good BEING, to whom we are all indebted for our being and ſupport, whom we call GOD, and whoſe very name ſhould be mentioned with the moſt profound reverence and awe.

I am perſuaded that this GOD is, every moment, *preſent* with me, and with every part of his works; and, as he has given me powers and rules of action, that he *obſerves* how I apply and follow them, and will call me to *account* accordingly.

I am perſuaded that *this ſtate* is but, as it were, the *infancy* of my being, in which I am to improve and prepare for *another*, by doing whatever I have reaſon to believe GOD requires of me, and I am ſenſible that all the view I can expect of GOD in this ſtate, or intercourſe with and direction from him, is by my own *reaſon* and *conſcience* leading to the proper exercile of *faith* towards him, and influenced by his *ſpirit*, agreeably to the revelation he has made of his nature and will.

Agreeably to theſe views of GOD and of my relation to him, and his regard and attention to me, I am reſolved to devote myſelf to him, walk with him, and make his *will*, as diſcovered to me in the manner now mentioned, the ſupreme rule of my conduct.

I am

I am perſuaded that he wills, and does every thing for the good and order of his *univerſal kingdom* or ſyſtem of intelligent beings, and that every thing therein is ordered by him for this end in ſuch a way as is conſiſtent with the laws he has eſtabliſhed in it, with his own perfections, and the capacities of action, enjoyment, and perfection he has given to his creatures.

Though I ſee not the various links of that *chain*, by which the good and order of this *univerſal mental ſyſtem* now mentioned, of which I am a member, is advanced, yet the inward approbation which I find myſelf neceſſarily determined to give certain actions and diſpoſitions as *good*, makes me conclude that they have a tendency to the end now mentioned, and are, as it were, *anticipations* of the *ſupreme good*, which I conſider myſelf as bound to purſue, by following the dictates of my own reaſon and conſcience.

I am reſolved to *ſubmit*, with chearfulneſs and contentment, to whatever the ſupreme Ruler of all, orders and appoints with reſpect to me, *ſatisfied* with theſe circumſtances and talents he allots me, ſenſible that they are from him, and reſolving to improve them in the way that appears moſt agreeable to his will.

I am

I am reſolved to place my *happineſs* in a *ſenſe of his favour* and approbation alone, as attainable through the mediation of his ſon; and, as it is the *heart* and *affections* which he regards, my ſtudy ſhall be to have theſe properly regulated with reſpect to God and man.

As I thus place my happineſs in the *favour of* GOD, I am reſolved to ſhake off all other regards that interfere with it, and, as long as my own mind, upon a juſt review of it, gives me any evidence or impreſſion of this, nothing elſe ſhall diſturb me.

I am reſolved to maintain ſuch a *truſt* in GOD for all that concerns or awaits me, as ſhall ſilence all *fear and anxiety* on my part with reſpect to it.

Being fully ſatisfied as to my *articles of faith* and *rules of life*, after the ſtricteſt examination I am capable of, I am reſolved never more to call them in queſtion, but to proceed agreeably to them, in a humble dependence on divine grace. "Do thou, O GOD "of all grace and comfort! bring all theſe "home to my heart; inſpire me with "every diſpoſition thou approveſt of; *for-* "*give*, for my Redeemer's ſake, my many "offences; diſcover to me, and remove a- "ny inſincerity in my *reſolutions*, and keep "me ever ſteady and uniform in my adhe-

"rence

" rence to them, ſo as I may never return to
" folly. Whether *outward comforts* are af-
" forded or denied, let not my HAPPI-
" NESS depend upon them, but let GOD
" (who is now the *deliberate choice of my ſoul*)
" be the ſtrength of my heart, MY PORTI-
" ON, AND HAPPINESS FOR EVER."

DISSER-

DISSERTATION V.

On DESIRE.

PART I.

The Origin *of* DESIRE, *and its* Modifications, *or* the Affections *moſt nearly allied to it.*

AMONG all the ſubjects of man's knowledge and ſpeculation, none ſeems to puzzle him more than what paſſes *within himſelf*: His fancy may carry him through all the regions of nature, from the centre of the earth to the moſt diſtant ſpheres, yet loſe itſelf at home, where he is moſt concerned to know how all is ordered and carried on: To direct him in the purſuit of ſuch uſeful knowledge, has been always among the chief aims not only of true *Religion*, but likewiſe of its handmaid, *Philoſophy*: By theſe we are led into

to the moſt retired corners of the mind, to inveſtigate its nature, and the firſt principles of its operations.

In doing this, though the various enquirers have, according, perhaps, to their different tempers and circumſtances, gone into different opinions; this on all hands is agreed upon, that the object of the mind's purſuit, and in which its faculties do all concenter, is GOOD or HAPPINESS: To this our Maker has implanted in us a certain tendency or inclination, which we call DESIRE, in its firſt and ſimpleſt form, as he has alſo a diſpoſition to fly from and avoid evil or miſery, called AVERSION: But as we reckon freedom from evil a good, we may, without any impropriety, ſometimes ſpeak of them both under the name of *Deſire*.

Theſe two may perhaps be juſtly enough ſaid to anſwer the ſame purpoſes in the moral world, as the oppoſite forces of attraction and repulſion do in the natural. How neceſſary ingredients they are of human nature, when under due regulation, and how much they do in ſome ſhape or other, influence our actions, needs no proof: What deſerves our attention moſt is, the manner of regulating them for the attainment of the propoſed ultimate end, *Happineſs*.

The nature of this *happineſs*, or what conſtitutes the ſovereign good of man, together with

with the means and manner of attaining it, has been the ſubject of the preceeding Diſſertation *; and from what was there advanced, it appears that there are other ſubjects, nearly connected with this, which deſerve more attention than is commonly given them; ſome of theſe, therefore, we ſhall likewiſe endeavour to illuſtrate;—but our preſent enquiry ſhall be confined to the *Affections*, or various motions of the mind towards Good or Happineſs; and one of the diſtincteſt views we can have of them is by tracing that principle, or ſimple original affection, we call *Deſire*, from its ſource, through all its various modifications, and according to the degrees of ſtrength it acquires in the purſuit of its object, after which the proper regulation and reſtraint of it ſhall be conſidered.

The ſimplicity of the idea of *Deſire*, ſeems to render it incapable of definition; ſome call it uneaſineſs in the abſence of good, while others, ſeeing the impropriety of this definition, have confounded it with the act of volition or chuſing, in conſequence of this uneaſineſs; but, ſo far as we can, from a narrow inſpection of the order of our ideas, diſtinguiſh theſe which are ſo nearly related;—Methinks they may be thus ranked.

Firſt,

* It may be mentioned as a particular recommendation of the account we have given of Happineſs, that, by this, it appears to have an inſeparable connection with, and influence on Duty.——Vide page 36,—53.

First, we have a perception of the object conceived to be good; on this, if often repeated, or much attended to by the imagination, there follows an *uneaſineſs* in the abſence of it; which uneaſineſs always and neceſſarily raiſes an inclination of the mind towards it, or *Deſire* after it, if it is thought attainable; and when, by this inclination or deſire, the mind is moved in any particular direction towards it, or exerciſes its faculty of willing in any particular action for the attainment of it, it is called *Volition* or willing.

Thus, when one ſees a beautiful houſe, which he thinks he can acquire the poſſeſſion of, his perception or idea of it, by repetition, attention, and other cauſes engaging the imagination, comes to be accompanied with an uneaſy ſenſation in the want of it: On this follows *Deſire;* by which, when the will is determined to any action for obtaining it, as buying or aſking it of the owner, this exerciſe of the will is called *Volition*.

All the deſcription then we can give of Deſire is, that it is a certain inclination or affection of the mind towards an object or end conceived good and attainable, raiſed by uneaſineſs in its abſence, and followed by volition, or the exerciſe of the will for attaining it.

Averſion being the oppoſite of Deſire, the nature of it may be underſtood from what has been ſaid of the other.

Theſe two, *Deſire* and *Averſion*, are the only affections, in a ſtrict ſenſe (as diſtinct from all ſenſation) but according as the objects of them differ in their nature and circumſtances, and are preſent or future, (for good or evil paſt raiſe no affection, unleſs when the former is conſidered as a preſent evil, the latter as a preſent good); theſe calm affections come to be diverſified, and often attended with confuſed and violent ſenſations of pleaſure or pain, together with certain natural propenſities or impulſes towards the object, and perhaps bodily motions, with ſuch an engagement and commotion of the mind as excludes every thing elſe, even any deliberation and reaſoning about our conduct; when therefore any, or all of theſe, accompany the calm affections, they are modified into what we call PASSIONS; becauſe, where theſe animal emotions prevail, the mind is not reckoned equally free, but rather paſſive in its determinations. The chief * of theſe modifications, and to which all

* The whole of them (or, at leaſt, all for which we have names in the Engliſh language) are brought into one point of view, and their nature, relation, and government, briefly ſet furth in our ſcheme of the Human Faculties and Paſſions, entituled, The HEART DISPLAYED, &c. to which, by reaſon of the ſimilarity of the ſubjects, and for

all the reſt are reducible, ſeem to be *Love*, *Hope*, and *Joy*, and their oppoſites, *Hatred*, *Fear*, and *Sorrow*; the object of the firſt three being *good*, of the three laſt *evil*, either real or imagined.

When the object we *deſire* * to obtain or preſerve, is ſo reflected on, and its engaging qualities ſo repreſented to the mind, that an approbation † of it is raiſed, and an impreſſion made on the imagination, attended with ſenſations of pleaſure, and ſome inclination or propenſity of the mind towards it as good, we call it *Love*. Of Love there are two ge-

for avoiding repetitions, we are here ſometimes obliged to refer.

* Deſire and Averſion are ſometimes ſo ſimple and uncompounded, that in any ſcheme or analyſis of the affections, it ſeems indifferent whether they are claſſed after Love and Hatred, or (as is here done) before them; nor can it eaſily be ſaid which of them in reſpect of its extent ſhould be ranked firſt; for as we love many objects which we do not deſire, becauſe not thought attainable, nor any uneaſineſs felt in the want of them, ſo we deſire many objects, without ſuch a particular contemplation of their amiable qualities, as is neceſſary to raiſe Love; and the ſame may be ſaid of the extent of Hatred and Averſion.

† Approbation and Diſapprobation are (in our ſcheme of the faculties and paſſions) for the ſake of tracing more clearly their different modifications, conſidered as affections; but they are the ſimpleſt of them all, and therefore placed firſt, being very little removed from mere perceptions. Theſe, with Love and Joy, are the only affections that ſeem to be ſuited to a ſtate of compleat happineſs and perfection.

neral branches, according as we ourſelves, or others, are the objects of it: When we ourſelves are the objects, it is *Self-Love*, when others are ſo, it is *Benevolence**. The firſt the deſire of our own happineſs, the ſecond of the happineſs of others, each of which come to be modified as above, according to their various objects or degrees of intenſeneſs.

The firſt of theſe, *Self-Love*, appears under different forms and names, according as the object or means differ which are purſued by it, in ſubſerviency to that private good or happineſs which is its ultimate end. Here the happineſs of others might indeed be reckoned one of the objects fit to be purſued from ſelf-love, as ſubſervient to private happineſs. But as we ſee that by thoſe natures, in which ſelf-love is found without any indication of benevolent affections, as in moſt brutes, *External* ſenſible good is the only object purſued, and that, with rational beings, the more ſelf-love prevails, the more is external good † purſued, while

* As this is not intended for a compleat ſcheme of the paſſions, but only ſuch of them as have any relation to Deſire and Averſion, we have here made no mention of Complacence, Eſteem, Admiration, and many other affections, whoſe uſe, abuſe, government, and outward indications, are ſet forth in the large ſcheme or plan of the faculties and paſſions, formerly publiſhed, of which we endeavour to repeat as little as poſſible here.

† Hence we find in fact, that no man, whoſe heart is much ſet upon external good of any kind, was ever found ſuſceptible

while the happineſs of others, as the means of their own, is ſeldom or never thought of; from this, I ſay, we may conclude, that the common object of Self-love is *external* good; and though the true happineſs of others infallibly promotes our own, yet, wherever it is purſued, even in this light, we may take it for granted, that Benevolence prevails, that the temper is formed to virtue, and conſequently the affection of Self-love, as well as every other affection rectified *, and made to co-operate with one another for the general good. It is in this ſenſe, therefore, we muſt ſuppoſe that the learned and pious Biſhop *Butler* takes Self love, when he makes its object *internal;* for in this ſenſe it has the good and improvement of the mind for its principal object, and labours to promote the ſame in others, ſo that it coincides with Benevolence; but when we conſider them in the way in which they generally operate, as different from one another, we may take *external* good for the common object of Self-love, in which

ſuſceptible of true friendſhip, or of any benevolent kind affections towards others.

* There ſeems to be one ſeminal principle (if I may ſo call it) of vice, as there is of virtue, however numerous their effects; according to the prevalence of the firſt, the whole habit is depraved; and, where the ſecond prevails, it is in ſome degree rectified, in reſpect of every affection and diſpoſition, tho' not compleat in each.

view it has four different forms, anſwering the four different kinds of external good.

When the object deſired and purſued is ſenſual pleaſure*, it is called *Senſuality;* when honour, power, and authority, among men, *Ambition;* when riches, it is *Avarice;* and when fame or diſtinction is the object, it may be called *Emulation*, a word commonly uſed when we are deſirous and active to obtain the ſame ſort of good another ſeeks after, ſo that it is applicable enough in this caſe.

Theſe four modes of Self-love, Senſuality, Ambition, Avarice, and Emulation, may be juſtly conſidered as general affections; by the prevalency of which four different ſelfiſh characters are formed, the general objects of whoſe purſuit are *Pleaſure*, *Power*, *Riches*, or *Fame;* which, according to the different circumſtances we are placed in, give riſe to, or occaſion many different paſſions, to be afterwards conſidered.

The other general form or direction in which Love operates is, when *others* are the objects of it, and then it is called *Benevolence;* which appears in many different forms and degrees of intenſeneſs, according to the extent

* With reſpect to the paſſions of different ages, it is obſervable, that the love of pleaſure prevails moſt in youth; love of power and fame in manhood; of riches, and often of life, in old age.

tent and circumſtances of its object. Thus, when it is extended to all mankind, yea and all ſenſitive natures, it is univerſal calm *good will*; when the object is more confined, as to one's native country, the neareſt term we have for it is *Patriotiſm*; if you reſtrict it further to a family and relations, it is called *natural Affection*. If the object be one who hath beſtowed any good on us, and we incline to requite it, our affection takes the name of *Gratitude*. If our benefactor be one who is heartily diſpoſed to do us good, as we are reciprocally to do him, and that we are attached by a ſimilarity of taſte and manners, and purſuit of the ſame common end, virtue and true goodneſs, the affection is formed into *Friendſhip*.

Again, the benevolent affection varies, not only according to the extent of the object, but likewiſe according to the different circumſtances in which it is placed, and which may be either good and joyful, or bad and ſorrowful. If it is in *joyful* circumſtances, we have no word expreſſive enough of the affection *, *Congratulation* being rather a mode of outward civility than of inward affection; nor perhaps

* It was neceſſary that we ſhould be more affected by the miſery of others than by their happineſs, becauſe we have it much more in our power to promote the former than the latter.

perhaps is there here any other affection than joy: But when the object is in bad or *ſorrowful* circumſtances, it is called *Pity*, Sympathy, or Compaſſion*. Here we may obſerve the ſame of the objects of Benevolence, as we did of thoſe of Self-love, that, according to the different circumſtances they happen to be placed in, they give riſe to, or occaſion various other paſſions, which we ſhall afterwards conſider.

From Love we proceed to trace the modifications of Deſire in the Paſſion of HOPE. Thus, when there is a probability of obtaining the object of our deſire, there ſeems to be mixt with this affection ſome degree of that joy which ariſes from the actual acquiſition and poſſeſſion of the object. This mixture of deſire and joy, accompanied with the confuſed ſenſations and propenſities formerly mentioned, is called *Hope*, which, when in a fluctuating ſtate, by our being at a loſs for the means we ſhould uſe to acquire the object, making the probability of our acquiſition low, is called *Suſpenſe*; but when the probability is thought very high, it riſes to *Aſſurance*.

Thus

* There ſeems to be a pleaſure in the very exerciſe of compaſſion, ariſing partly from the conſciouſneſs of feeling a right affection; this pleaſure appears from the inclination moſt people have to ſee objects of compaſſion even when they cannot relieve them, but which puts them in the way of doing it when they can.

Thus may *Deſire* be purſued through its various modifications, to the acquiſition of its object; after which our affection cannot be ſaid to have in it any mixture of deſire, unleſs we are threatned with the loſs of it; when with our fear is mixt a deſire of preſerving it: But, upon ſuch acquiſition of the object, it is ſucceeded by the pleaſing, I might ſay, paſſionate affection of Joy; for, tho' in its ſimpleſt form it be calm, and attended with little perturbation, yet, when it riſes high, ſcarce any of the paſſions have more of this, or is accompanied with more violent ſenſations; ſo that it may be queſtioned, whether it and *Sorrow* be not peculiar mental ſenſations of pleaſure and pain, rather than affections, and differing from the immediate perceptions of pleaſure and pain from the objects themſelves, in this, perhaps, that the pleaſing ſenſation of joy comes not ſo much from a perception of, or a reflection on, the qualities of the object acquired, but from the deſires being gratified, and the uneaſineſs that raiſed it removed, and ſo, on the other hand, of ſorrow.

We ſhall not attempt to reckon up the various forms of this affection of Joy, they being as numerous and various as the paſſions, whoſe gratifications raiſe them, tho' few of them have got diſtinct names. The Joy ariſing from the real, or imagined poſſeſſion of honour,

honour, or claim to it, if attended with a contempt of others, is called *Pride**. When joy ariſes from ſome comical occaſion or amuſement, it is called *Mirth*; when from a conqueſt over ſome conſiderable oppoſition, *Triumph*; when it riſes high ſuddenly, *Exultation*; when ſettled into a habit, Gaiety or *Chearfulneſs*.

From DESIRE, and its Modifications, in the purſuit of *good*, we come to conſider AVERSION to *Evil*, implying uneaſineſs at the preſence or approach of it, and an endeavour to remove or avoid it. This, in effect, is no more than a deſire of being freed from it, ſuch freedom being looked on as a real good, ſo that Averſion might be comprehended under Deſire; but, for deducing the painful paſſions more diſtinctly from it, we ſhall take it ſeparately; and as it is variouſly modified into the paſſions of *Hatred* and *Fear*, according to the nature and circumſtances of the object, while diſtant, till its arrival or preſence, when *Sorrow* and its modes take place.

When the object of Averſion is often reflected on, and its diſagreeable qualities frequently repreſented to the mind, till the imagination is impreſſed with them, there ariſes a *diſapprobation*

* This is only one ſpecies of pride; our other ſcheme (formerly referred to) contains a fuller account of this and the paſſions related to it, with remarks on them.

a *diſapprobation* of it, attended with ſenſations of pain, and a natural propenſity to avoid it, which we called HATRED, and which may be conſidered with reſpect either to the object, or to the meaſure and degree of it. Of this we ourſelves never are the objects; the ſelf-tormentor, from this principle of ſelf-hatred, being an uncommon and unnatural character among men. Nor can we imagine others ever to be the objects of this paſſion, under the form of diſintereſted *malevolence* or ill-will, when no evil is apprehended from them. The tranſports of the unnatural paſſions have indeed ſome reſemblance of ſuch diſintereſted malice, but are not really ſuch. The proper object then of Hatred is not ourſelves or others, but whatever is thought to occaſion evil to ourſelves or others; and it takes different forms according to the nature and circumſtances of the object, and according as the evil apprehended from it is natural or moral: In the firſt reſpect, it is modified in the ſame way as love is, though its modifications have no diſtinct names, as being eaſily reducible to thoſe of the other. Thus our Hatred of whatever brings on us pain, diſhonour, poverty or contempt, is a conſequence of, and falls in with, our love of their contraries, pleaſure, power, riches, or fame; and, in the ſame way, our Hatred of what is hurtful to others, anſwers the different modifications

cations of love to all beings, to men, to our country, relations, benefactors, and friends.

This paſſion has likewiſe different appearances, according as the evil apprehended to ourſelves, or others, is natural or moral. If it is the former, we call it Natural Averſion or Hatred; and when, from any one's particular conſtitution, this comes always to riſe very high in him, immediately on the perception of an object agreeable enough to others, it is called *Antipathy*. If the evil apprehended to ourſelves, or others, be moral, the averſion, or hatred to it, is called *Moral*; and when it riſes very high, *Abhorrence* and *Deteſtation*. Thus may Hatred be conſidered as to its object.

The other modifications of it are according to its meaſure and degree, when the object or agent occaſioning good or evil to ourſelves, or others, is intelligent. Thus, if the offence or injury * done us appear great, and our hatred riſes all of a ſudden, attended with violent uneaſy ſenſations and commotions, perhaps

* As ſome ſenſibility of injuries done others is allowable, it cannot be denied that the ſame is allowable in our own caſe, to ſuch a degree as would be proper for a diſintereſted ſpectator to have, or for ourſelves to have, if the caſe was another's. "Thus far may we have anger without ſin;" but when it riſes to the degrees aftermentioned, it is ſinful and unlawful. Anger is raſh or haſty reſentment, and reſentment is deliberate anger.

haps of body and mind, with a deſire of reparation, ſecurity, and repelling the injury, it is called *Anger*, and our ſenſe of the injury received, *Reſentment*. When anger is attended with a propenſity to occaſion miſery to the offender, without any deſire of his recovery, it goes by the name of *Revenge*; which, when ſettled into a habit, eſpecially if without any juſt foundation, and if all reconciliation is refuſed, is called *Spite*, *Malice*, or *Rancour*. In the ſame way, when an habitual proneneſs is contracted to anger and reſentment on every little occaſion, it is called *Peeviſhneſs*, and a ſudden fit of anger, when it riſes to a very high degree, becomes *Rage* and *Fury*.

Some of the modifications of anger, according to the circumſtances of the offender, have alſo got diſtinct names. Thus, if he is conceived to be inferior to us, an injury from him is termed an *Indignity*, and the ſenſe or reſentment of it, *Indignation*. If he is in miſerable circumſtances, and our paſſion carries us to inſult and afflict him, it is *Cruelty* and *Inhumanity*.

The next general modification of Averſion, and conſequent upon Hatred, is FEAR. Thus, when there is a probability apprehended of that evil's coming upon us, which was formerly conſidered as the object of averſion, there appears to be mixt with this affection ſome

degree of that ſorrow, which ariſes from the actual arrival or preſence of the object. This mixture of averſion and ſorrow, accompanied with the confuſed ſenſations and propenſities formerly mentioned, is called *Fear*, which, when ſuddenly raiſed to a high degree, by ſome unexpected evil, is called *Terror*. Again, when there is any probability of another's obtaining that good which we are afraid to loſe, our fear takes the name of *Jealouſy*, and, when he obtains it, our *envy* ariſes, which is a modification of *Sorrow*, that will be taken notice of afterwards. In fine, when we find the object of our fear and averſion, whether loſs of good, or arrival of evil, to be unavoidable, it turns into *Deſpair*.

It is upon the arrival, or certain proſpect, of that evil which was the object of our averſion, hatred, and fear, that the third general painful paſſion of SORROW takes place. What we have ſaid of *Joy's* being a peculiar mental ſenſation rather than an affection, and of the number of its modifications, may be likewiſe applied to *Sorrow*: Its object, or rather the occaſion of its riſe (for the reſpect that good and evil have to joy and ſorrow, ſeem to be rather that of raiſing or occaſioning certain ſenſations, than being objects of affection): The occaſions, I ſay, on which ſorrow is raiſed, are the preſence or approach of evil to ourſelves or others. The different forms of

Sorrow

Sorrow ariſing from the preſence of natural evil to ourſelves, have no fixt names; and I know only two that have ſuch, even when moral evil is the proper ſource; theſe are *Remorſe* and *Shame*: *Remorſe* ariſing from a conſciouſneſs of our having done any action immoral and unlawful, and, when it riſes high, taking the name of *Anguiſh*. Shame, again, from an apprehenſion of having done ſomething diſhonourable, and deſerving the contempt of others.

When our ſorrow reſpects *others*, it is either natural or unnatural; *natural*, when it ariſes from a ſenſe of the evils and ſufferings of others, and is called *Sympathy*, *Condolence*, and *Compaſſion*, which have been already conſidered as a branch of benevolence: *Unnatural*, when it ariſes from a view of the happineſs of others, enjoying a good which we ourſelves deſire, and think we deſerve better, which is called *Envy*. This, with the paſſions of *Malice* or *Rancour*, *Jealouſy*, and *Cruelty* or *Inhumanity*, are juſtly called *Unnatural*; and are, with great propriety, compared to tumours and cancers, to feveriſh heats, and unnatural indiſpoſitions of the body; the proper management of which ſhall be afterwards taken notice of.



up among them which nature originally eſtabliſhed.—*Firſt*, As to the proper *objects* of our affections and paſſions, we have already ſhewn how, in *general*, they are good or evil, preſent or future, and different as to their kinds and circumſtances: But further, as to every *particular* object of purſuit, which may occur, it is likewiſe neceſſary that the *diſcerning* and other powers * be, in ſome degree, employed for regulating our affections with reſpect to it, *viz.* The *underſtanding*, in diſcovering, from its qualities and tendency to happineſs, of what affection it is the proper object: And the *imagination*, in raiſing this affection towards it.

Thus then, the firſt thing neceſſary is to be fully ſatisfied as to what is really our *chief good* or *ultimate end*, in the attainment of which our higheſt happineſs conſiſts, and then to diſcover the relation or tendency of any particular objects or ends to this, (as being what conſtitutes them good or evil) with the affections, in different degrees, proper for and proportioned to each of them.

* For a fuller account of theſe as to their nature, conduct, uſe, abuſe, *etc.* ſee the *other ſcheme* of them formerly mentioned: All we need here obſerve is, that by the *underſtanding* and *imagination*, we mean, the powers of diſcovering and diſpoſing to truth and good, by the *will* and *affections*, the powers of chuſing and purſuing them.

So far we may reckon the province of the *underſtanding*. But before the affections towards any of theſe (though thus diſcovered proper for them) can be raiſed, the *imagination* muſt be engaged, both in favour of what is thus found to be the ſupreme good itſelf, and of any objects or ends ſubſervient to it; which is done, by the frequent repreſentation of their qualities, tendencies, and effects, till an impreſſion is made upon it, and an image formed of all theſe ideas blended together. This brings them as it were home in their full dimenſions to the mind, which now comes to feel an uneaſy ſenſation in the want of them, and on this the affection of *deſire* immediately ariſes, either ſimple, or in ſome of its modifications, which can no longer be ſuppoſed miſplaced or applied to improper objects, if the previous operations of the underſtanding and imagination have been rightly carried on.

Thus if mental or ſpiritual happineſs, lying in a conformity to God's will, and conſequent ſenſe of his favour, is found to be man's ultimate end, it muſt be acknowledged to be the only proper object of his moſt intenſe deſire; ſin or moral evil, mental miſery (if I may ſo call it) or contrariety to God's will, and a conſequent ſenſe of his diſpleaſure, the proper object of man's higheſt averſion.

When,

When, therefore, theſe affections are thus directed by the *underſtanding* to their proper objects, its office next is to diſcover the tendency and relation of any particular object to theſe two, that the paſſions may be ſuited and proportioned to it accordingly; ſo that, on its perceiving the tendency of a generous, pious, publick-ſpirited action, or any benevolent, kind, devout diſpoſition, to procure happineſs in any degree (eſpecially, if of the kind now mentioned) to ourſelves or others; it alſo becomes the proper object of deſire, in its various forms, the contrary of averſion; and ſo far as any external advantages or enjoyments of pleaſure, wealth, power, or fame, appear to have this tendency, (as when rightly applied, they may have, though not in a way ſo powerful and immediate) they deſerve the ſame affections in a lower degree; but if they are conſidered, without any reſpect to ſuch a tendency and application of them, but only to their intrinſic value, and oft-times miſchievous effects, by the wrong uſe and purſuit of them, they become the proper objects of moral averſion and hatred, from which they cannot be exeemed even by the borrowed aids of an incorrect *imagination*, aſſociating moral ideas with them while purſued, but dropping theſe, in their application, when attained.

This

This leads us to inquire more particularly into the province of the *imagination* in the inſtances now mentioned; that of the *underſtanding* being all that we have as yet conſidered.

It has already been obſerved in general, that the office of the *imagination* is to raiſe or move the affections, towards what the underſtanding finds to be their proper objects, and that the imagination is engaged for this purpoſe, by frequent repreſentations of the diſcovered qualities, tendencies, and effects of the objects, till an impreſſion is made on it, and an image formed of all theſe ideas blended together, in conſequence of which the affection immediately ariſes, and is increaſed, or altered as much, by the increaſe or alteration of this inward impreſſion, as by that of the outward object.

Thus, admitting that conformity mentioned of temper and conduct to the will of the Supreme Being, and conſequent ſenſe of his favour, to be the proper object of our higheſt *deſire*, in order to raiſe this affection towards it, its ſublimity, permanency, and advantageous effects, as being moſt productive of true happineſs, and moſt perfective of our natures at preſent, as well as moſt conducive to higher happineſs and perfection hereafter; all theſe muſt be often viewed or contemplated by the *imagination*, till an impreſſion or image is formed

formed as above, and the mind becomes uneaſy upon any apprehenſion of the want of it; on which *deſire* immediately ariſes, in various forms and degrees of intenſeneſs, according to the ſtrength or weakneſs of the impreſſion made on the imagination, and excites to the diligent uſe of every mean neceſſary for attaining or ſecuring its object.

This proceſs towards the raiſing deſire or any other affection to an object, according to the tendency and relation it is found to have to the ultimate end, may be eaſily applied in the other inſtances above mentioned; but as here the influence of the *imagination* is ſo great, and its proper government of ſuch importance, ſome of the *miſtakes* it is liable to, deſerve to be conſidered.

The moſt remarkable of theſe will be found to lie in its being too ſtrongly impreſſed with the images of *preſent* objects, and too faintly with thoſe that are *abſent*, to which we may add its not attending ſufficiently to the conſequences and future tendency of either, as diſcovered by the underſtanding. For as the mind is ſcarcely capable of more than one ſenſation at once, either of pleaſure or pain, and apt to receive this from the neareſt object; ſuch a ſenſation, if pleaſant, is ready to ſatisfy it as long as it laſts, and to prevent any impreſſion from what is abſent. If painful,

ful, it has a ſtill ſtronger effect, and ſets the mind on work to remove it, as imagined greater than any abſent evil, whilſt the good conſequences of the latter, and bad conſequences of the former, though never ſo certain and evident, not having the ſame advantage of nearneſs, make but a faint impreſſion on the imagination; it is intirely engroſſed by the preſent object, as external pleaſure, power, riches, or fame; and to juſtify, as it were, to the ſuperior faculties, its raiſing towards them an affection, whoſe proper object is a higher kind of good, it aſſociates with them the ideas of this higher moral or ſpiritual good, and, by habitual indulgence, ſo blends or unites their ideas together, that it becomes at length very difficult to ſeparate them; hence ariſes the difficulty of bringing the ambitious, the covetous, or the voluptuous man to relinquiſh their purſuits, even when their reaſon is convinced of their being wrong.

One of the firſt ſteps, therefore, to the government of the paſſions, is correcting the *imagination*; which is done, by breaking off theſe aſſociations now mentioned of moral qualities with things immoral or indifferent, to which wrong habits and inattention may have led us, and by applying our minds to the nobler purſuits of ſuch objects as need no foreign

reign ornaments to ſet them off, till a contrary and more rational habit be acquired.

The only way to ſurmount the ſollicitations of any objects of affection that are preſent and diſapproved of by the underſtanding, is by frequent and lively repreſentations of their deſtructive qualities and conſequences, together with the deſireable qualities and conſequences of ſuch as are abſent, and their tendency and neceſſity to true happineſs; by bringing, I ſay, all theſe ſo near the *imagination* as to appear in their full dimenſions, and make the ſame impreſſion on it as if they were preſent; till thus, uneaſineſs following in the want of what is found to be truly deſireable, the proper affections are immediately raiſed towards it; for it is in this *indirect* way that affections can be raiſed, and not by any poſitive or *direct* act of the will itſelf, as might be exemplified in all its modifications or affections: Thus when the imagination is impreſſed with the notion of another's undeſerved miſery, our *pity* is raiſed, when with that of his power and inclination to hurt us, our *fear*, and when with the amiable and engaging qualities of our fellow-creatures, *benevolence* may be raiſed, though formerly ſuppreſſed by the force of oppoſite habits and affections, or perhaps partial views of its object, publick good, as confined to ſome particular ſect or party.

To

To run over again all the different modifications of deſire, and ſhew, what are their proper objects, and how they are to be raiſed towards them, would be unneceſſary, the geral proceſs above laid down being eaſily applicable to particular inſtances. If ſufficient care be taken to keep up a conſtant attention of mind, and habitual diſcipline over ourſelves with a fixed reſolution, in ſuch caſes as are any way dangerous or delicate, to ſtop all action until there be a proper examination of the circumſtances, qualities, and tendencies of the objects about which our affections are exerciſed. The confuſed ſenſations and propenſities that raiſe them into *paſſions* are, indeed, when for any time indulged, very difficult to be reſtrained, but may be ſo in ſome meaſure, by frequent conſideration of their calamitous conſequences, till an habitual ſuſpicion and dread of them be raiſed, which recurring always along with them may remind us of the neceſſary diſcipline.

What makes this the more neceſſary, is, that the long continuance and frequent returns of any paſſion, as anger, fear, ſorrow, *&c.* creates a proneneſs to them for the future, which may be confirmed into habits very deſtructive of happineſs, and pernicious to the whole conſtitution.

The

2. The *other* thing neceſſary in the management of the affections, when raiſed as above, is to keep them in a due proportion to their objects, and in a juſt balance and oeconomy among themſelves. What ſeems neceſſary to ſuch a proportion is, that, according to the diſcovered nature and qualities of any object, the affection to it be raiſed higher when too weak, and moderated when too ſtrong: How this is to be done in an indirect way, may be in a good meaſure underſtood from the preceeding obſervations: It may be of uſe however, further to conſider, and, as it were, frequently repreſent to the imagination, the conſequences and effects of having our *deſires* of outward good, or *averſion* to outward natural evil, too ſtrong.

Thus, it may be obſerved, that the violence of *deſire* and *hope*, does not proportionally enliven our ſenſation in the enjoyment of good, (unleſs in the tranſient raptures and firſt confuſed hurry of our ſucceſs) though it increaſes the pain of diſappointment; ſo that he who, by no wrong opinions or aſſociations of ideas, raiſes his deſire above the real moment of good in the object, though he may want the firſt tranſient eceſtaſies on acquiſition of it, yet he enjoys all the permanent good the object can afford, while he eſcapes the uneaſineſs of violent deſire and torments of diſ-

appointment to which perſons of irregular imaginations are liable.

On the other hand, the ſtronger our averſion and fear of evil is, we ſhall be the leſs able to bear it, whereas, by undervaluing and laying our account with it, our fear will be diminiſhed while it is in ſuſpenſe, and our ſorrow or grief upon its arrival.

But here I muſt be underſtood to mean, as was ſuggeſted, *natural* good and evil; for that deſire and averſion, which have reſpect to the *moral* or *ſpiritual* objects formerly mentioned, cannot be too ſtrong.

Thus then, in ſome meaſure, may a proportion be kept up betwixt our various affections and their objects; the keeping up a juſt *balance* and oeconomy among themſelves remains yet to be conſidered.

In this perhaps as much art is requiſite, and acquaintance with human nature, as in any part of the religious or moral government of the mind; the keeping us in exerciſe and action, and putting our obedience and virtue to the trial, being probably one end our Maker had in giving us principles of action, leading, in appearance, to oppoſite marks, yet in reality, in their primary ſtate, balanced againſt one another, like the antagoniſt muſcles of the body, either of which ſeparately would occaſion diſtortion and irregular motion, yet jointly

jointly form an admirable ſyſtem or compoſition; the voluntary mangling and diſmembring of which is not more cruel, unnatural, and deſtructive to it, than the ſtraining any affection or indulging a wrong paſſion is to the inward fabrick and conſtitution.

The general rule then for balancing the affections, is to indulge or ſtrain none of them, ſo far as to occaſion diſturbance and diſproportion to the reſt, but to let each of them have its due ſcope and force.

Thus is that balance to be kept up betwixt the *publick* and *ſelfiſh* affections, which ſeems to be originally eſtabliſhed, though cuſtom, habit, aſſociations of ideas, and perhaps other preternatural cauſes, oftimes turn the balance to the ſide of the latter, and makes it neceſſary to add the more weight to the former, by engaging the imagination ſtrongly on their ſide. And even the ſelfiſh affections themſelves may be ſometimes too weak, when they do not anſwer the proviſionary care of nature for every one of its offspring, in which caſe they will need the ſame management.

In this way the *pleaſing* and *painful* paſſions muſt be balanced againſt one another. The deſire of preſent good muſt not be raiſed ſo high as to ſurmount the averſion to its conſequent evil, when it is ſuch perhaps as would prove deſtructive to the conſtitution. *Hope*

that their cure muſt be ſimilar to that of the latter, no lenitives are ſufficient, without intirely eradicating them, and this can be done, only by rectifying the whole habit of the mind; to effect which in ſome meaſure, it may be of uſe to dwell always on the moſt lovely ſide of every character, to conſider the injurious, who are objects of thoſe paſſions, as our fellow-members in this great intellectual ſyſtem, their real ſprings of action, as at worſt only ſelf intereſt, or miſtaken ſelf-love, and their injuries, as proceeding from a weakneſs of temper, to be pitied rather than reſented.

To what has been advanced about the government of the paſſions, other *general* directions might be added, as, The not letting them determine our opinions of perſons and things; their province not being to diſcover truth and good, but to purſue or excite to the purſuit of them: The guarding particularly againſt that ruling or maſter paſſion in the breaſt, which, (as an ingenious Poet expreſſes it) "like Aaron's ſerpent, ſwallows up the reſt;" guarding alſo againſt the other paſſions that attend our particular conſtitutions, tempers and ſtations, and the incentives to them in company, occurrences, and the like; but theſe are, in a great meaſure, deducible from the preceeding obſervations.

How far the paſſions depend on the temperament and conſtitution of the body, with their outward expreſſions in its features and motions *, though a curious enough inquiry, is not of ſuch importance as to underſtand their nature and regulation now ſpoken of: How neceſſary the ſtudy of this is to our eaſe and happineſs in this life, though no reſpect ſhould be had to a future, and much more when this is taken into the account. I need ſpend no time in evincing, nor in further recommending it, from any other topics, than the deſcription already given of the daily inſtances that occur of the woful effect which unreſtrained paſſions and inclinations have on human life and happineſs.

But however hurtful the *paſſions* are found to be when *abuſed* or miſapplied, it muſt not, from what has been here advanced, be ſuppoſed, that they have not likewiſe their *uſefulneſs* and importance; ſo that inſtead of being ſubſervient to ſenſe and appetite (as they often are) they may be made conducive to that improvement, which is neceſſary in order to our preſent and future happineſs.

Man's preſent circumſtances and conſtitution are indeed ſuch, that the *paſſions* are not only *uſeful*, but even *neceſſary*, to him in various reſpects, as for exciting ſometimes to action,

* For this alſo, See The HEART DISPLAYED, *etc.*

tion, before there can be a deliberate proceſs of reaſon for this purpoſe, alſo for engaging reaſon or the ſuperior faculties to attend to, and examine any object, and for giving it a proper importance, and thereby quickening us in the purſuit of it, after examination; ſome paſſions are likewiſe uſeful for *balancing* other paſſions in ourſelves, and for ſecuring againſt thoſe of others.

The reaſons of our being thus conſtituted, and ſtanding in need of principles or forces ſeemingly oppoſite, are indeed what we cannot fully explain, more than we can do the reaſons why light and darkneſs, heat and cold, and various contending elements are intermixed in the manner in which they are in nature; the whole muſt be reſolved into the depth of divine wiſdom unfathomable by us at preſent, but which may, by ſuch a conteſt or oppoſition of principles, bring about, in the iſſue, a harmony and perfection of the whole intellectual and moral ſyſtem, ſo much the more aſtoniſhing, when ſeen to ariſe from the moſt unlikely cauſes and beginnings.

For more of this, and what elſe appears moſt material in relation to the human *faculties and paſſions*, ſee the *Heart Diſplayed*, or the Anatomy of the Human Mind, &c.

DISSER-

DISSERTATION VI.

ON

ACTION, CONTEMPLATION, *and* DISENGAGEMENT *from the World.*

AN eminent writer*, whom we had occaſion to quote in our fourth Diſſertation, conſiders the life of man as of four different kinds, according to the prevailing objects of his choice and purſuit; theſe four kinds or ſpecieſes of life, he calls the *Political*, the *Lucrative*, the *Pleaſurable*, and the *Contemplative*; and he thus diſtinguiſhes them, to ſhow that none of them fall in intirely with his preconceptions of the ſovereign good or happineſs; but tho' he has ſufficiently evinced this, yet it may ſtill continue a queſtion, What kind of life falls in moſt with theſe preconceptions, or is moſt conducive to happineſs, and thereby moſt eligible?

In this view the diviſion is commonly ſhortned, and the competition made to run betwixt what we call an *active life* and a *contemplative*,

* Harris on Happineſs.

plative, which indeed comprehend the whole; and nature itſelf (if carefully attended to) points out one or other of theſe to every man, according to the form and extent of capacity given him; but it is certain the general taſte is for *active* life; for, however much many ſpeak of their ſatiety or fatigue by it, yet how few inſtances are there of its being renounced, without a deſire afterwards of reſuming it? The good of ſociety will not admit of its members giving much way to ſuch *Contemplation*, as excludes all *Action*; nor will action be rightly directed for this end, without ſome mixture of contemplation.

It can never, therefore, be a matter of diſpute, which of the two, Action or Contemplation, ſociety could ſubſiſt without, as both are * neceſſary to its ſupport and improvement; nor can it be doubted that in both ways many virtues are diſplayed: But there may be a queſtion of ſome nicety with reſpect to their proper limits and mixture, as well as which of the two (when properly aſcertained and diſtinguiſhed) gives ſcope for the exerciſe of moſt virtues? which of the two contributes moſt to the good and improvement of ſociety? or, in fine, which of them

a *wiſe*

* Natura nos ad utrumque genuit, et contemplationem rerum et actionem.

SENECA.

a *wise man*, who has the entire command of his own temper and way of life, ſhould chuſe, with a view of becoming happy in himſelf, and uſeful to others? for as to a man who has no command of his own temper and way of life, ſo as to accommodate them to what his reaſon moſt approves, there can be no queſtion, as there is no room for choice on his part, he muſt go whereſoever his diſpoſition and circumſtances lead him, whether it is to the buſy ſcenes of public life, or to the private retreats of contemplation.

It is plain, therefore, that the common queſtion, Whether an active or contemplative life be moſt eligible? muſt be very indeterminate, if taken in a general view, without bringing into the account the perſon's temper and circumſtances who is to make the choice; it is juſt as if any ſhould diſpute about what ſauce or fruit is beſt, without conſidering the taſte or conſtitution of the perſon who is to uſe them.

For determining, therefore, as to the merits of the two different kinds of life mentioned, it is fit to begin with laying down the two following poſitions.

1. That the perſon, whoſe election of a manner of life we are to conſider, muſt be ſuch a one as really has an election or choice; that is, ſuch a one as has the command or direction

rection of his own way of life, by having the command of his own mind as well as of his outward circumſtances, ſo as to be capable of proſecuting either of the courſes propoſed; for if his paſſions are ſo little under his government, as to carry him violently to any one of theſe courſes, or his fortune ſo fixt as to leave him no choice, he muſt be excluded the preſent queſtion: It may be ſaid, that a man who has thus the command of himſelf, can be happy in any way of life; and I confeſs he may be ſo, if that command be compleat; but the queſtion is, What way of life he would judge moſt favourable to the eſtabliſhing this command, and making a proper uſe of it, for obtaining the greateſt degree of happineſs to himſelf or others, whether the active or contemplative would be his choice? This leads to

2. Another poſition, which will be eaſily admitted, and will prepare our way for determining as to the point in queſtion, and that is, that whatever way of life favours moſt a man's *happineſs in himſelf, and uſefulneſs to others*, is the moſt eligible.

After laying down theſe poſitions for directing our enquiry, it will be proper to begin it with defining what we mean by an *active*, and what by a *contemplative* way of life.

I believe

I believe it will be found that, for the moſt part, in ſpeaking of theſe, we mean by an active life, that which engages us moſt in the commerce of mankind; and by a contemplative, that which withdraws us moſt from it. Not that theſe two are to be conſidered as oppoſites, or that any way of life can be devoid of ſome ſhare of both theſe, Action and Contemplation; but according as either of them moſt prevails in any courſe of life, and engages a man more or leſs in the buſy world, we call him Active or Contemplative, without conſidering that, where there is any degree of life and reflection, ſome degree of *action* is inſeparable from it; and that many whom we rank amongſt the active world, as being more than ordinarily engaged in crowds and public tranſactions, are often more inactive or indolent, than the obſcure inhabitant of the cottage, or the philoſopher in his muſeum.

Tho' therefore, the common notion of a man's being active or contemplative, according as he is more or leſs engaged in commerce and converſation with the reſt of mankind, tho' this may afford us a tolerable definition of theſe different ways of life, yet it may not be improper to try, whether, from conſidering the common nature of the ſpecies,

we

we may not find a definition more to our preſent purpoſe.

That the human conſtitution is made up of two parts, *Body* and *Mind*, intimately connected together, is univerſally agreed: Theſe two have their ſeveral powers, *ſenſible* and *mental*; the object of the firſt being the concerns of the body; that of the latter, the concerns of the mind, and its improvement: The exerciſe of theſe powers on their different objects, we call *Action*, which thus comes either to reſpect the body, and is called *Senſation* or *Motion*, or to reſpect the mind, and then it has the name of *Reflection* and *Thinking*; but tho' in both theſe *Action* is implied, yet, as the former is generally more attended to than the latter, we commonly call theſe operations which reſpect our *ſenſible* concerns, *Action*, and thoſe relating to our *mental* purſuits, *Reflection* and *Contemplation*.

May we not, therefore, in this view, define a *contemplative* way of life to be, ſuch as turns our attention moſt to *mental* objects, and an *active* way of life, as diſtinguiſhed from the former by common uſe, to be ſuch as turns our attention moſt to *ſenſible* objects and purſuits.

If theſe definitions are admitted, the ſuperiority of the *contemplative* life to what is called the *active*, will be as evident as the ſupe-

riority of mind to body, of ſpiritual enjoyments and purſuits to ſuch as are merely ſenſible. But, before we determine finally as to this, let us look back a little to theſe characters or preconceptions, we propoſed to apply to each of theſe two, for diſcovering their value and excellency.

The characters we laid down for this purpoſe in our ſecond poſition were, that whatever courſe of life puts a man moſt in the way of being *happy in himſelf, and uſeful to others*, that courſe of life undoubtedly deſerves our preference.——Apply this, therefore, to the caſe in hand.

A man who has the command of his own temper and fortune, as much as is here attainable, ſo that he is not unalterably fixed by either of them in any particular courſe of life, but at liberty to chuſe and follow whatever ſcheme his reaſon, upon careful examination, approves. Such a man, I ſay, has theſe two ſchemes propoſed to him, either to lead an *active* life, chiefly attentive to outward *ſenſible* objects, or to lead a *contemplative* life, in attention to *mental* intereſts and improvement; that he may determine which of theſe two ſchemes of life he ſhould chuſe, he conſiders which of them will put him moſt in the way of being *happy in himſelf, and uſeful to others*. In the active courſe he may have

have a proſpect of every enjoyment that is *external* to the mind; for the reward of his induſtry, he may promiſe himſelf riches and honours, pleaſure and renown; nay, and he may hope that he ſhall be enabled to procure the ſame *ſenſible* enjoyments and advantages to others, for whom he is concerned; he may expect to raiſe himſelf and his family to the higheſt offices in the ſtate, to fill them with honour and applauſe, and even to carry the commerce and conqueſts of his country to the utmoſt extent they are capable of. All thoſe outward flattering proſpects of *ſenſible* or *imaginary* enjoyments he may have for himſelf and others; but will theſe, even when the poſſeſſion of them is attained, bring either him, or them, one ſtep nearer theſe *internal* and *ſpiritual* enjoyments, in which (as we elſewhere made appear) the *true happineſs* of man conſiſts, or will it enable him to procure them to others, and ſo make him uſeful to them in the higheſt ſenſe, in what reſpects the true improvement of the mind, and therefore the true intereſt of man? will they, by an *activity* and attention, ſtill directed to ſomething *external* to the mind, be ever brought nearer *ſelf-enjoyment*, and rendered more truly wiſe, virtuous, and happy? We have inſtances enough of thoſe who feel and acknowledge their diſappointment in this way; high in

their expectations of outward good, and active in the purſuit of it, the happineſs they vainly graſp at flies their embrace, or diſappoints their hope.

It is plain, therefore, that in the *active* way of life, as directed chiefly to what is *ſenſible* and *external*, we find not theſe characters neceſſary to determine a wiſe man's choice in favour of it alone; we ſee that however much it may procure him all thoſe *external* gratifications of ſenſe or imagination, which are foreign to the mind, yet it can never, by this alone, render him truly happy in himſelf, or truly uſeful to others; ſuch happineſs and uſefulneſs depending not on material and ſenſible, but on mental or ſpiritual enjoyments and improvements.

Let us next conſider, therefore, how far theſe are affected by what we called the *contemplative* ſcheme of life, or how far any man, deliberating as we now ſuppoſe, would find that a *contemplative* life, engaged chiefly in what concerns the mind, would contribute to render him happy in himſelf, and uſeful to others.

That it would make him much *happier in himſelf*, is too evident to need reaſoning upon it; for as the *mind* is by all acknowledged the nobleſt, the *ſuperior* part of man, the happineſs belonging to it muſt alſo be ſuperior.

Here

Here it muſt be obſerved, that the enjoyments of every being are in proportion to its powers; two ſtates may be happy in their kind, and yet the one far preferable to the other; tho' therefore, the gratifications of ſenſe, or theſe enjoyments which reſpect the body only, be called Happineſs, and is the higheſt kind of it we can conceive brutes to attain to, yet is it as far excelled by the other, by what we call *mental* or rational happineſs, as theſe groſs, material, and corruptible bodies in which we are involved, are excelled by the active intellectual beings which animate and inform them: As, therefore, an attention to the enjoyments and improvement of the mind, bids faireſt for procuring true mental happineſs; and, as the contemplative man's attention is chiefly turned this way, his courſe of life bids faireſt for making him truly *happy in himſelf**; that it will not make him ſo *uſeful* or ſerviceable to *others*, in the way formerly mentioned, by helping them to the *outward* gratifications of vanity and ſenſe, will eaſily be granted, for this is not what he conſiders as of moſt conſe-

* ——————— And Wiſdom's ſelf,
Oft ſeeks to ſweet retired ſolitude,
Where, with her beſt nurſe, Contemplation,
She plumes her feathers, and lets grow her wings,
Which, in the various buſtle of reſort,
Were ſometimes ruffled, and perhaps impaired.
MILTON's MASK of COMUS.

quence to himſelf or others; but the improvement of their minds, in every moral, virtuous, and devout diſpoſition, he is, by this way of life, led to promote, juſt as much as he is led to promote his own intereſt in this reſpect; for. ſuch is the nature of true *mental* improvement, that it cannot but *diffuſe*, or, at leaſt, endeavour to diffuſe itſelf. No man can truly improve his own mind without improving in good will to mankind, and raiſing every poſſible deſire and endeavour to promote what appears to be their true intereſt: Not that the contemplative man's deſire of being uſeful in this way, will lead him officiouſly to mingle with the crowd of mankind, and to laviſh his inſtructions upon them indiſcriminately and promiſcuouſly; but he chuſes proper opportunities for this, and muſt not therefore be ſuppoſed to exclude himſelf entirely from their ſociety; when, however, his verbal admonitions cannot extend to them, the world is edified and improved by the literary productions of his philoſophic ſolitude; and I hope it will be allowed, that to be uſeful in this way of promoting inward mental improvement, in any degree, very far tranſcends the higheſt degree of that kind of uſefulneſs which lies only in procuring or heightning the external delights of ſenſe or fancy.

Before

Before we quit this ſubject, it may perhaps not be improper to ſubjoin a few hints for illuſtrating it, according to the other acceptation we mentioned of the terms in debate, that is by conſidering an *active* life to be only ſuch as engages a man moſt in the *common commerce* of mankind, and a *contemplative*, ſuch as withdraws him moſt from it; ſo that the queſtion here would be, Which of the two, publick buſineſs or ſolitude, outward occupation or ſtudy, a wiſe man would chuſe, in order to become happy in himſelf, and uſeful to others?

That the ſtudious or *contemplative* man has, when his ſtudies are rightly directed, to the regulation of his own mind in the firſt place, and, after that, to the cultivation of whatever branches of ſcience appear moſt conducive to the improvement and entertainment of himſelf and others, that in ſuch contemplations as theſe, I ſay, however ſolitary and recluſe, a man has more truly the enjoyment of himſelf, than when engaged in the buſy ſcenes of life, ſeems to be generally agreed: They may indeed, to a mind not formed or diſpoſed for ſuch contemplations, appear joyleſs and inſipid; but the objection that might ariſe from this diſlike of ſome to them, we obviated in the beginning, by laying it down as one of our poſitions, that the perſon whoſe election

we

we were to conſider muſt be ſuppoſed ſuch as had the command of his own mind, ſo far as to bring it to a reliſh of what he found in itſelf moſt eligible.

The other conſideration we reckoned neceſſary for determining his election was, in which of the two ways of life he might expect to be moſt uſeful to others, whether in the active courſe or in the ſtudious and contemplative? and here, if any where, muſt the men of buſineſs and action be ſuppoſed, by ſome, to have the advantage, becauſe many cannot ſo eaſily ſee, or at leaſt will not acknowledge a man's uſefulneſs to the world, while he appears wrapt up in himſelf, immured in ſolitude and abſtract contemplation; this miſtake ariſes from that common prejudice formerly mentioned in favour of outward ſenſible objects, as if they were the only proper objects of activity; without conſidering that the mental world, the proper field of contemplation, affords exerciſe to our faculties, in a way much more uſeful and extenſive than all that is comprehended within the regions of ſenſe. To prevent, however, all foundation for any objection of this kind, to the contemplative man's uſefulneſs, it may not be improper to add the following *obſervations*.

1. That

1. That however entertaining abſtract ſpeculations may be to himſelf, yet they will never render him ſo uſeful to others as theſe branchesof ſcience, which have a reſpect, either to the improvement of the *heart*, or the accommodation of life, particularly the former; to theſe, therefore, his application ſhould chiefly be directed, if he would prevent all foundation for that ſelf-condemning reflection with which the learned *Grotius* is ſaid to have cloſed his life and his ſtudies, "Vitam perdidi operoſe nihil agendo." I have loſt my life in painfully doing nothing.

2. For the ſame reaſons that the man of ſtudy and contemplation ought to apply himſelf chiefly to theſe branches of ſcience now mentioned, he ſhould alſo ſtudy the moſt effectual way that his circumſtances will permit of *communicating* his ſentiments and inſtructions to others, though it ſhould be ſometimes at the expence of his own eaſe, by mingling more in their ſociety than would otherwiſe be agreeable to him.

3. The contemplative man would likewiſe do well to obſerve, that he has much more need than the man of buſineſs and action, to have all well regulated within himſelf, ſo that he may calmly bear his own review, becauſe he is more in the way of looking ſometimes into himſelf, and having many ſelf-approving

or condemning hours, than thoſe whoſe attention is generally engaged by things without them.

To all this it may be added, that as the good of ſociety requires a mixture of various characters and occupations, however much ſome of theſe may appear ſuperior, or, at leaſt, more eligible than others, yet the man who applies to contemplation and improves by it, will have no ſuch opinion of his own ſuperiority, as will lead him ſuperciliouſly to deſpiſe the meaneſt mechanic whoſe talents are made any way ſubſervient to the general good; ſuperior knowledge will juſtify ſuch contempt, even leſs than ſuperior riches and honours.

The all-wiſe Author of our being has not deſigned all of us for philoſophers, politicians, or lawgivers, he has endowed us with a variety of talents and capacities, according to the various ſpheres and circumſtances in which he has appointed us to act, with a view to the great end of our being: In all theſe, however, there is a certain degree of diſengagement from outward things, which he has made neceſſary to our reliſhing or attaining that *higher happineſs* deſcribed in our fourth diſſertation, which conſiſts in an *intire conformity of heart and life to his will, and conſequent ſenſe of his favour.*

Before

. Before we diſmiſs this ſubject, therefore, we ſhall offer a few hints (as promiſed in the fourth diſſertation) with reſpect to that DISENGAGEMENT *from the world* which religion requires, and which (when conſidered in a juſt light) has the teſtimony both of reaſon and experience in its favour, as of the greateſt importance to our preſent and future happineſs.

All men would wiſh to be happy. Whence is it then that they come to be ſo oft in miſery and diſquiet? Experience will direct to an anſwer: They are generally taken up in the purſuit of things which they expect to be happy in, and find themſelves diſappointed, being neither able to ſecure the poſſeſſion of them, nor meeting with the looked for returns of enjoyment and ſatisfaction while they have them; though an elevation of the ſoul to GOD, the Author of its exiſtence and happineſs, might ſeem natural, eaſy, and agreeable to its original dignity and derivation of all perfection from him, yet ſo much is it fallen from its original date, that we may almoſt ſay of it now, that, inſtead of the heart's aſcending naturally to GOD, and uniting eaſily with him, it ſeems rather natural to it to gravitate, as it were, towards theſe inferior objects now mentioned, ſo that we muſt meet with many diſappointments from them and

many

many inſtances of their inſufficiency for our happineſs before we can be brought to renounce them, and look for happineſs in him in whom alone it is to be found. The things which thus delude us are ſenſible and worldly things, the pleaſures, the honours and the riches of this world, courting our ſenſes, and ingroſſing our hearts in a thouſand different forms, according to the difference of our natural diſpoſitions and manner of life; but the inſufficiency of theſe for our happineſs will appear from the ſlighteſt view of them. For,

Firſt, As to what are commonly called the *pleaſures* of life, the gratifications of mere ſenſe*, whether of a groſſer or more refined nature, we all own there is nothing in them that can give any ſatisfaction ſolid and laſting, and ſuited to the capacity of a rational being. Had not, indeed, our wiſe and merciful Creator indued us with reaſon and underſtanding above the fowls of the air and the beaſts of the field, had we been made capable of reliſhing no higher happineſs than that of the brute creation around us, then might ſenſual pleaſure have been reckoned ſuitable enough to our nature, and high enough for us to aſpire after: But is there any man ſo mean and degenerate as to think that God has not deſigned

* True happineſs ne'er enter'd at an Eye;
True happineſs reſides in things unſeen.
YOUNG.

ed and qualified him for ſomething higher than the brutes? Is there any ſo vile and corrupt as that he would not be thought to have a reliſh for any higher pleaſures than (to ſpeak in the emphatick language of ſcripture) thoſe of the dog, who delights in his vomit, or the ſow that wallows in the mire? Such meanneſs as this is what none of us, I dare ſay, would wiſh to be charged with, we have generally ſo much ſenſe of the dignity of our nature, or, at leaſt, ſo much natural pride, that we would be thought to have ſouls above ſuch brutal enjoyments and purſuits. But alas! whatever way men would be thought of, it is certain they really are often, if not generally, engaged in ſeeking after thoſe very pleaſures of ſenſe and appetite which they ſo much pretend to deſpiſe, and by which they are ſet on a level with the beaſts that periſh. We may uſe a great deal of ſubtilty and take great pains in juſtifying to ourſelves or others ſuch an attention to the concerns of the body, as neceſſary or unavoidable in our preſent ſtate of connection with it, but I am afraid moſt of our reaſonings to this purpoſe are only ſelf-deluſion; for, however much they may juſtify a moderate attention to the ſimple demands of nature for our preſent comfortable ſupport, they will never juſtify an anxious concern about our future eaſe and

 convenience,

conveniency, or our taking up ſo much of our time and thoughts in this way as may in the leaſt encroach upon the nobler offices of this life, or divert us from the improvement of our minds into a fitneſs for the next.

It is true indeed, we are not all equally groſs and ſenſual in our deſires after what we ſhall eat or what we ſhall drink, we may, by our particular circumſtances, education, and natural conſtitution be led to temperance and moderation, in reſpect of ſome of the *pleaſures* of life, and may therefore flatter ourſelves that we are ſufficiently *diſengaged* from the world, even while we allow other vanities to take up that place in our hearts which is due to GOD only; but, before he can be ſaid to have the reception due to him there, we muſt break off all engagement to every earthly pleaſure that ſeems to *rival* him in our affections, ſo as our chief, our higheſt delight may be in him, his enjoyment, worſhip and obedience.

And not only muſt we be, in order to that diſengagement we are ſpeaking of, indifferent to the pleaſures of life, but likewiſe to its *pains* and *calamities*, ſo far as to let no childiſh fear of them deter or diſcourage us from what we know to be our duty: Here I am afraid, we ſhall find ſtill more difficulty than in the former caſe, as the patient encountering

countering or bearing any hardſhip and diſtreſs appointed us, requires more reſolution than reſtraining our deſires, and renouncing any ſuperfluous pleaſure we are poſſeſſed of; and yet it is certain we ſhall never get our affections ſteadily fixt on God, if we are too eaſily diſconcerted and diſcompoſed by the common afflictions of life, unleſs we fortify our minds againſt any ſaviſh fear of *pain*, at the ſame time that we moderate our deſires to every worldly pleaſure and delight, without exception, that threatens to draw us off from the love and obedience of our merciful Creator, our never-failing Friend and Benefactor; "He that loveth father or mother more than "him, is not worthy of him, he that loveth "ſon or daughter more than him, is not wor-"thy of him, and he that taketh not up his "croſs and followeth after him, is not wor-"thy of him."

But there are many who can ſay that they are *diſengaged* from the world, ſo far as not to be ſollicitous about what we commonly call the *pleaſures* of ſenſe and appetite, and yet they have other worldly purſuits that draw off their attention from the ſovereign good; their aim may be at *honour* and preferment in the world, at the *favour* and vain applauſe of men, thereby to gratify their pride and ambition, and ſet themſelves above others about

them; this we mentioned as a diſtinct branch from the former, but which we muſt alſo be *diſengaged* from, before we can get the deſires of our ſouls turned towards that object who is truly worthy of them; for in this, as well as moſt other caſes, it is not the affection itſelf that religion diſapproves, but the injudicious choice of its object; ſo far as *ambition* leads us to diſtinguiſh ourſelves for wiſdom and goodneſs, and to promote the honour and glory of our Maker, it may be reckoned one of the nobleſt principles implanted in the human breaſt; but it is the *abuſe* of it, into a deſire of gaining the favour, reſpect, or ſervile ſubmiſſion of others, even at the expence of our integrity, piety and virtue, which religion requires our being *diſengaged* from. Many of us may poſſibly be very much ſtrangers to theſe wild projects of pride and ambition, by which the affairs of mankind are often diſtracted, and the minds of many others, in higher ſtations of life, diſquieted and taken off from the purſuit of true happineſs; but, however low a man's rank may be in the world, the occaſions of being thus diſturbed, and engaged in the purſuit of worldly honours and preferment, are not wanting to him; the meaneſt of us may have deſires above his circumſtances, and, by a vain endeavour of diſtinguiſhing himſelf, and gaining the praiſe, admiration

admiration and favour of men, may make himſelf very unhappy here, and very unfit for reliſhing or obtaining that ſpiritual happineſs propoſed to us hereafter in the love and favour of God.

There remains however a *third ſort* of worldly deſires ſtill more inconſiſtent with the love of GOD and goodneſs than any thing we have as yet mentioned, and that is the extravagant purſuit of *wealth or riches*, which, however evidently inſignificant in themſelves, and unable to make us happy, are too often ſeen to ingroſs the minds of many to a degree of devotion or worſhip; nor is there any affection of mind that ſeparates more between God and us than this inordinate concern about amaſſing together worldly wealth of any kind, to provide, we may pretend, for a family, or to ſecure againſt future events, as if we were not under the continual care of an all-ruling providence, whoſe goodneſs we may ever truſt to, ſo far as to take no thought about heaping up its preſent gifts, for fear that it may afterwards prove leſs liberal to us than it ought to be.

Thus then we ſee what kind of objects we muſt be *diſengaged* from, before the true happineſs of the ſoul can be reliſhed, purſued or attained by us, and a *diſengagement* from theſe is the *firſt* ſtep to be taken, and perhaps the

moſt difficult, in our advancement to the reſemblance and enjoyment of God; the moſt difficult, I ſay, in ſo much that however clearly it may be underſtood by thoſe who have felt or practiſed it, it cannot eaſily be conceived by thoſe who have not; and of this laſt ſort there are, I'm afraid, too many, who look upon a *religious diſengagement* from the world, ſuch as we would here with to recommend, either as a thing intirely chimerical and no where to be found, or as an enthuſiaſtick degree of goodneſs, that would ſink the buſy enterprizing part of mankind, into an ignominious ſtate of inactivity and reſt. On the other hand we'll find there are who think, that, if they have renounced a few of thoſe worldly things they were formerly taken up with, they have ſufficiently practiſed this duty.

To remove both theſe miſtakes, let us conſider further the *nature and reaſonableneſs* of that diſengagement required from ſuch objects as were juſt now deſcribed, with the *properties* belonging to it, and *means* of acquiring it.

By a *religious diſengagement* from the world, that is, from the worldly objects and purſuits juſt now mentioned, muſt be underſtood, not any unſocial retirement from it, nor any indolent diſregard of the neceſſary callings and connections appointed us by providence; this, if ſome extraordinary circumſtances do not

call

call to it, would be impiouſly to defeat the very end of our being; it would be deſerting the poſt appointed us by the Almighty Sovereign of the univerſe, and we may be aſſured true religion is far from leading to this; ſo that wherever any man appears idle and remiſs, in the neceſſary affairs of life, any pretence of religion as the cauſe of it, is only to cover his own indolence or weakneſs, and will never juſtify him at giving an account of his ſtewardſhip to the all-knowing Searcher of hearts. To be religiouſly diſengaged from the world, is to be taken off, not from any part of our duty in it, but from every thing that is inconſiſtent with duty, it is to have our affections elevated above * this life, to conſider it as of no further value than as we have therein the opportunity of preparing ourſelves for a better, and to be diſengaged from every thing in it that can any way diſqualify us for this, ever ready to reſign our all with chearfulneſs when called for, to his hands who gave us it. This is the only way of being ſuperior to the world, and avoiding an ignoble ſubjection to it.

The *reaſonableneſs* of practiſing and cultivating this habit of mind, of endeavouring to draw

* A man on earth, devoted to the ſkies,
Like ſhips in ſeas, while in, above the world.
YOUNG.

draw off our affections from an immoderate attachment to earthly and ſenſible things, is a ſubject which we cannot too often and ſeriouſly dwell upon, as it will take our utmoſt care and pains, to get our minds ſo deeply impreſſed with it, as that we may ſtand our ground, and ſteadily purſue that which appears to be our true intereſt and happineſs, amidſt the enſnaring delights of ſenſe which continually ſurround us. There are two ways by which we may reaſon ourſelves into that religious *diſengagement* from worldly and ſenſible things juſt now deſcribed; the one is by taking a juſt view of their intrinſic *value* in themſelves, and the other by reviewing our own *experience* of their vanity: The *firſt* conſideration may appear ſomewhat ſubtile and refined, but it will pave the way for the other, and weigh much with every thinking perſon.

Firſt then, I ſay, the reaſonableneſs of raiſing our minds above the things of this world, will appear evidently from conſidering their real value and importance to our happineſs as rational beings. The leaſt attention to the condition of our natures muſt convince us, that, as we are endowed with rational and immortal *ſouls*, whatever contributes moſt to their happineſs and perfection, deſerves the

firſt

firſt place in our attention and regard, ſo that the things of this life, with which we are connected only by our *body*, and from which conſequently we muſt be ſeparated by our ſeparation from the body, deſerve to be valued and purſued by us no further, than as they contribute to the good and improvement of our *minds*, in order to ſome higher and more durable happineſs, challenging our higheſt attention; for, in our preſent ſtate, we are ſo placed as to have our attention divided between ſenſible and ſpiritual things, between the concerns of this life and thoſe of the next; theſe two make a kind of competition for our regard, and we are left to chuſe which of them we will prefer, tho' it is impoſſible we can long doubt which of them deſerves our preference, whether the gratification of our bodily ſenſes and deſires, or the improvement of our ſouls into a conformity to the divine nature and will.

Nor are theſe two, when conſidered in a juſt light, inconſiſtent with one another: When our Creator placed us in ſuch a ſtate as requires ſome attention to the ordinary concerns of life, we may be aſſured he never will require of us a thing ſo inconſiſtent with our condition as the being intirely abſtracted from theſe, or giving up all manner of intercourſe and connection with the world, for this would

prevent

prevent our anſwering the purpoſes of his providence in ſending us into it; what he enjoins us is, the putting no more than a juſt value on it; what he plainly intends, by placing us in ſuch a ſtate of connection with, and dependence upon outward and ſenſible things, is to exerciſe our inward graces and virtues, to put us to the trial, and make us draw ſome inward mental improvement from every outward circumſtance we are placed in. Thus, when we are in want or outward diſtreſs, it is to try our ſubmiſſion to his will, to teach us humility and patience when afflicted, and prepare us for the exerciſe of gratitude when delivered: When we ſee others in want or diſtreſs around us, is it that God could not eaſily have prevented this, and appointed a way of having them all ſupplied and relieved immediately by himſelf, or ſo ordered men's condition as that none of them ſhould ſtand in need of any ſuch occaſional ſucceſſive ſupplies and relief? all this he could eaſily have done, but he choſe to make the intervention or inſtrumentality of their fellow-men neceſſary for this purpoſe, for the ſake of cheriſhing habits of charity and compaſſion in them. Thus alſo when we are ſurrounded with all the pleaſures and conveniencies of life, our chriſtian fortitude is exerciſed in keeping our minds unpolluted by and diſengaged from them,

them, as well as attentive to ſomething higher, and ready to be reſigned when deprived of them; it was for ſuch purpoſes as theſe, that we were involved in bodies periſhing and corruptible, not for the ſake of any addition that their enjoyments can make to our happineſs, but that we might draw inward, moral, or ſpiritual improvement, from the intercourſe by them eſtabliſhed with things without us, if we conſider them in the right point of view, as deſerving no further attention than as they are made ſubſervient to this end.

The unreaſonableneſs and folly of any ſtronger engagement than was now mentioned, to this world and the things thereof, will yet further appear from

The *other* conſideration we took notice of, namely our own *experience* of their vanity, that is, of their changeableneſs, inconſtancy and inſufficiency, even for giving us preſent happineſs and ſatisfaction, ſubjects often ſpoken of, and plain from every one's experience, but whoſe influence on practice is too little to be ſeen. It is indeed one ſtrong proof of our being deſigned for ſomething higher than can be obtained or enjoyed in this life, that we never meet with any thing in it which can give us that enjoyment or improvement of which we find ourſelves capable, or that even continues to give us ſo much

much pleaſure and ſatisfaction as we may have once expected from it; when we receive any new addition to our wealth and fortune, any preferment perhaps, or ſettlement in the world, much deſired for ourſelves or for our friends, then we think all will be well with us, and that it will always give us the ſame pleaſure as at firſt, yea and though we find ourſelves diſappointed in ſome inſtances, yet we ſtill go on in the ſame round of folly and ſelf deceit, until at length it become extremely difficult, and almoſt impoſſible for us, to get our minds diſengaged from what we know to be undeſerving of our eſteem; our wiſeſt method, therefore, would be to reſolve, that if we have been once deceived in this manner, we ſhall not be ſo a ſecond time; that we ſhall loſe no time in diſengaging ourſelves from theſe vanities, in quitting our attachments to every thing that has the leaſt tendency to draw us off from the paths of virtue, from the love of God and true goodneſs: The conſciouſneſs of this will be a never-failing ſource of joy and delight, while every thing elſe is found to diſappoint us, even in this life, and will much more be found to do ſo in the next, when the condition of our ſouls ſhall be laid open, and an eternal ſeparation put between us and thoſe periſhing

delights

delights of ſenſe, by which we had formerly allowed ourſelves, even againſt the conviction of our own minds, to be corrupted and enſlaved.

Many things more might be ſaid to recommend that religious and devout *Diſengagement from the World*, which we are conſidering; the perſuaſives to it in ſcripture are innumerable, particularly in the whole of our Saviour's life and doctrine. One of the moſt celebrated enemies of our religion was forced to own, that there was no argument in defence of Chriſtianity more difficult for him to anſwer than this, That after all his enquiries into the life of CHRIST, he could not find one inſtance of his being engaged in any worldly deſigns and purſuits; and, indeed, whoever conſiders aright our Saviour's life and doctrine in this view, muſt ſee ſomething in them more than human; ſome features of divinity not to be found in any fictitious or political ſcheme of religion, that ever appeared in the world; for (to proſecute this argument a little further) as our condition and continuance in this world, is by all owned to bear very little proportion to what we look for in the next, we muſt, however ignorant of the nature of our future condition, always ſuppoſe its intereſts and enjoyments to be ſuch as concern us infinitely above every thing in this

life; ſo that any meſſenger to us from the other world, may naturally be ſuppoſed to bend his chief care towards the giving us a high opinion of it, and drawing off our affection from all theſe periſhing things in this life which are inconſiſtent with it, when he ſees us ſet on them to our own deſtruction. The intereſts of another life are evidently our higheſt intereſts; the advancing them therefore, in preference to all temporal concerns, muſt be the peculiar province of true religion, and the peculiar deſign of any inſtructions or manifeſtations to us from that God, who has always our higheſt good in view; ſo that whatever doctrine does not ſeem directed for promoting this, can never be thought directed by God, or deſigned for the true happineſs of mankind; but, on the other hand, where any teacher, or any doctrine, appears to conſider preſent and future things in a juſt light, to value them as they really deſerve, and, of conſequence, to turn our thoughts and affections from the things of this tranſient ſtate, as of very ſmall value and importance to us, towards the concerns of a future endleſs ſtate; wherever, I ſay, any teacher gives ſuch evidence of his acquaintance with another world, by exemplifying in himſelf, and recommending to others a juſt regard to its ſuperior intereſts, as well as a juſt contempt of every

thing

thing here below, ſuch a teacher may be preſumed to have his commiſſion from on high, and deſerves to be hearkned to accordingly; but where were theſe ever ſo remarkably diſplayed as in the life and doctrine of the *Chriſtian* REDEEMER? Where was he ever ſeen anxiouſly providing againſt the hardſhips and diſtreſſes of human life, or indulging himſelf in its unneceſſary pleaſures? What he taught that he practiſed; he did not lay up for himſelf treaſure on earth; neither took he any thought about its ſhort-lived enjoyments and purſuits; theſe to him were nothing when compared to the heavenly joys in his view; and whether his followers, in all ages, do actually practiſe the ſame *diſengagement from the world*, or not, it is certain the arguments and injunctions to it never were more repeated, enforced, and exemplified, than by him.

From what has been ſaid, joined to any ſerious reflection on the different occurrences of life, we may eaſily ſee that a *diſengagement from the World*, ſuch as has been deſcribed, is a diſpoſition both reaſonable and ſuitable to our preſent ſtate; but, that we may the better underſtand it, and know when we are poſſeſſed of it, there are ſome of its characters or properties, which we promiſed here to take notice of, as

1. That it muſt be *deliberate* and *compoſed*, proceeding from a fair and diligent examination of the real value of theſe different objects that preſent themſelves to us, and ſollicit our regard. Upon meeting with ſome worldly croſſes and diſappointments, many have formed good enough reſolutions of renouncing their former fond attachment to ſenſible pleaſures and purſuits, and been perhaps, for ſome time, heartily out of humour with the world, till better ſucceſs has reconciled them to it; but this is far from that calm and rational diſengagement from it which religion requires, and which proceeds from no inſolent contempt of others, nor from any unnatural diſregard to the intereſts of mankind, ſuch as appears in theſe peeviſh and capricious devotees now mentioned; but from a juſt ſenſe of the excellency of our nature as men, and the ſanctity of our calling as Chriſtians, directing us to fix our aims on ſomething nobler and more exalted than the pleaſures of ſenſe and appetite; to delight ourſelves, not with the mere poſſeſſion of the good things of this life, but with the judicious uſe of them, for adminiſtring to the neceſſities, and contributing to the good of others; all this being neceſſary to qualify us for any higher ſpheres of enjoyment and perfection we may hereafter be deſigned for.

This

'This reaſonable and deliberate *diſengagement* of our affections from all worldly purſuits and concerns, is what may be practiſed in any ſtation of life, however much involved in its neceſſary employments and affairs, as all that is required is, not the giving up entirely with theſe, but the proſecuting them in ſuch a way as may make them ſubſervient to the higher purpoſes for which we were created; not but that ſome have, by their ſtation and circumſtances, more advantage in this way than others; or that the man, who is neceſſarily engaged in all the hurry and noiſe of tumultuous life, can be as much diſengaged from it as the hermit in his diſtant cell. This can never be expected or required; we have, in this, as well as in other inſtances, our different talents and opportunities to anſwer for, ſome more, ſome leſs; yet ſtill it muſt be acknowledged, that in no condition or circumſtances, we need be ſo entirely immerſed in worldly affairs, as to hurt our integrity and innocence, or have our attention quite removed from our eternal and more momentous concerns.

From this *deliberation* and compoſure of thought, in drawing off our minds from too ſtrong an attachment to ſenſible things, there follows

Another certain character of ſuch a *diſengagement*, namely, that it will be *conſtant* and

uniform on all occaſions, and not varying with the different changes of our outward circumſtances and fortune, as is too often the caſe with us, when we lay down to ourſelves reſolutions and rules of conduct, whoſe conſequences we have not maturely weighed. In vain, therefore, will any man pretend to be *diſengaged* from the world, and devoted to God, unleſs he can bring himſelf, not by ſtarts only, but at all times, to look with indifference on the enſnaring delights of ſenſe, as ſoon as they appear to attract too much of his regard, and unleſs he can ſtrengthen his reſolutions againſt all the viciſſitudes of human life.

The only other property I ſhall mention is, that our *diſengagement* from the world, in order to our being devoted to the love and ſervice of God, muſt be *entire* and *unreſerved*; a heart divided betwixt God and the world, will be but a poor offering to our Maker, who alone has the juſt title to it. There is indeed nothing in which we are apter to impoſe upon ourſelves than this, of thinking that we may retain *ſome* vanities, ſome worldly deſires and purſuits, that are moſt agreeable to our temper and inclination, imagining them innocent, or at leaſt excuſable, if we give up with other things that ly not ſo much in our way. Thus the man who deſpiſes riches and pleaſures, thinks himſelf perhaps ſufficiently diſengaged from

from the world, and that he may purſue his ambitious projects with a ſafe conſcience, as, on the other hand, the ſenſual and covetous man flatters himſelf, that, if he baniſhes pride and ambition, he puts ſufficient bounds to his deſires; but let no man deceive himſelf here, God is not to be mocked by ſuch a partial ſurrender of ourſelves to him; nor indeed ſhall we ever have that entire ſatisfaction we wiſh for in our own minds, that "peace of "God which paſſeth underſtanding," unleſs every idol of our hearts be ſacrificed to him, every thought and affection brought into obedience to his will.

I ſhall only further take notice of two means or directions for attaining that deliberate, conſtant, and unreſerved *diſengagement from the world*, which we have been deſcribing; and

The *firſt* is, only to take a *ſerious view* of it, coolly to conſider what ſatisfaction we have ever got, or expect to get from it. If we ſaw a man deeply engaged in any unprofitable branch of trade, without ever caſting up his gains by it, or changing it for a better and more profitable, when in his offer, we would very juſtly condemn him; or if we ſaw our friend much bent upon obtaining any inheritance or office, without ever conſidering the dangers he run by it, or the returns it was to make him,

we

we would certainly think him very raſh and imprudent; if we would be our own friends, therefore, ſhould we not ſeriouſly conſider, when engaged in the eager purſuit of the things of this life, what danger we run, and what advantage we have reaped, or expect to reap from them? and indeed a cool reflection on theſe would be enough to make us reliniquiſh moſt of our wordly purſuits.

The other mean of *diſengaging* our minds from this world, is frequently to *meditate* on the next; to dwell often in our thoughts on the ſublimity and purity of theſe future endleſs delights, which reaſon and ſcripture propoſe as the great mark we ought always to aim at; the *habitual* contemplation of theſe, will certainly put us out of conceit with the fading vanities of this life, eſpecially when they appear to prejudice our eternal intereſts; and there cannot be a ſtronger mark of the depravity and degeneracy of our natures, than to ſee the coldneſs and indifference with which we receive the certain, and almoſt demonſtrable aſſurances of our being deſigned for the moſt exalted happineſs and perfection our nature is capable of, if we are not wanting to ourſelves in the means of arriving at it. The livelieſt views we can have of our future condition, come indeed far ſhort of the reality of things, as they ſhall afterwards appear; yet

yet ſtill, methinks, they might leſſen our value for all mean and ſenſual enjoyments, and moderate our purſuit of them, in like manner as a hearty engagement in the more important buſineſs of life, leaves no room to be taken up with trifling amuſements. Let our chief intereſts, therefore, engroſs the whole capacity of our ſouls: Let the habitual contemplation of future glories, diſengage our minds from all the ſordid views and purſuits of this vain world; that, when it with its enchantments are diſſolved, our portion may ſtill remain to us, our views of GOD, and evidences of his favour, may be unclouded, and our ſouls admitted into an indiſſoluble union with that infinitely perfect Being, from whom all bliſs, being, and perfection, are derived.

DISSER-

DISSERTATION VII.

ON

EDUCATION.

THE title hereto prefixed informs of the ſubject I have now in view; and tho' I allow the reſult of my enquiries and reflections, with reſpect to it, to paſs under the name of a *Diſſertation*, in common with the preceeding tracts, yet it is not ſo much my intention, to treat of it in the philoſophical or didactic way, as in the practical; there being no ſubject that has more immediate reſpect to practice, than EDUCATION: Thoſe who are no philoſophers muſt have it long committed to them; but, like other ſciences of moſt general utility, it muſt have its foundation in theory; there muſt be ſome inſight into human nature; ſome knowledge of the powers and principles implanted in it; the improvement they are capable of; the great end in view by ſuch improvement; and the moſt effectual way of conducting the mind towards it. In the knowledge of all theſe lies the

the *Theory* of *Education*; and, for this, I beg leave to refer to the preceeding Diſſertations.

To ſay much on the importance of Education, that is, of having it carefully attended to and conducted, is alſo unneceſſary, as is every ſort of labour, to prove what men generally admit; and, with reſpect to Education, it will eaſily be admitted, that the difference betwixt one man and another, as to every branch of improvement, mental or corporeal, generally ſpeaking, ariſes as much from this, as from any original eſſential difference, in reſpect of conſtitution or capacity.

What we now chiefly propoſe is, to conſider *Education*, in its progreſs through the different periods of life; or, rather, through that part of life, to which it principally has reſpect, and which is commonly conſidered as terminating on our arrival at manhood. The age at which this is commonly fixed is well known, but no general rule will ſuit all caſes here: The growth of the underſtanding (which may be ſuppoſed the moſt neceſſary requiſite to manhood) admits of as great diverſity as that of the body; ſome are farther advanced at ſixteen than others at the age of twenty; but, as the conduct of affairs in life makes it neceſſary, that a certain rule ſhould be eſtabliſhed as to this, extending to all caſes, without

diſtinction

diſtinction of characters or capacities. We find that one third part, or nearly ſo, of the common extent of active life, is ſuppoſed to paſs, before manhood or maturity of years, and of intellect, is attained. Previous to this, three leſſer periods may be reckoned, to which Education muſt have reſpect; theſe are, Infancy, Childhood, and Youth, allowing ſix or ſeven years to each of them, as much preciſion here is neither neceſſary nor practicable. During the

Firſt of theſe PERIODS (whether called by the name of INFANCY, or any other) the buſineſs of *Education* may be ſaid to have reſpect rather to the corporeal ſyſtem than to the mental, tho' the latter alſo is not to be entirely over-looked, during the whole of this period, they are, indeed, ſo nearly connected with one another, that a total inattention to either of them, might be prejudicial to both. It muſt, however, be always remembered, that what has reſpect to the bodily part, muſt be conſidered and attended to, in a ſubſerviency to the other; and, with this view, it muſt not be thought a matter of little or no conſequence, even in infancy, before the powers of the mind are unfolded, to give a particular attention to the ſtate of the body; an attention deſcending to ſome things, which, however minute,

minute, cannot be thought trivial, but by the undiſcerning and unexperienced.

The *firſt* of this kind that occurs is the buſineſs of *Nurſing:* As to this, it will be enough to make one obſervation, which extends to many other caſes, that we may afterwards have occaſion to mention; and that is, that wherever the method, which nature moſt obviouſly points out, muſt be departed from, the leſs this is done the better. When (as is often the caſe) mothers cannot ſuckle their own children, their place would be beſt ſupplied, by thoſe who are moſt nearly of the ſame age and complexion, but with as much advantage as poſſible, in reſpect of health and conſtitution. Nothing, but an unavoidable neceſſity, will juſtify the nurſing of infants by the ſpoon, inſtead of ſuckling them; or the making choice of a nurſe, with that hurry and precipitation with which it is often done, tho' nature gives ſuch early warning with reſpect to it. Whoever felt the inconvenience of changing them, upon the diſcovery of conſtitutional diſeaſes, want of milk, ſluggiſhneſs, and the like, (all which they endeavour artfully to conceal as much as poſſible) will not think it unneceſſary to take this warning as to nurſes. What proof they may formerly have given of their ſucceſs, and what regimen

they then obſerved, ought chiefly to be attended to.

Beſides her being healthful and careful, I cannot help mentioning *Chearfulneſs* as a qualification of particular importance to a nurſe, by giving hopes of her promoting the health and livelineſs of the child, while ſhe only gratifies her own humour and affection, by the frequent but careful dandling of it.

Nor can we condemn the attention, which ſome have recommended, in reſpect of pregnant mothers, as well as nurſes, in the way of preventing whatever may diſturb, deject, or diſcompoſe them, and ſtudying to promote their eaſe of mind, ſerenity and chearfulneſs, as having a beneficial influence on the fruit of their care, on the embryo or infant, as well as on themſelves.

The good effect of the *cold bath* as to health, at every time of life, and particularly in infancy, is ſo univerſally admitted, that there would be no occaſion for mentioning it, were it not to introduce a remark or two, with reſpect to the manner of managing it; which is, that, as the ſeat of diſeaſes, with infants, is chiefly in the head and upper parts of the body, care ſhould be taken to bathe theſe firſt: And again, that, tho' ſome occaſional diſorders may make it neceſſary to diſcontinue the uſe of the cold bath for a little, or, at leaſt,

leaſt, to make it leſs cold, yet care ſhould be taken to return, as ſoon as poſſible, to the former regimen; a miſtaken tenderneſs as to this, has often given occaſion to ricketiſh diſorders, and weakneſs of conſtitution, which might, by a judicious uſe of the cold bath in infancy, have been prevented.

For the ſame reaſon that cold bathing is mentioned, as having ſo much influence on health, ſome notice muſt alſo be taken of *Cloathing*, particularly in infancy, when all ſtraitneſs, and unneceſſary warmth, are to be carefully avoided. This rule, and the reaſon of it, are ſo univerſally admitted, that no enlargement on them is neceſſary, however fit it may be to recommend a greater attention to them in practice; as alſo to the manner of bringing infants, gradually, to uſe their tender limbs, without occaſioning any diſtortion or deformity, which they may afterwards be unable to get rid of.

When the means of health are mentioned, it might be expected, that ſome notice ſhould alſo be taken of the *diſeaſes* peculiar to this period; but, unleſs they are prevented, or mitigated in their effects, by the uſe of ſimple means, there is little room to hope, for their being remedied, at this age, by any of thoſe compound medicinal preparations, which might, in a more advanced period of life, be

cannot eaſily fall in with Monſ. Rouſſeau, in neglecting or taking no charge of ſuch children as are conſtitutionally weak and ſickly: By this rule, the celebrated Monſ. Paſchal, Mr Boyle, and many others of diſtinguiſhed character and genius, would have ſhared the fate of the Hebrew children in Egypt, and the world have been deprived of their incomparable labours.

But, is there as yet (you will ſay) no room for any higher object of attention? very little indeed, till the dawnings of reaſon begin to appear; and, when they do, your firſt care muſt be, to prevent any *wrong habits* being contracted.

In infancy and childhood, it is remarkable, how eaſily any infection is caught, any *habits** of body or mind contracted, from the example and imitation of thoſe who are often with us, eſpecially if they are ſuch as we are led to regard, with particular affection or eſteem: Even bodily attitudes, the moſt aukward, I have known to be thus acquired, and long retained.

* To eſtabliſh *habits*---it is not enough to give rules or inſtructions——Example, with conſequent imitation, will have more effect, and cuſtom is a frequent and uniform reiteration of acts, long continued.——The acquiſition of language is enough to ſhew the power of cuſtom and habit; for from this only ariſes any facility in the uſe of one language rather than another.

Habits of impudence or baſhfulneſs, obſtinacy or pliableneſs, ſincerity or inſincerity, we may likewiſe often ſee imbibed by infants, when advancing in years; from, perhaps, the example of the moſt contemptible, of thoſe whoſe company they have moſt acceſs to, and delight in.

How is all this, you will ſay, to be prevented or remedied? It is to be done, by a proper choice of thoſe who are about them; by not allowing them to paſs too much of their time among ſervants and dependents, or thoſe who would either humour or croſs them injudiciouſly; by keeping them, as much as poſſible, in the company of ſuch as may, by imitation, lead them to *good habits*, (for of this alſo they are ſoon capable) by obſerving carefully when they begin to contract bad ones, ſo as to check them ſoon; and, as there is danger that parents may not be ſo quick-ſighted with reſpect to this, it might be of uſe to make them, ſometimes, undergo the inſpection of ſuch as would be leſs partial to their faults.

Another direction, ſuited even to the age of infants, tho' not confined to this period, is to encourage an *inquiſitive diſpoſition** in them, to

* *Curioſity* is weak in old age, but ſtrong in infancy and youth; and as it is peculiar to the human ſpecies, it gives them an unſpeakable advantage over other animals, in the acquiſition of knowledge and improvement of their ſuperior capacities.

to give anſwers to their queſtions, in ſuch a way as may make ſome impreſſion on their fancy, in order to their being remembred: Hence it is that the uſe of fables is ſo proper at this age, when any traces in the memory wear out very ſoon, if it has no aſſiſtance, in this way, from the fancy or imagination, they cannot be too ſoon accuſtomed likewiſe to reaſon a little, and to draw juſt inferences or concluſions from what they ſee and hear.

To accuſtom them early to *reſtrain appetite*, or have it under ſome command, is alſo of great conſequence; were they even engaged, rather *voluntarily* than by any exertion of authority, to deny themſelves ſome gratifications; rather voluntarily, I ſay, than by an exertion of *authority*, which is a way of managing them that ſhould be extended to all other caſes likewiſe; for the engaging them, as it were of themſelves, to do what is right, would give the greateſt hopes of their perſevering in it.

But authority there muſt be, in ſome hand or other, however ſeldom, and however gently it may be uſed; it is neither neceſſary, nor proper, that this authority ſhould be in many hands, elſe there may be ſometimes a claſhing of it, or it may work a kind of ſervility; but, in ſome one hand at leaſt there muſt be ſuch authority, to be exerted when neceſſary; and

and, in order to its having the proper effect, in this as well as in all other caſes, there muſt be a perſuaſion, as to him who exerciſes it, that he has an affection for them, with a ſincere deſire and intention of doing them good; and that, for doing this, beſides affection and integrity, he is poſſeſſed of wiſdom and capacity, far ſuperior to their own, ſo as to know much better than they do, what is good for them, and how the ſame may be attained; the great difficulty here will be, to preſerve that affection ſpoken of, without ſuch a miſtaken tenderneſs, as may either hinder the exerciſing authority when proper, or the allowing our infant charge to be expoſed to ſome little pains, hazards and hardſhips, that may be neceſſary to prevent debility of body or mind.

One other particular remains to be ſpoke to, as to this period, and that is, How far it will admit of ſome attention to *books* or *ſtudy*, of any kind? There is no doubt but there have been inſtances of great proficiency made by ſome extraordinary geniuſes, even in the period we are now ſpeaking of; ſuch as Monſieur Paſchal, Grotius, Taſſo and others; but theſe are, by no means, to be drawn into precedents; it may rather, with more ſafety, be admitted, as a general rule, that, to have the faculties of mind and body invigorated, and

and prepared for future employment, ſhould rather be the object of attention during this period, than any premature exerciſe of them, in the way of learning, unleſs ſo far as it can be inſenſibly inſtilled, without making it, by any means, a taſk or burden.

In a conſiſtency with this view, the rudiments of ſome branch of erudition, might poſſibly be inſtilled; ſuch as, very ſhort general tables of geography and chronology; but that which is particularly ſuited to this period, is the acquiring any of the living *languages*, that are moſt neceſſary for uſe, particularly their *native* language, which, even in this period, they might, by any of the ingenious methods mentioned *by Mr Locke*, or otherwiſe, be brought to read diſtinctly, without its being made any burden to them, and, ſo far as reſpects *pronunciation*, their organs can, at this age, be formed to it, much more eaſily than afterwards, and any habit of pronunciation now got, is very likely to be retained, in ſome meaſure, all their life.

To learn by the ear, but not as yet by grammar, a little of the *French* language, or of any other language that may be uſeful, not excepting even the *Latin*, in the way of ſpeaking it familiarily, might, poſſibly, in many caſes, be more practicable than is commonly thought, even before the expiration of that

period

period which we have hitherto been treating of, and have, for the ſake of order or method, made to comprehend the firſt ſeven years of life, or third part of our time before arriving at manhood.

Having therefore finiſhed what appears moſt neceſſary to be ſaid, with reſpect to this, we proceed to the

Second PERIOD, diſtinguiſhed by the name of CHILDHOOD or *Puerility*, and taking in the ſix or ſeven years, immediately following that which we have been now conſidering, but, in ſuch a manner, as will not admit of an invariable rule, by which we are to determine, when it is that the diſtinction, betwixt it and infancy on the one hand, or youth on the other, may be ſaid to take place; this depending, as was formerly obſerved, not on the increaſe of years only, but alſo on the diverſity of genius, capacity, and advantages for improvement.

In the tranſition from infancy to childhood, when they are, as it were, blended together, the attention formerly mentioned to any *habits* that are formed, is particularly neceſſary; habits of indolence or application, of vanity or modeſty, of generoſity or meanneſs, of benevolence or ſelfiſhneſs, are then, as it were, in embryo, and ſo ready to eſcape the attention of thoſe whoſe charge they were formerly,

formerly, that, generally ſpeaking, it would be adviſeable (ſo far as other circumſtances will admit of it) to have, as it were, a ſecond weaning of them, at this period, by committing them to private *boarding-ſchools* *, where no care or tenderneſs neceſſary ſhould be wanting, but where any preference given them ſhould depend intirely on their behaviour. In this view, it will eaſily be ſeen, that the choice

* We have here ventured to differ (though not ſo much as may at firſt appear) with Mr Locke and others, who have ſaid a great deal as to the preference of private tutors to publick ſchools. To enter on any argument or diſpute as to this here is unneceſſary, but we beg leave to obviate what may be ſaid againſt the method here propoſed by the two following obſervations.

1. The genius and diſpoſition of children, in reſpect of idleneſs or diligence, baſhfulneſs or forwardneſs, and the like, as alſo the diſpoſition of thoſe with whom they have a domeſtic connection, muſt be taken into the account, before we can judge of the expediency of a private or publick education in different caſes, nor is there any diſadvantage in trying the moſt private method firſt, and continuing it while it is ſucceſsful, and when it muſt be departed from, the moſt private boarding-ſchools (both in reſpect of the number of ſcholars, and ſome diſtance from towns) ſhould be preferred.

2. The qualifications required by Mr Locke and others in a private tutor, are ſuch as make it extremely difficult to find any ſo qualified, and of ſuch experience, who would undertake ſo young a charge as we are now ſpeaking of, with an engagement to continue in it. In moſt caſes it will probably be found, that private boarding-ſchools are beſt ſuited to what we here mention as the ſecond period of education, *viz.* from the age of ſeven to that of fourteen, and private tutors at the univerſity and elſewhere for four years more, being the time in which there is moſt danger of being corrupted as to principle and practice.

choice of a boarding ſchool, ſhould depend upon the condition of life in view for children, ſo as to put them in the way of aſſociating neither with thoſe, over whom they might aſſume too much ſuperiority, nor even with ſuch as might do the ſame over them, and give them an admiration of ſplendour, or taſte for expence beyond their circumſtances; but rather, to mix with thoſe of different ſtations, and, in a particular manner, ſuch as are nearly of the ſame ſtation with themſelves; to which we may add a circumſtance of ſome importance, *viz.* that the diſtance (which there muſt be) from their parents or neareſt friends, ſhould (if poſſible) not be ſo great, but that they may lay their account with having their behaviour reported to them, and the uſage they meet with; and may, by ſeeing them on ſome occaſions, (but not too often) ſatisfy them as to their proficiency, in thoſe qualifications that are neceſſary to form them for being men, as well as ſcholars.

What was ſaid as to preventing wrong habits in infancy, may be extended to childhood, with this addition, that there muſt be ſuperadded, ſome more attention in bringing them to *right habits*; thoſe particularly, in which they appear to be moſt defective. The farther they advance in this period, endeavour to manage or deal with them, more in the way of *reaſoning* than of authority, and to engage

gage their affection to thoſe, whoſe precepts you would have them obey; accompanied with that perſuaſion, formerly mentioned, of their authority's being ſupported by ſuperior knowledge and attention to their real good and welfare.

In this period, I have often obſerved the conſtitution of children ſuffer more by a miſtaken tenderneſs, than either before or after it. The care neceſſary, on their being ſeized with any of the common indiſpoſitions, to which they are then liable, is often continued too long, ſo as to enfeeble them, by confinement, by too much reſtraint as to their diet, by exceſs in cloathing, by diſcontinuing that great ſtrengthener, formerly mentioned, the cold bath, and even, perhaps, by ſtuffing them with medicines. 'Tis true, indeed, that this is the period, in which any conſtitutional weakneſſes or diſeaſes will moſt readily appear, and, when diſcovered, they are to be cautiouſly and ſeaſonably attended to; but you muſt beware of exceeding here, and continuing the uſe of the means for recovering health, ſo long as to be hurtful to it, and perhaps bring on worſe diſeaſes. Beware alſo of making this a reaſon for immoderate indulgence; for, giving the child all his will, rather than fret him by denying it, the conſequence of this will be, that, as he will very

ſoon diſcover your injudicious fondneſs and partiality; he'll take care not to recover very faſt, either his health or good humour; he'll probably grow more unreaſonable and impetuous in his demands, till, at laſt, you'll be obliged to uſe more violent methods in croſſing him, than would, at firſt, have been neceſſary.

Our obſervation as to conſtitutional diſeaſes being beſt diſcovered at this period, may be extended to the mind likewiſe, its *ruling paſſions*, or idioſyncracies, whether raſhneſs or timidity, ſoftneſs or ſeverity, cunning or ſimplicity, peeviſhneſs or bluntneſs, narrowneſs or profuſion, and the like; now is the time to diſcover theſe, and to bring them, as much as poſſible, under the reſtraint of reaſon, aſſiſted by a proper *balancing* of the one againſt the other; that is, by ſometimes permitting your young pupil, to go ſo far to that ſide to which he ſeems too inclineable, as that he himſelf may be made ſenſible of his error; or to ſtrengthen the motives, that may engage him to the oppoſite ſide, beyond what you would otherwiſe approve, making allowance for the oppoſition that will ariſe, from his inclination to the contrary.

If even in infancy, much more now is it neceſſary, to accuſtom children, to have their deſires, paſſions and purſuits, under proper reſtraint,

ſtraint, by ſubmitting them all (as was ſaid of the ruling paſſion) to the authority of reaſon; nor is it one paſſion only, that will be found always to rule; that which for the time is ſtrongeſt will carry all before it, if not timeouſly checked, and accuſtomed to the *government of reaſon*, as juſt now mentioned; and, however oft they fail of being thus governed, they are to be encouraged ſtill to continue their endeavours after it.

Even before it is ſafe to encourage them to reaſon or argue, as to what reſpects *religion*, it will be proper, to make them keep up a reverence for every thing ſacred, and, in forming the ideas that are annexed to the words they uſe, to take care that they be as correct as poſſible, but not too complex. A reverence and affection for their parents is one of the moſt natural principles in children, which cannot be too much inculcated; and the moſt natural way, in which they can riſe to any conception of the *Supreme Being*, is, by conſidering him, in the relation of our common Parent and Guardian, ſeeing and over-ruling all, and fit to be addreſſed and adored, obeyed and relied on accordingly, in ſuch a way as is moſt agreeable to the manifeſtations he has made of his nature and will to us, both by the light of nature and revelation.

To reaſon, in ſome degree, is as natural for children as to breathe; that, in which there is difficulty here, therefore is, the teaching them to *reflect* a little while they *reaſon;* that is, before they draw concluſions, and form their judgments and opinions; they are not to be encouraged either to form or to declare their opinion too haſtily, eſpecially when it is not aſked, but ſhould be accuſtomed to deliberate, yet not too long; to hear with attention; to ſpeak with modeſty; to aſk information; to reflect a little on it when got, and to ly open always to conviction from reaſon.

When there appears to be any natural defect in their faculties, or a very great degree of natural *dullneſs* and ſtupidity, ſo far as theſe can be remedied by proper culture, upon the principles already laid down, it ſhould be done; but, where they cannot, great tenderneſs and compaſſion ſhould be ſhewn, rather than any unavailable ſeverity and correction that might cruſh their ſpirit; but where theſe natural defects do not take place, ſome care is neceſſary to guard againſt an exceſs of *forwardneſs* or pertneſs on the one hand, as well as a ſheepiſh *backwardneſs* on the other; the latter is to be cured, not ſo much by reproofs, as by moderate indulgence, by ſometimes overlooking it, by expreſſing a good opinion of them, and bringing them to a better opinion

tion of themſelves, by the company, ſometimes, of thoſe who are more backward, and by commending any proficiency they make. But the former, the forwardneſs and pertneſs mentioned, though it be a greater enemy to improvement, becauſe it is generally accompanied with too much vanity and ſelf-conceit, to receive inſtruction and be profited by it, yet it is rather more difficult to cure than the other, as it commonly meets with more indulgence, and even approbation, through its being miſtaken for manlineſs and ſpirit; it is not however incurable at this age; nothing being eaſier than to find out the agreeable young prattler in many blunders, and, perhaps to convince him, that he is far ſhort of others, who have leſs ſhew but more merit, and with whom he ſhould be made to aſſociate, and to appear frequently amongſt them, however diſagreeable it may be to him, and whatever diſadvantage he may have, at firſt, by a compariſon with them, till he is excited to rival or excel them, in reſpect of that which gives them ſuch advantage over him. Care ſhould be taken, however, that ſuch compariſon or rivalſhip be practiſed rather with ſtrangers than with near connections, or children of the ſame family, among whom it might breed unnatural differences and diſlike. For the ſame reaſon, parents ſhould beware of

ſhewing ſuch a partiality in favour of ſome of their children as may draw on them the envy and ill-will of the reſt.

As it is in the period we are now treating of, that the diverſity of tempers and diſpoſitions in children appears, ſo, it is now likewiſe, that the diverſity of their *genius* begins to ſhew itſelf, and ſhould be carefully obſerved, as the beſt rule for directing their future deſtination or way of life. By *genius* we here mean a natural diſpoſition and capacity for ſome particular ſtudy or purſuit beyond others, and, to diſcover the bent of this in children, is a matter of ſome nicety. You muſt let them uſe great freedom with you, before they will diſcloſe it, and, if you cannot do this yourſelf, you muſt conſult and employ others with whom they have ſuch intire freedom; you muſt obſerve how they chooſe to employ their time, when alone, and, when no particular taſk is appointed them; or, if they are come the length of being intruſted with any money, you muſt obſerve how they manage it, and on what they chooſe to lay it out; what it is that they ſooneſt weary of, and what they are willing to labour longeſt about, even privately and of themſelves; alſo what elevates or depreſſes them moſt. By an obſervation of all theſe it is, that the bent of their genius may

be

be diſcovered, and proper meaſures taken thereupon.

The ſtudies and exerciſes proper for them, ſhall be touched at a little, afterwards; all that we ſhall here obſerve is, that, as the *memory* is the ſtore-houſe of ideas, care ſhould be taken, through this period particularly, to have it well repleniſhed, and its furniture in ſuch order as may be fitteſt for uſe afterwards; this will give the *underſtanding*, as it advances, ſomething to work upon, and make its work eaſier. But, with reſpect to the *imagination* or *fancy*, there is no difficulty in diſcovering where it is remarkably lively, and aſſiſting its exerciſe; it may, however, be obſerved, that, where there is great ſterility or barrenneſs of imagination, it can ſcarcely be cured; nor is it of great conſequence to labour much with children for this purpoſe; they may have a ſound underſtanding, with great poverty of imagination, and become uſeful members of ſociety, though they are neither poets, painters or even orators; nay, there have been inſtances of ſome children, who were thought dull and ſtupid, and yet afterwards proved to have ſtrong intellects. Cato was reckoned almoſt a fool in his infancy, and was remarkably reſerved and obſtinate; I have heard that even the great Sir Iſaac Newton, was likewiſe reckoned a dull boy at ſchool, till his private

private mathematical exerciſes diſcovered the ſuperiority of his genius in that way. When ſpeaking of the imagination, we may obſerve, that it is of conſequence, in reſpect of its operations in childhood, to guard againſt wrong aſſociations of ideas, ſuch as, their aſſociating the idea of ſuperior merit with that of fine cloaths, equipage, *&c.* the idea of darkneſs with that of ſpirits, and the idea of ſpirits, or inviſible beings with that of fear, danger or hoſtility, and the like.

With reſpect to the different exerciſes and branches of learning, that are fit to be attended to in the education of youth, all that falls under our notice further here, in our way through the different periods we are treating of, is that, before the end of this, which we are at preſent conſidering, that is before the age of fourteen (without being very preciſe as to the number of years, or meaſure of time to be allotted each period) all ſhould (if poſſible) be over that is neceſſary, in the way of thoſe *exerciſes*, which have any reſpect to the body, and to which it is moſt eaſily formed, while its organs and limbs are tender and pliable; ſuch are *dancing*, ſome knowledge of *muſick*, vocal and inſtrumental, and *writing*. The other exerciſes that ſhall be taken notice of afterwards, as more particularly ſuited to the next period, *viz.* that of youth, ſuch as fencing, riding,

riding, ſwimming, *&c.* as they require a greater exertion of ſtrength, than is commonly attained before the age now mentioned, they can ſcarcely be recommended ſooner; unleſs in the caſe of ſuch as are remarkably forward in reſpect of their growth and bodily ſtrength.

Diet and *diverſions* are all that we have to make any further remarks on, during this period. As to *diet*, therefore, the proper regimen for children needs not be here mentioned, being ſo often treated of, and generally ſo well known, were it but equally well attended to in practice. The few following obſervations may however not be improper here.

A plain diet, *i. e.* that which requires leaſt of cookery, ſauces, mixture of different foods and the like, is fitteſt for children, as tending moſt to nouriſh and ſtrengthen them, without inflaming or vitiating their juices: A milk diet is particularly ſuited to them in moſt caſes.

The fewer diſhes they are accuſtomed to at their meals, ſo much the better; for the gratification of an appetite, that is provoked only by variety, will probably be more hurtful than uſeful to them.

While their health and digeſtion are good, there needs not be great anxiety about reſtraining them, as to the *quantity* of their food, if it is only regulated aright as to quality; it would

would not indeed be improper, to have ſo much regard to *frequency*, in the diet of children, as to prevent their overloading their ſtomachs at once, even with plain food, but there is little danger from this, when the appetite is not provoked by variety, or unneceſſary delicacy.

Some are rather more rigorous than is neceſſary in keeping *animal food* from children, *viz.* fleſh or fiſh, even in the plaineſt way; but, as it will make, probably, the principal part of their ſolid food through the reſt of life, it does not ſeem improper to accuſtom them, in ſome meaſure, to it, as ſoon as the juvenile diſeaſes of ſmall-pox, *&c.* are well got over; taking care, however, that it be always accompanied with ſo much of the vegetable kind, *viz.* bread, roots, and the like, as may prevent their becoming too carnivorous and inflammable.

As to *drink*, indeed, ſuch as may be called ſtrong, whatever proſpect there may be of any future uſe of it, the reaſon drawn from this for the moderate uſe of animal food muſt be very cautiouſly extended to it; I am not clear for the uſe of any drink, much ſtro r than water, or very weak beer, till this iod is over. The firſt effect of all liquors, in ſome degree, more or leſs, to contract the fibres, and coats of the veſ-

ſels,

ſels they approach; which makes all ſuch liquors the more improper till full growth is attained, and, even when it is, we ſhall ſee great reaſon for moderating the uſe of them.

With reſpect to the *diverſions* and amuſements of children, all we ſhall obſerve here is, that, as the diſpoſition towards them, is now under leſs reſtraint, from any other views, principles or engagements, than afterwards, when they are more advanced, there will be the more need for the uſe of ſome authority (but ſuch as muſt always be ſupported by reaſon and exerciſed with affection) for reſtraining, or keeping it within proper bounds, ſo as to avoid contracting an habitual averſion to every thing, in the way of ſtudy or buſineſs, that may interfere with it. This is often the conſequence of an unbounded diſpoſition for play, even as they advance in childhood; and, was there nothing more loſt by it, but the time now ſquandered in this way, there might be hopes of eaſily retrieving it; but the view of what may be afterwards loſt or miſapplied, by their contracting a habit of idleneſs and diſlike of application, makes it a matter of ſome more importance.

While, therefore, diverſions are allowed children, with much more latitude, freedom, and even uſefulneſs to health, at this age, than

than at any other, the following regulations may be proper with reſpect to them.

1. Their diverſions ſhould be always ſuch as are moſt conducive to health and vigour, not ſuch as may confine, relax or enervate. All exerciſes that require running are fitteſt at this age, and, together with theſe, ſuch as exerciſe the arms much, without diſtorting any other part of the body.

2. As they muſt have companions in their diverſions, a regard to juſtice, honour and good humour towards them, ſhould be cheriſhed, and, on the contrary, every appearance of injuſtice, diſhoneſty or ill-nature, carefully and immediately reſtrained.

3. Diverſions ſhould, as much as poſſible, be made the reward of application, or a preparative and incitement to it, and, therefore,

4. They muſt be always ſo far under your own command, and that of others, as to diſcontinue their diverſions, without grumbling, how ſoon ever this appears proper or neceſſary.

We conclude our remarks, on this period, with obſerving, that the ſtudy of *languages* ſhould, if poſſible, be over with it, or, at leaſt, that part of it which would be moſt laborious and difficult of attainment afterwards. And if, as we ſhall afterwards obſerve, ſuch progreſs is made in the living languages, even before this

this period begins, as to have the expreſſion and pronounciation, in ſome meaſure, formed, while the organs of ſpeech are moſt pliable; it will not be thought a matter of great difficulty, before this period ends, while the memory is in its greateſt vigour, to acquire as much knowledge of the dead languages, that is, of what are commonly called the learned, *viz.* the Greek, Latin, and alſo the Hebrew languages, as is neceſſary for the eaſy peruſal of any books wrote in them; without this, they cannot eaſily purſue the different ſtudies that are reſerved for the following period: But, tho' the degree of acquaintance with theſe languages, neceſſary for the purpoſes mentioned, be now ſuppoſed attainable, yet we cannot expect ſuch acquaintance with them, at this age, as is neceſſary for the critical peruſal of books, and elegance in compoſition, to which a maturity of judgment is required, that ſuits better the

Third PERIOD we are to treat of, *viz.* that of YOUTH or *Puberty*, reckoning it from the age of fourteen or fifteen, to that of twenty or twenty-one.

The preceeding period is ſuppoſed to have been ſpent moſtly at the *boarding-ſchool*, where the teachers, companions, and attendants, are all ſuppoſed to be ſuch as (while no neceſſary care or tenderneſs are omitted) will have no blind

partiality, in favour of their charge, that may endanger their indulging them, in wrong habits or practices, either through unwillingneſs to correct them, or by their eſcaping their notice; of both which there is ſome danger, while they are chiefly converſant with their parents, neareſt relations and dependents: We would not, however, have them conſidered, while at boarding-ſchools, as entirely excluded from the notice of thoſe now mentioned, who are particularly intereſted in them; on the contrary, it is of conſequence, as a ſpur to their aſſiduity, and for keeping them on their good behaviour, as well as for exonering, in ſome meaſure, thoſe with whom they are entruſted, that, at certain intervals, an account may be ſuppoſed to be given of their improvement; that there be acceſs to further information, if wanted; and ſuch a connection ſtill kept up, both by correſpondence, and, by, at leaſt, annual occaſions of paſſing ſome time together, as that the ties and feelings of affection, on both ſides, may ſtill continue; and that, while children are animated, by the proſpect of approbation from their parents, and friends, theſe may alſo have their care and anxiety in ſome meaſure allayed and compenſated, by their returns of affection and ſucceſs, and may have it in their power to obſerve, more narrowly, their progreſs, or what

new

new directions may, at different times, appear neceſſary with reſpect to them; as to which, we would further obſerve, that,

When any great *change* is found neceſſary, in their management or behaviour, through any wrong habits and practices being too long indulged, and the contrary neglected, it may, ſometimes, be proper to transfer the management of them to others, who, if they are entire ſtrangers to them, will have much advantage, over thoſe who had the charge of them formerly, however capable they may have been of it; for, even an untowardly child, is, generally, upon his good behaviour among ſtrangers, and endeavours, perhaps, to gain on them, but as ſoon as he finds their opinion of him to be fixed, by being either againſt him, or biaſſed in his favour, he is no longer reſtrained by any regard to it; and, even when his own mind tells him, that his behaviour has been wrong, it often happens, thro' a kind of falſe ſhame or obſtinacy, that he will not condemn himſelf, ſo far as to change it, among his former acquaintances; but let him be ſent among entire ſtrangers, who will regard him only according to his merit and behaviour, and who are not ſuppoſed to be prejudiced againſt him, by any knowledge of his former miſconduct, it is poſſible, nay very likely, that he will exert himſelf more, to

correct what is wrong, and, perhaps, change the whole ſyſtem of his conduct, than if he had continued under the ſame management as formerly, however unexceptionable it might have been.

Whether a change of managers, in this way, be found neceſſary or not, during the period laſt ſpoken of, we may take it for granted, that, upon the commencement of this, which we are now conſidering, call it Puberty, Youth, or what you will, ſuch a change will be neceſſary, both on account of the different ſtudies now to be attended to, and the different manner in which advice is to be given, and authority maintained. As to this laſt, indeed, it muſt be owned, that to have advice and authority regarded, we muſt proceed with Youth, as they advance, more invariably than ever, upon the principles formerly laid down, *viz.* the getting their reaſon always on our ſide, convincing them of our affection, ſuperior diſcretion and regard to their intereſt; for, when they are thus far advanced in years, let them make what uſe they will of their liberty, it is certain, they muſt be left more to their own management than formerly; they muſt be allowed to ſtand more upon their own legs, tho' with the riſk of ſometimes falling, rather than be always indebted to others for ſupporting them.

With

With this view then, it is plain, that the more ſtrict diſcipline and confinement of a boarding-ſchool, muſt now give place to a plan of greater enlargement, the conducting of which muſt be determined, by what now appears, more plainly, to be, either the *bent* of their *genius*, or, at leaſt, not very diſagreeable to it; for tho', in ſome caſes, it is obſervable, that a certain bent of genius appears, towards ſome particular ſtudies, profeſſions or occupations, and is ſo ſtrong, that it ſhould not be croſſed, or, if it is, it will, afterwards, force a regard to itſelf, with more diſadvantage; tho' (I ſay) thus much muſt be obſerved, as to any remarkable bent of genius, in one particular way, yet, in moſt caſes, the genius of youth is ſuch, as that it may be ſucceſsfully turned, more ways than one; but, there muſt be a choice now made, that its force may be more collected towards one point; and, as their inexperience of the world, makes them unfit to chooſe for themſelves, others, who have more experience, muſt chooſe for them, according to their circumſtances and capacities; and, if a judicious regard is had to theſe, time and habit will reconcile them to the choice, tho' there ſhould not appear to be an uncommon bent of genius towards it, if care be taken, that it is not ſuch as they have a particular averſion to, and that a prevailing

bent of genius to ſomething elſe, be not thereby directly oppoſed or counteracted.

According to the choice, therefore, or determination that is now made as to this, muſt the buſineſs of Education, in this laſt and moſt important period, be conducted; now it is, that any errors, in their former management, will appear; and the firſt care muſt be, to correct or remedy theſe, as ſoon as poſſible, before they take deeper root, and to make up or compenſate any diſadvantages, that ſome may have beyond others, even from nature itſelf, *i. e.* from their natural conſtitution, parts, or capacities.

The tranſition from Childhood to Youth, is gradual and inſenſible, yet not ſo much ſo, but that a ſhort interval of time may be now ſpent, under the eye of a parent, or ſome wiſe and watchful guardian, for making ſuch diſcoveries, with reſpect to the various particulars now mentioned, as may regulate their future plan, which, tho' it admits of great variety, we may here conſider, more generally, as having reſpect to one of theſe two, either to *books* or to *buſineſs*; *i. e.* either to ſuch ſtudies or ſciences, as make an application to books, or reading, in different languages and faculties, neceſſary; or, ſuch purſuits and employments in life, as, tho' they may have ſome aſſiſtance in this way, yet are to be acquired,

chiefly,

chiefly, by imitation, or practice; ſuch are, all the uſeful arts and occupations of life.

When this laſt is the choice, the buſineſs of Education is, generally, made leſs account of, and yet, even here, there is much room for improvement, and there might, at this period, be ſome time uſefully ſpent, even by thoſe who are deſigned for men of buſineſs, in the way of getting ſuch a knowledge, or rather taſte of books, as may facilitate their future plan of action, without retarding or interrupting it, and, more eſpecially, in the way of getting their minds formed to piety, virtue, and reflection, in any calling or occupation of life.

EDUCATION, in its more general and extenſive ſenſe, is an apprenticeſhip for life; its buſineſs is to teach us, not any one particular art or ſcience only, but the *ſcience* of *human life*; not only to form the philoſopher, orator, or divine, but to form the man; and, even when this laſt period of education, which we are now conſidering, is finiſhed, and, what is commonly reckoned manhood, or maturity of years, obtained, after all the pains that could be taken formerly, application given, or progreſs made, the moſt that can be expected as to youth is, to have a good foundation laid for their future improvement, when launching out into the world; and for a ſucceſsful application,

cation, to their different ſtudies or purſuits, when left to their own conduct and management.

It is, however, when regard is had to ſuch a plan of life, as makes an application to books neceſſary, with a view to the ſtudies of *law*, *phyſic*, or *divinity*, and to the acquiſition of ſuch knowledge, as may be either uſeful or ornamental in life; it is, I ſay, when regard is had to a plan of this kind, rather than to the common occupations of life, that a more liberal education is neceſſary, and the whole of that period, we are now conſidering, employed in proſecuting it. With a view to this, therefore, various particulars occur to be treated of, by conſidering the ſubject of Education in the following lights.

1. According to the different *branches* it has reſpect to, *i. e.* the different *objects* of attention propoſed by it, *viz.* health, morals, manners, religion, learning, buſineſs and amuſements, company.

2. According to the difference of ſtation, diſpoſition, character, and capacity, to which it has reſpect.—And,

Laſtly, According to the different methods of conducting it, private or public ſchools, univerſities, tutors, travelling, and converſation.

This

This opens a very extenſive and uſeful field of enquiry, to any who have either leiſure or abilities to go through it; and, after all that has been wrote upon the ſubject, it will probably be found, that much might be added, or, at leaſt, ſet furth in a way, more accommodated to practice, than moſt of the treatiſes on this ſubject. My inclination leads me much to beſtow ſome time and pains in this way, according to the ſmall ſhare of abilities and experience I have; being a way in which, I think, my labours might be as uſeful to mankind as any; nor are the ſubjects of the preceeding Eſſays and Diſſertations unconnected with it; but other objects, of more immediate attention, prevent my undertaking for any thing of this kind; I ſhall here, however, ſubjoin ſome curſory obſervations, reſpecting the different particulars now mentioned; wiſhing to ſee them more fully treated of by others.

The acquiſition of *learning*, is ſo far from being the only object, that it can ſcarcely be called even the principal object of attention, in the education of youth; but, as there is a certain meaſure or degree of it ſuited to men of buſineſs, whoſe way of life raiſes them above the vulgar, and a higher degree fit for thoſe, whoſe independent fortunes make an application to buſineſs unneceſſary for them, but, at the ſame time, enable them, like the great

great Mr Boyle, to purſue ſome uſeful ſtudies, that would be too expenſive for others; it would be no ſmall advantage to ſociety in general, if proper *plans* were laid down of the different branches of knowledge, that are beſt ſuited to each of theſe.

Young gentlemen of the *Army* and *Navy*, have often much ſpare time, which they might beſtow on ſuch ſtudies as would be improving and entertaining to them, tho' not relating immediately to their own profeſſion, if they had but any fixed plan, for this purpoſe, particularly ſuited to themſelves. Something, of the ſame kind, might be adapted to thoſe in a *mercantile* way, who have often much leiſure, eſpecially during their apprenticeſhip*.

Nor is the education of youth, in the *inferior* ſtations of life, an object of ſo little importance to the public, but that ſome plain eaſy ſyſtem might likewiſe be calculated for them; remembering always, in whatever plans or ſchemes of this kind are laid down, to take care, that they do not interfere with the principal views of thoſe for whom they are deſigned, by bringing men of buſineſs and action to be too ſtudious, or over-fond of books and contemplation; remembering alſo, in every

* Upwards of twenty years ago, I remember to have read with great pleaſure, a very ſmall treatiſe, much to the purpoſe of what is here mentioned, entituled, "A Preſent for an Apprentice."

very ſcheme or ſyſtem that is purſued, to have a particular regard to whatever reſpects the improvement of the mind, and the conduct of life, according to the different claſſes, or conditions of men, now mentioned, and the different duties, connections, difficulties, and temptations, that are peculiar to each of them.

'But, without enlarging further on theſe general points, we ſhall now proceed to the *miſcellaneous obſervations* propoſed, in which no particular order or connection will be neceſſary, except their having relation, principally, to this laſt period of Education, *viz.* that of YOUTH.

All the knowledge you can inſtil into a young man yourſelf, nay, tho' he had twenty tutors lecturing to him, and tho' he could repeat all that you want him to retain in the ſcientific way, yet this will not avail him ſo much, as the giving him ſuch a *taſte* for knowledge, *i.e.* for the different branches of ſcience that are moſt neceſſary for him, as will engage and enable him to ſearch it out for himſelf, by going to the ſource of things. He muſt indeed be obliged to others, who have more experience, for information, as to the books, or other ſources, from which he may draw moſt improvement; but, if he has no reliſh for the matter himſelf, leading him to apply his

his mind to it, more or leſs as is neceſſary and practicable for him, all the knowledge that he can get by the ear, or in the way of a taſk preſcribed to him by others, will avail as little for his improvement, as your getting him ſtores of the moſt delicate and wholeſome kinds of food, would do for his health or nouriſhment, if he diſreliſhed them.

But how, you will ſay, is this reliſh for knowledge to be wrought or inſtilled? I know of no other way ſo effectual as that of *emulation*: by having a young man often in the company, not of thoſe much farther advanced than himſelf, but of thoſe whom you think he wants to equal, if not excel. At the ſame time, the greateſt care muſt be taken always, in cheriſhing emulation, to prevent its begetting in him any wrong paſſion, that may have ſome ſimilarity or relation to it, ſuch as envying, inſtead of endeavouring to equal others; or bringing them down to his level, rather than nobly ſtriving to riſe to their's, and acknowledging what is due to them when they excel him, by undiſputed merit, and have therefore a juſt claim to preference; on the other hand, he is to be cautioned againſt triumphing over others, when he ſeems to excel them, in ſuch a way as indicates contempt and ſelf-conceit; let theſe be prevented, together with too much impatience for being diſtinguiſhed, and liableneſs

liableneſs to diſcouragement on every failure or diſappointment; let theſe, I ſay, be prevented, and no principle will be of greater efficacy for improvement, than emulation; but, without attention to what was now mentioned, it may be hurtful.

The accuſtoming a young man to *think cloſely* and accurately, is alſo of great conſequence; I do not mean the making him entirely mopiſh and cogitative, for I would have his mind kept free and diſengaged, for ſlighter or more ſerious exerciſes, for turning eaſily and quickly to whatever ſubject demands moſt immediate attention, according as it comes in his way, cultivating a quick command of his thoughts for this purpoſe, and taking only one ſubject, or a part of it, at once; but if he is not accuſtomed to think cloſely and accurately, when a ſubject occurs that requires it, he will loſe much time and pains in ſetting about it, and labour under an unſpeakable diſadvantage, in whatever reſpects the acquiſition of knowledge, or reaſoning, in conſequence of it.

One who thinks cloſely on what he reads or conſiders, ſo as to enquire directly into the nature of the thing itſelf, and take it in the different views it is capable of, will do more in one hour, than another, who goes ſuperfi-

cially to work, (labouring only to collect the ſentiments of others, without thinking cloſely for himſelf) will do in ſix.

Mathematical ſtudies have often been recommended, as of uſe to give young men a habit of cloſe thinking. The engaging them ſometimes in an argument, with reſpect to any ſubject they ſuppoſe themſelves maſters of, ſhewing on what ſide the argument is weak, (when, perhaps, leaſt ſuſpected to be ſo by them) and the preciſe point on which it turns, will alſo be of great uſe. Playing at *Cheſs* might ſeem a trivial expedient to be recommended, with the view now mentioned, of fixing the attention; but it would, I am perſuaded, in many caſes, be of ſome uſe, as it gives ſuch frequent inſtances of the bad effect of inattention, and the difficulty of retrieving any error to which it has given occaſion.

It ſhouldbe a general rule, with thoſe who read books, not merely for amuſement but for inſtruction; and it is a rule particularly neceſſary for young ſtudents, to read a book *from beginning to end*, without too much interruption in doing it, and without having many books on hand at once. If they have no ſuch rule as this, nor conſider it as neceſſary, they will be in danger of becoming deſultory in their reading, and ſatisfy themſelves with the

erudition

erudition of the *Ladies* *, taken from title pages, dictionaries, periodical collections, and detached paſſages of books; and, beſides reading through one treatiſe on any ſubject of particular importance, young ſtudents ſhould be accuſtomed to hunt after different books that have reſpect to it, and make it their aim rather to maſter the ſubject, than to have it to ſay, that they have read ſuch and ſuch books on it.

It would, indeed, make the matter much eaſier to young ſtudents, if thoſe, who have more knowledge and experience, would direct them to the books that beſt deſerve their peruſal, on the different ſubjects fit to be ſtudied by them, or even to thoſe parts, of very large works, which have reſpect to them: This would ſave them the trouble of going through many pieces of little value, as they often muſt, in hopes, from their title, that ſome light may be got from them, but often meeting with much diſappointment. It may alſo be further ſuggeſted, as a method very proper to be taken

* If any of them ſhall do me the honour to read this, I beg their forgiveneſs for what is here ſaid of their erudition, as not at all meant in the way of diſparagement, or diſreſpect; but, tho' they well deſerve all the advantage that can be had from books, in the way of entertainment or improvement ſuited to them, yet they have more powerful charms to recommend them than thoſe of letters; nor is much *literary knowledge* and ſtudy, any more neceſſary for them than ſwords and targets.

ken with young readers, that their opinion ſhould be aſked of any books they read, and their reaſons for approving or diſapproving them.

The being directed to proper books, for underſtanding different ſubjects, and ſomewhat aſſiſted in the peruſal of them, may be conſidered as no ſmall advantage, in the way of *Univerſity Education*, under the direction of men capable of aſſiſting young ſtudents, and making their work eaſier in the manner now mentioned. Nor would it be improper to add two obſervations more, that will be found of no ſmall conſequence, in order to profitable reading, *viz.*

1. When you read over a book, with one particular *view*, you will probably give the leſs attention to many other things in it, which have not relation to this; ſo that, you are not to ſuppoſe it unneceſſary, to have recourſe to it again, (poſſibly with another view) as reckoning you are already maſter of it. A book may be valuable, partly for the language or ſtile, partly for the ſubject or ſentiments, ſome of it for one controverſy, ſome for another: Views to every one of theſe, may, poſſibly, make it neceſſary to look, oftener than once, through a book; but, it would make a reperuſal eaſy, if the reader could, at his firſt peruſal, mark the paſſages fit to be reviewed, or even

even abridge and write them out into a book of excerpts, if they are of conſequence in any view; but, if they are not, it would be loſing too much time thus to extract them.

2. Another direction, that will be neceſſary for young ſtudents, is, to beware of thinking that they are maſters of any ſubject, merely becauſe they have read many books on it; they muſt alſo digeſt it in their thoughts, and ſee clearly, on what preciſe points it reſts moſt; and, how far theſe are known or underſtood by them, whether they be matters of fact or of opinion.

After all that a writer ſays, ſometimes, for his opinion, we cannot poſſibly ſee it in the ſame light with him, and, till we do, we cannot be blamed for with holding our aſſent to it; we muſt beware therefore of being carried away by ſtrong aſſertion, in the place of argument, and not reckon ourſelves maſters of a ſubject, till we converſe on it, conſider it in different lights, and ſtate or anſwer objections againſt it, obſerving carefully, on what ſides the proof is ſtrongeſt or weakeſt, which will not be ſo well known or attended to, till we come, either to converſe on it, or to commit our ſentiments to writing, and make it the ſubject of correſpondence with others: Nor can too much be ſaid to diſſuade from taking things implicitly, on the opinion or

teſtimony of others, without thinking for ourſelves; not in the way of being ſceptical or incredulous of what others ſay or write; but that, according to the evidences or means of proof and information we have acceſs to, we endeavour honeſtly, as far as we are capable, to form our judgment of perſons and things, and to have ſome other foundation for it than merely the opinion or teſtimony of others, without conſidering on what they are built.

It is of no ſmall conſequence to young men to accuſtom them to *application*; to bring them to a habit of it; or, at leaſt, to make them capable of it; but beware of overſtretching their attention, if you do this but in a few inſtances, there is danger of their being diſcouraged from any attempts of the kind ever after; and, in moſt branches of human knowledge, great progreſs may be made, by ſlow degrees, without that rapidity, and long or violent exertion of its powers, which leaves the mind feeble and exhauſted. Regular perſeverance, therefore, is what will have moſt effect; ſo that, you cannot too much recommend this perſeverance, induſtry and regular application, in ſuch a way as to make the acquiſition of knowledge, as well as proſecution of buſineſs, eaſy, yet ſucceſsful.

The foundations of *religion* and *morality* are to be laid in youth, by giving proper ideas of GOD,

God, and of our relation to him, and to one another, with the duties thence ariſing, as ſet forth in our firſt and fourth diſſertations, which are ſo full on this ſubject that any further enlargement on it here is unneceſſary *; nor can too much care be taken, in recommending and eſtabliſhing ſuch a reliance on providence, as encourages induſtry and the uſe of means, in all caſes, but ſubmits events intirely to the ſupreme will, ſuppreſſing all childiſh fears, and ſuperſtitious apprehenſions with reſpect to them. Pains ſhould likewiſe be taken to cheriſh in youth a habit of *philanthropy* or general good-will to mankind, (without exception of ſects or parties) and a diſpoſition to

* It is made a queſtion by ſome, whether it be moſt adviſeable to give the young generation any aſſiſtance in forming opinions and habite, or leave them intirely to themſelves; but, it may be obſerved, that this laſt is impracticable: If they are not intirely excluded from the world, they muſt lie open to the receiving *opinions*, and *habits* from others, and there is danger of their taking up with the *worſt* as being the moſt numerous, of their taking up with *error* rather than *truth*, the former being much diverſified, while the latter is ſettled in one way only; and the ſame might be obſerved as to their taking the ſide of *virtue* or of *vice*, if left intirely to themſelves. Are we then (you'll ſay) to preſcribe or lay down *ſyſtems* to them to enſlave and fetter their reaſon? No! but to lay open to them, as much as poſſible, the reaſons of things, and accuſtom them to exerciſe their reaſon and underſtanding fairly with reſpect to them; but what is of ſtill greater importance, and inſeparably connected with that diſcovery of truth to the *underſtanding*, now ſpoken of, is forming the *heart* to *virtue* and *piety*. Theſe are the two great branches of *education* neceſſary to be attended to.

to think favourably of them rather than otherwiſe. This is the more neceſſary that the writings of ſome, and the practices of others, often tend to give them a contrary bent, or a diſpoſition to ſuſpect and judge always unfavourably of others; which diſpoſition, though conſecrated by the name of prudence, ſagacity, knowledge of the world, and the like, has certainly an ill effect, in corrupting the heart, checking benevolent diſpoſitions, as being all imaginary, and benevolent actions, as unmerited. Much judgment, therefore, is here neceſſary for putting youth upon their guard againſt the corrupt practices of Mankind, and yet preventing the general prejudices and ſuſpicions now mentioned; nor do I ſee how the principle of virtue, with reſpect to others, can here be ſupported without the help of religion directing our regard to God, the intimations of his will, and the relations in which he has placed us, and drawing the motives to duty from this ſource.

A *firmneſs* in their opinion is not unbecoming young men, when it is proportioned to the reaſons they have to ſupport it; but they muſt be directed, to lie open in all caſes to information and conviction from the arguments on both ſides, that may be further ſuggeſted, while they are carrying on their inquiry; but, when it is once finiſhed or completed,

pleated, to the beſt of their ability, their judgment is to be no longer wavering, but fixed and eſtabliſhed; and, it would be no ſmall advantage, if the grounds of it could be retained and recollected, when neceſſary, for the ſatisfaction of others.

I have ſometimes had a difficulty in determining, how far it is proper to indulge young gentlemen, in their paſſion for MUSIC; which is a ſtudy or exerciſe, not only delightful but uſeful, when not carried too far: Some indeed have no ſuch paſſion for muſic, not even a reliſh for it; but, when they have, it is undoubtedly in youth, that they can improve moſt, and yet, there is danger of its carrying their thoughts from every thing elſe; their heads will be full of crochets, when they ſhould be otherwiſe employed, and their time and company much regulated by their engagements in this way.

Vocal muſic, indeed, deſerves, I think, more attention, than is generally given to it, and would be proper, particularly in youth, when the voice can beſt be formed, and even the ear more improved, than is commonly imagined, for ſuch a combination of ſounds, as is moſt conducive to harmony*; but, as for *inſtrumental*

* This is likewiſe of ſome conſequence even for elegant *compoſition*, and much more ſo in order to graceful *pronunciation*, which deſerves to be ſtudied, but not ſo far as

inſtrumental muſic, what would ſeem moſt advi-ſeable with reſpect to it, is, to encourage the inclination to it as far as is neceſſary to their reliſhing and judging of muſical compoſitions, but not ſo far as to compoſe or to practiſe on many inſtruments themſelves; their performing on one inſtrument is ſufficient for the purpoſe now mentioned, and will be neceſſary; for, their ideas of muſic, even with a pretty good natural genius towards it, will not be determinate, without an acquaintance with one inſtrument, but I would not have it of the moſt complicated kind, as the ſtringed ones generally are, ſo that the *violin* I would abſolutely forbid my young charge, it admits of too much variety and muſical perfection; what we commonly call the *German flute* is ſufficient to amuſe, compoſe and join in concert with others, when neceſſary; and even in this, I would never have him conſider himſelf, in the light of a performer; but as a judge or connoiſſeur; and much the ſame may be ſaid as to his taſte for *painting* and *drawing*, which is to be cultivated in ſome degree, ſo as to judge of what is well deſigned and executed in that way, by others, but not ſo

as to make it too *theatrical*. A muſical ear will avail the young orator only, when it has joined with it a delicacy of *taſte*, and propriety of *ſentiment*.

ſo as to have his own time or attention ingroſſed by it, unleſs a view to ſome particular profeſſion or purpoſe makes it neceſſary.

In what reſpects thoſe *exerciſes* and amuſements, that are conducive to health, much more latitude may be given, than in theſe ſedentary ones, that were juſt now mentioned, without your pupil's being ſo much hurt by the conſequences of them, and there are ſome of them that deſerve to be particularly mentioned,

Dancing, he is ſuppoſed to have been taught, in the former period of puerility, *viz.* between the age of ſeven and fourteen, ſo that there now remains for him, only the practiſing it, in the plaineſt and eaſieſt way in which he can gracefully harmonize, with that lively mixture and diverſity of ſounds, which is commonly uſed, for animating the mind, and regulating the motions of the body in theſe exerciſes. This is all, I hope, that will be thought neceſſary, in this way, not only for ſtudents, but even for men of faſhion and breeding, to whom high dances appear to me to be no great accompliſhment; ſome one kind of them, that may give moſt occaſion to exerciſe the limbs gracefully, and get the intire and eaſy command of them, may indeed be allowable; but, what exceeds that, ſeems to be the property of the ſtage, and is

not

not to be coveted by the ſober and regular part of mankind.

In order to give youth that vigour in their limbs, and that intire command of them we were ſpeaking of, there is another exerciſe, which I have often thought fully as effectual and uſeful as dancing, and that is *fencing* *; ſome little practice in this way is very common, and the carrying the practice ſo far as to pretend to be a ſwordſman, is not very conſiſtent with the character either of a man of buſineſs, of letters, or of faſhion; but, I have often thought, the uſe of foils might have more advantage, than is generally taken notice of, were it only in the way of playing over the ſame common leſſons of cart and tierce, without any anxiety about learning all the different feints and thruſts, vaults, batters, *&c.* contrived by the common maſters of this art; without all this, I ſay, the plain and common uſe of foils, is not only ſerviceable for health, but has likewiſe an excellent effect, for giving an intire command of the arms, limbs and every joint of the body; it has

* On this point likewiſe, I have ventured to differ with Mr Locke and others, who condemn any attempt at ſkill in this way, as diſpoſing to be quarrelſome in reliance on it; but the method of duelling (which ſcarcely any laws can reſtrain) is now ſuch as that any dexterity, in the way here ſpoken of, can give but very little encouragement to venture on it, and yet may ſometimes be uſeful for ſelf-defence.

has indeed this effect more than any other exercise I know; and such an easy command of every motion, is one of the principal ingredients of what we call gracefulness of person and action, which is then most remarkable, when every motion appears to be performed not with agility only, but with ease, judgment, and propriety both as to time and manner, nothing wanting, and nothing superfluous.

The subject we have been here led to touch at, under the head of exercises, may suggest something in relation to it, necessary to be instilled into youth, before their arriving at manhood; and that is, the guarding against quarrels, or whatever may involve in them, such as abusive language, rash anger, self-conceit, bad company, excess in drinking, contempt of others and the like: To guard against these and cultivate sweetness of temper and manners, will be a better preservative from *duels* (or *rencounters* as they are now called) than any establishment that law has as yet made against them in any country, and better than even the *wise* Mr *Rousseau's* † expedient for this purpose.

Another exercise fit for young gentlemen to practise, and be masters of, is *riding*. Any rules, necessary for this, are so few, that they

† See an account of it in the end of this Dissertation.

will ſoon be acquired †, but the facility, firmneſs and gracefulneſs, which ſome attain to in it, require more time and practice; nor is there any doubt, but that, in time, it may draw after it ſome attention to the nature, diſeaſes and different breeds of horſes, in order to be able to give ſuch directions with reſpect to them, as may, on many occaſions, be neceſſary, to balance the negligence or ignorance of ſervants, which, in this caſe, may ſometimes be very hurtful. The extravagant paſſion for horſe-racing, laying bets, and every ſcheme of artifice and expence attending it, ſhould be conſidered, as ſo far out of their road, who have any uſeful branch of education to purſue, that nothing needs be ſaid with reſpect to them, further than to baniſh them intirely from their thoughts, if ever they appear to have any inclination towards them; and, even as to that attention to horſes ſpoken of, in a moderate degree, ſome care will be neceſſary to prevent its beginning too ſoon, or being carried to too much expence; which may ſtill more be ſaid as to *dogs*, and yet *hunting*, with ſome management of fire-arms, or ſhooting, are diverſions extremely ſuitable to young gentlemen, and generally ſo engaging to them, that they can ſcarcely be indulged ſo

† The art of leaping over gates, hedges, *&c.* though commonly taught, is, in reality, ſo uſeleſs, and has ſo many hurtful conſequences to the ſportſman as well as to the farmer, that it would be much better to lay it intirely aſide.

ſo much in this way, as they would incline, till moſt of the period we are now treating of be over.

The only other exerciſe I ſhall mention is *ſwimming*: One of the manlieſt and moſt noted among the antients, and very conducive to health, but now much overlooked: The rules for it are few, ſimple and well known; any dexterity in it depends intirely on practice, and, if this practice is not begun in youth, it will not be eaſy to acquire it afterwards; it is therefore worth the having ſome directions* given about it, by thoſe who have youth in charge, as it may be a mean, not only of health, but alſo, of ſaving their own lives, and thoſe of others.

Many other amuſements and diverſions might be mentioned, about which no obſervation is neceſſary, but the general one, of keeping them in their own place, let them never be conſidered as primary objects of attention, but only as ſecondary; as good only, in ſo far as they can be any way conducive either to the health and vigour of the body, or to the ornament and improvement of the mind.

Games of *hazard* cannot be ſaid to deſerve thus much tolerance in youth; there will be

* *Directions* as to the exerciſe itſelf may be very few, as nothing more is neceſſary but ſtretching and poiſing the body, proper reſpiration and baniſhing all fear; but more *directions* will be neceſſary for guarding againſt immoderate cold, fatigue, raſhneſs, *&c.*

danger of their intoxicating too much, corrupting the mind, inflaming the paſſions, and (not to mention fortune) waſting time unſpeakably; nor is it a good mark, of the temper and ſpirit of the preſent age, that they ſhould now be reckoned ſo neceſſary, for paſſing time agreeably in the polite world; but, neither theſe, nor even the public diverſions of the *ſtage*, will be found very conſiſtent with a proper attention either to books, buſineſs, or any kind of uſeful improvement.

Could young gentlemen, even thoſe of the greateſt rank and fortune, be kept intire ſtrangers to all games of hazard, and theatrical entertainments *, till they arrive at manhood, and their judgment be ſo far ripened, as to prevent their carrying a fondneſs for ſuch amuſements to exceſs, it would be the ſafeſt way of managing them; and therefore, theſe places of education ſhould always be preferred, in which they are not admitted, nor any tolerance of them, either in public or private: But, when their ſituation is ſuch, as that they cannot be kept off from them intirely, all that can

* What is here ſaid will not be ſo eaſily admitted as to theatrical entertainments, and yet it is certain that ſome maturity of judgment is neceſſary in order to draw any improvement from them. This obſervation might be extended to the immoderate reading of plays, novels, romances, which, if begun too early or practiſed injudiciouſly, may corrupt the fancy, and indiſpoſe for more ſerious and important exerciſes.

can be done is, to take the more pains, in impreſſing properly and fortifying againſt them; ſo as to put off their acquaintance with them, as long as poſſible; to prevent their being enamoured of them, as is often the caſe very early, and, when ſome knowledge of them becomes neceſſary, in view of their launching out into the world, to beſtow ſome pains, in making them well acquainted, with the principles upon which they are conducted, for the ſame reaſon that they are taught fencing (or the noble ſcience of ſelf-defence as it is often called) that they may not be dupes to all they meet with, when they muſt ſometimes join the polite circle; nor ſo much ſlaves to any unbounded inclination this way, as would be hurtful to their intereſt and improvement, in every other reſpect.

The diſpoſition and taſte of youth, as to the different particulars we were now ſpeaking of, and indeed, their ſucceſs in every branch of improvement, depends much on the *company* which they frequent or have moſt acceſs to. Variety is a matter of no ſmall conſequence here for giving them a modeſt aſſurance; but, firſt of all, in order to judge of their genius and inclination, it is fit to obſerve what company they themſelves chooſe; if it is with inferiors and dependents, of whatever character, with thoſe who will humour or

flatter them moſt, whatever they do, that they are obſerved to aſſociate, it is fit that they ſhould be kept, as long as poſſible, from having their own choice; they are in danger of contracting mean, and, perhaps vitious habits in this way, inſenſibly; but, it is a moſt promiſing mark of them, if their own inclinations appear to lead them, to the choice of ſuch as are rather above them, not merely on account of ſuperior rank, ſplendour or fortune, but with a view to improvement, to have their minds the more enlarged, and their behaviour regulated among ſuch as will regard them according to it.

It will ſcarcely be neceſſary to obſerve, not only, that the ſmalleſt inclination for ſuch company, as would lead to places of bad fame, is to be *checked* *, but likewiſe all immodeſty, all obſcenity of diſcourſe or ſentiment, double entendre, common ſwearing, and the like: To which we may add, that all *tavern-meetings*, or pretences of aſſembling together in the convivial way, where, not only drinking, but intoxication is the chief object, in ſhort, all good bottle-companions are to be avoided,

as

* It is not always by warning againſt what is here mentioned, or any thing groſsly immoral and criminal, that youth are to be *checked*, but, ſometimes, by conſidering them as above being ſuſpected of any ſuch enormities, and ſeeming to be ſurpriſed if at any time the contrary appears.

as by no means ſuitable to young men, nor correſponding with any views of what reſpects health, improvement, or any of the purpoſes of education.

It may perhaps be a queſtion, however, on this head of company, How far the *company of the* LADIES * may now be proper? or, if it might not be a mean of improvement to young gentlemen, as they advance in this laſt period of education, which we are now conſidering?

This is a matter of ſome delicacy, and which will not admit of a general rule ſuited to all caſes. The natural diſpoſition, temper, and character of your pupil muſt be attended to, in part, for determining this: If he is naturally either baſhful and aukward, or, appears to have ſomething of roughneſs and ferocity, in either of theſe caſes, the company of the Ladies, is an excellent mean, of enlivening and poliſhing, as well as ſoftening and

* Though nothing is here ſaid of the *education* of the LADIES in particular, yet it is a very fit obbject of general attention, in itſelf, and in reſpect of its influence (as here ſet forth) by their having almoſt the ſole charge of children in the beginning of life, and no ſmall ſhare of their education afterwards. Whoever, therefore, would wiſh to be more particularly inſtructed as to what reſpects the education of the Ladies may have ſufficient ſatisfaction from peruſing what the Earls of Halifax and Cheſterfield, Dean Swift, Mr Addiſon, and Dr Fordyce have wrote on this ſubject, ſetting forth that modeſt dignity and diſcretion, that delicacy of taſte and ſweetneſs of temper, that oeconomy, prudence and piety, which are the ornaments of the female character.

and humanizing his diſpoſition, and he may be the more indulged in this way, that poſſibly, his own inclination will not lead ſtrongly to it, ſo as to carry it too far. There is rather danger, that one of this laſt character, may be taken up with low women, which there is no better mean of preventing, than by introducing him to the acquaintance and company of Ladies of virtue and character. But, on the other hand, if your pupil be rather ſoft and effeminate in his diſpoſition, if he is like to be a dandler after the ladies, and to devote too much of his time and thoughts to them, at a period, when the purpoſes of his education and improvement require his having ſome other objects of attention; his fondneſs for their company muſt be reſtrained: The occaſions of acceſs to it, in weekly or monthly aſſemblies, of the youth of both ſexes, will be ſufficient, nor will he loſe much, though he ſhould ſometimes happen, to be out of the way of theſe likewiſe; it will ſoon be made up; and notice ſhould be taken, whether he ſhews any particular attachments, in this way; if he does, and that they are any way prudent and virtuous, inſtead of checking them by violent means, it may rather be found adviſeable to cheriſh and continue them, under proper regulations; for inſtead of doing any thing that may delay a young man's ſettlement

ment in a married ſtate, when his family and fortune require or admit of it, it ſhould rather be encouraged; but till this is the caſe, care ſhould be taken, as much as poſſible, to prevent his forming any particular attachments or engagements, with a view to it; when once formed, they ſhould indeed be held ſacred and fulfilled; but, they ſhould rather be entirely prevented, if the proſpect of fulfilling them be remote, as it is not poſſible for man to foreſee the changes of circumſtances, that may, in a few years, work ſuch a change, either as to ſentiments or intereſts, as might make laſting connections of this kind, formerly deſireable, to be very improper and undeſireable; and yet, when a foundation is laid for them, by ſuch previous puerile attachments as were mentioned, they cannot, in ſome caſes, be honourably got rid of.

It may therefore be conſidered, as a general rule, proper here, that all ſuch intimacies or engagements, reſpecting love and marriage, be the intentions never ſo fair and honourable on both ſides, ſhould rather (as much as poſſible) be carefully prevented, till there be a near proſpect of judiciouſly fulfilling them.

This, however, is not to prevent that general acquaintance with the Ladies, which we mentioned as of ſingular uſefulneſs; nor even a preference of eſteem and affection, to ſome

of

of them beyond others; but, there muſt be no private declarations of this, that may draw on the mutual engagements, and perhaps embarraſſments, now ſpoken of.

The mention made of fidelity to engagements that might be embarraſſing, gives occaſion for obſerving, among the inſtructions particularly neceſſary for youth, that they cannot be taught to conſider *truth* as too ſacred a thing, nor ſhew too much regard to it, in the way of *veracity*, or declaring what they believe to be truth, when neceſſary to be declared, with candour and openneſs; *ſincerity*, in not labouring to impoſe on others, by any falſe appearances of qualities, diſpoſitions, or ſentiments, which they are not poſſeſſed of; *fortitude* in bearing pain, diſappointment, and diſtreſs; inviolable *ſecrecy*, (when promiſed or required) and ſtrict *honour* or *faithfulneſs* to all their promiſes, in making which they cannot be adviſed to be too cautious; but which, when made, ſhould, amidſt all difficulties and diſadvantages, be religiouſly adhered to.

The *deſire* of *pleaſing* others, is ſtronger in youth than afterwards, and may be made a mean of engaging them to many things that are commendable; but, at the ſame time, care muſt be taken, of its not degenerating into a ſimple and ſervile compliance with the humour of others, be what it will, or into *frippery*, *i. e.* a frivolous attention to every little

the motion, geſture, and punctilio in behaviour or converſation, by which *petits maitres* are diſtinguiſhed.

When any mode of behaviour or diſcourſe, appears becoming in another, and gains admiration, young men are eaſily led to fall in with it, and wiſh to diſtinguiſh themſelves in the ſame way: *Imitation* is natural, and, what is becoming and engaging in another, will, they think, be ſo in them likewiſe; but ſome cautions will be neceſſary for them as to this: *Firſt* of all, it would be fit to diſtinguiſh between the *thing itſelf*, that is ſaid or done, and the *manner* of ſaying or doing it; the thing itſelf, if praiſe-worthy in one, will probably be ſo in another, unleſs the circumſtances of the perſon and caſe be very different: But the ſame cannot be ſaid as to the manner; for every man alive, has a manner of ſaying and doing things, as natural and peculiar to himſelf, and as diſtinguiſhing of him from others, as the features of his face. Good language, right pronunciation, gracefulneſs of motion, action or geſture, are all univerſally agreeable; but the particular phraſes, tone of voice, geſture and motion, which are natural to one, will often appear conſtrained, affected, and unnatural in another, ſaying or doing the very ſame things.

Too

Too much pains, therefore, cannot be taken, in recommending to youth, to give more attention to the things themſelves that are ſaid or done, and to the ſtate or temper of their minds at the time, than to their outward manner, or appearance to others; if their inward *ſentiments* are juſt, and harmoniſe with their action, in ſaying or doing, what is ſuppoſed in itſelf right, the leſs anxiety they have about outward circumſtances and appearances, the better; theſe will follow of courſe, according to the ſentiments that prevail; it is the *ſentiment*, indicated or expreſſed, that draws approbation; and, it is, when any one expreſſes it, in the way moſt natural to himſelf, that he does it with that eaſe and *propriety*, which are the greateſt charms of action and converſation, and which, to a diſcerning taſte, are manifeſt, but are ſuited, to that diverſity of characters, tempers, and circumſtances, to which no general rules can be adapted.

The opinion of an intelligent obſerver, with reſpect to the manner of doing things, regulated by the impreſſion they make upon himſelf at the time, and candidly declared, will avail more, in determining as to propriety, than all the maxims of the ſchools, all the precepts of tutors, or a ſlaviſh imitation of thoſe, who, by happily hitting on this propri-

ety

ety themſelves, have come off with honour and applauſe.

In the near approach of manhood, it will eaſily be admitted, that it is not, by methods of violence and compulſion, that any thing can be done with young men; unleſs they can be got to do things of themſelves, there is little to be expected from them; but, as much may be done inſenſibly to engage them to what is right, by a judicious intermixture of commendation and reproof, it will be fit to obſerve carefully, the various effects which theſe have on them. The way of commendation (which admits of much art and diverſity) even for appearances of what is right, or upon a ſuppoſition of its taking place, when, perhaps, as yet it does not this way; is what ſhould firſt be tried, and has generally the moſt laſting effect; but, if it is found that praiſe or commendation, inſtead of exciting to diligence or good behaviour, rather makes a young man more indolent, vain, and ſelf-conceited, the way of reproof will be neceſſary, but, ſtill to be ſo conducted, as that he may never think you have entirely loſt your good opinion of him, elſe he will be at no pains to preſerve or recover it.

You may poſſibly find it neceſſary, to juſtify your pupil to others, yet reprove him by himſelf; and your doing ſo thus, ſecretly, will

engage him much to you; nor will it be improper, ſometimes, to employ others to commend or challenge him, in a way that will ſeem more accidental, than if done by you. By methods of this kind, a judicious tutor may do a great deal, eſpecially, if he can preſerve the eſteem and affection of his pupil, ſo as he may be always ready to place confidence in him, or unboſom himſelf to him, rather than to any other.

The ruinous effects of *luxury* and *expence*, not limited or regulated by fortune, are ſo remarkable with us at preſent, and for many years paſt, that it is of no ſmall conſequence, to the future eaſe and ſucceſs of youth, to have their taſte rightly formed, as to the different articles that draw expence, or give occaſion to luxury; ſuch as dreſs, table, equipage, and the like; if the paſſion for games, and public diverſions, be kept within due bounds, it will go a great way to prevent the bad effects of profuſion and extravagance, commonly complained of; for theſe are articles, ſtill more deſtructive of the largeſt fortunes, than even what we are now conſidering, or what reſpects the ordinary expences of life, which do not admit of the ſame rule in all caſes, as they muſt be ſuited to a variety of circumſtances, and, to reſtrain them too much,

may

may, ſometimes, be more improper, than to increaſe them.

All that ſhall be ſuggeſted upon this head here, is, that, after obſerving carefully the diſpoſition of your pupil, in reſpect of his value for *money*, and, in what caſes he ſeems moſt willing to part with it, you endeavour to leſſen his value for it, if too great, or, if otherwiſe, to leſſen his value for any unneceſſary articles, upon which he inclines to laviſh it; make him ſenſible of its intrinſic value, which is none at all, and, of the comparative value of the different articles, for which it is exchanged, ſo as to check any appearance of parſimony, avarice, and mean attention to little things, on the one hand, as well as profuſion on the other, and (which is rather ſtill more difficult) to prevent ſuch a taſte for ſome expenſive gratification of humour, fancy, or appetite, as may give occaſion to the moſt ſordid penury in other inſtances for ſupporting it; and, perhaps, iſſue after all, in poverty and contempt.

One advice, that cannot be too often repeated, with a view of preventing all this, is, the recommending often and earneſtly to young men, to cultivate a *ſelf-command*, as to their paſſions, appetites, and deſires, by keeping them ſo far under the government of reaſon, as that they may ſollicit or obtain no indulgence inconſiſtent with it; but that, by an habitual maſtery over them, their happineſs

may be more in their own power, their taſte for immoderate expence reſtrained, and the ruinous conſequences of a boundleſs riot after pleaſure avoided.

As I do not here profeſs to treat of Education in the ſyſtematick way, I ſhall not enlarge on the different *academical ſtudies* proper for young gentlemen, and ſucceſsfully purſued in our different *Univerſities*, further than to make one general remark on the order that appears moſt natural for proſecuting them, and that is, that they ſhould be taken, ſo as to correſpond with the growth of our faculties: It will eaſily be ſeen, that thoſe faculties, which have moſt connection with the bodily frame or conſtitution, grow up before thoſe that are more purely mental; ſo that, after that early period of life, in which it may be ſaid, that ſenſe and appetite rule, or that all is ſenſitive, the *Memory* is the firſt faculty that diſtinguiſhes itſelf, or ſprings up ſooneſt, and is then rather quick than retentive: The *Imagination* next gathers ſtrength, then the *Will* and *Affections*, and, laſt of all, the *Underſtanding* and Judgment come to ſome maturity. Should not we, therefore, take the food of the mind, or the different branches of knowledge to be communicated to it, in the order that beſt ſuits the progreſs of its faculties now mentioned; beginning with languages, fables, examples,

amples, ſhort hiſtories, ſhort geographical and chronological tables, writing, and ſome arithmetick, in all which the *memory* is particularly concerned. The *Imagination* is next to be exerciſed and improved by poetry, painting, muſick, *i. e.* a taſte of theſe, ſo as to judge of them with ſome propriety, and be entertained by them; alſo natural and civil hiſtory, and even natural or experimental philoſophy. In this order we proceed to what reſpects the *Will* and *Affections*, which are to be formed by the ſtudy of moral philoſophy or ethics, together with theology, ſo far as it is connected with this. But thoſe branches of knowledge, which require higher efforts or operations of the *Underſtanding* and *Judgment*, than thoſe we have mentioned, ſhould come laſt, ſuch as logic, or the art of reaſoning; a ſhort ſketch of metaphyſicks and pneumaticks; the more abſtract parts of mathematicks; algebra; aſtronomy, *&c.* a critical knowledge of hiſtory, poetry, chronology, geography, *&c.* a competent knowledge of theology, both polemick and practical; and even of phyſick, particularly anatomy; alſo juriſprudence, compoſition, rhetorick, and elocution, *i. e.* the application of them to any purpoſes of importance in life.

There is one branch of education, not as yet touched at, which is generally conſidered as giving it the finiſhing ſtroke, and that is,

Travelling, which I do not conſider, as a mean of increaſing knowledge, in the manner it was among the ancients, when the communication of knowledge by books was not ſo eaſy as it is now; but it is certainly a mean, if properly conducted, of enlarging and humanizing the mind, which is of much more conſequence to its improvement, than any acquiſitions of knowledge or fortune: In order to its having this effect, however, the mind muſt be ſomewhat formed, its principles fixed, and its faculties arrived at ſuch vigour, as that it may, with ſafety, be expoſed to the great variety of impreſſions that will be made upon it, in its tranſition from one object and ſcene to another, approving or diſapproving, retaining or rejecting them, with judgment, according as they are conducive to any branch of civil or moral improvement.

In this view of forming and improving the mind, as well as collecting uſeful diſcoveries, inſtitutions, or inventions, that may have eſcaped the general notice, travelling may be of great benefit to young gentlemen, when the circumſtances of their family and fortune eaſily admit of it; but, when they do not, it is far from being of ſuch conſequence, as that their education cannot be carried on and compleated without it, ſo far as reſpects all that is eſſentially neceſſary for their improvement in knowledge

knowledge and virtue, as well as for the proper conduct of life.

In this view, likewiſe, it will eaſily be ſeen, that, tho' travelling ſhould be delayed, as was ſaid, till the mind be ſomewhat formed and ſettled, yet it ſhould not be delayed ſo long, as to contract any ſuch immoderate attachments and conceit, in favour of what it has been accuſtomed to at home, as may occaſion the conſidering, what is uſefully received and practiſed elſe where, with indifference or contempt.

Between the age of twenty and thirty, is the proper ſeaſon for travelling, where education or improvement is the object; I need not therefore add, that the idea of a tutor or governor, is entirely unſuitable to it. I would not have a young gentleman himſelf, and much leſs others to ſuppoſe, that he was travelling in leading ſtrings, to have his thoughts and reflections ſuggeſted, or the punctilios of his behaviour regulated by another, he muſt think and act for himſelf; but, as it adds unſpeakably to the advantage and comfort of travelling, to have one companion, to whom he may ſafely communicate his thoughts and reflections, and, in whom, he may place an entire confidence; to have ſuch a travelling companion, would be highly proper; and likewiſe, that he ſhould be one, who has prudence

and

and experience, but by no means to be conſidered as a travelling governor or tutor.

Whoever would travel with advantage, ſhould know ſo much of the laws*, cuſtoms, conſtitutions, manners, hiſtory, and geography, of his own country, as that he may be able to ſatisfy any ſenſible foreigner, who may make enquiry with reſpect to them, and, who will be ready to give in return, all the information wanted, as to the ſame particulars, in thoſe places with which he has had acceſs to be more acquainted. In order to this, however, it would be of conſequence, to have ſome previous knowledge of them, ſo as to know what enquiries may be proper with reſpect to them, to embrace proper opportunities of being informed, to give ſuch a turn to converſation as is neceſſary for this purpoſe, and, to mark down, very briefly, any new and uſeful.

* Whether there be a view of travelling or not, theſe are all proper objects of attention for young gentlemen, and particularly ſo much knowledge of the civil, municipal, and even eccleſiaſtical law, as may enable them to underſtand and manage their own affairs, to judge of the management of others with whom they are entruſted, and to ſupport their own juſt rights. The reaſon of ſelf-defence formerly given for learning ſome other ſciences, may likewiſe be given for this; nor is the danger of being made quarrelſome and wrangling, by having ſome knowledge of law, an objection of any greater weight here than in the caſe of fencing, formerly mentioned. The regulation of the temper, and not the reſtriction of ſkill or ability for ſelf-defence, is the way of checking the quarrelſome and the litigious.

ful information received, with the authorities for it, in a day-book or journal, to be afterwards mentioned.

The *Tour* of FRANCE, is by far too confined an object for travelling, and often begets a habit of levity and diſſipation, which cannot be more effectually cured, than by viſiting other parts of Europe, where different modes of behaviour take place.

For travelling with advantage through any country, I need ſcarcely obſerve, that it is abſolutely neceſſary to be maſter of ſome one language that is well underſtood in it; ſo as to be able to enter into converſation with the moſt ſenſible and intelligent of the inhabitants, without the aſſiſtance of another to explain or interpret. Some difficulty as to the language of other countries, is what occaſions the common error of travellers, aſſociating themſelves chiefly with their own countrymen, when they ought to be enlarging the circle of their acquaintance, among the native inhabitants of the different places they go thro'. It muſt be obſerved, however, that the enlarging it much, is neither neceſſary nor proper; and it would be of great conſequence to them to be well recommended to a few, in every place they reſort to, on whom they might rely for any information or aſſiſtance they may ſtand in need of; not forgetting, as they go along

along, to inform themſelves carefully, with reſpect to thoſe who are moſt eminent or diſtinguiſhed, for any particular excellency, and to cultivate their acquaintance; they ſhould not hurry too faſt from one place to another, except when, as is ſometimes the caſe, a general idea of the country is all that is wanted; and whatever ſingularities, or even ſeeming abſurdities, may be obſerved in the manners and cuſtoms of different places, and more eſpecially in what reſpects religion, they are by no means to be treated with ridicule or contempt; there is a reverence due to every thing that regards religion, and great caution neceſſary when engaged in any converſation with reſpect to it; nor ſhould even the politicks, or party heats and diſputes of any country, be wantonly meddled, or made free with by ſtrangers.

Travellers ſhould keep a ſhort *journal*, of the moſt material tranſactions and obſervations of every day, with the very impreſſions, as it were, that are made upon them, by the different objects that occur; a review of theſe afterwards will be a fund of great entertainment to them; but they are to beware of ſhewing too great attention to trifles, which is a fault they are often chargeable with, and, ſtill more, of indulging a paſſion for the marvellous, as if it were miraculous, but rather endeavour

deavour carefully to ſearch out the reaſons of things, and then the wonder will often ceaſe.

I may poſſibly be thought ſingular, in what I am now to ſay, but will be found, upon enquiry, to have ſome reaſon on my ſide, when I affirm, that, if a young gentleman's family and circumſtances are ſuch as require an early ſettlement in married life, I would expect more benefit from his travelling, either ſingle or in the family way, deliberately afterwards, than from his rambling, in a hurry, through foreign countries, before his mind be properly formed and diſpoſed for being improved, rather than corrupted by it: On the ſuppoſition, however, of any engagement of this kind, there is no queſtion, but the time and extent of his circuit muſt be more circumſcribed, than would otherwiſe be proper and practicable; but, with reſpect to this, it will be neceſſary to add one obſervation more, which is, that

Three years is the longeſt time that ſhould be beſtowed on travelling, with a view to education, and perhaps, rather too long; but, if they can eaſily be ſpared, they may be profitably ſpent in this way, and will be ſufficient for viſiting, at leaſt, the moſt remarkable parts of Europe. There are few of them in which travelling will be proper in winter; ſo that, was I to make ſo long a tour, my firſt winter

quarters

quarters would be in Paris, the next in Naples, and the third in Liſbon, making ſhort excurſions from each of theſe, in the way I found moſt convenient, and taking the moſt favourable ſeaſons of the year for larger circuits, not only on the continent of Europe, but even to ſome iſlands of the Archipelago, proceeding to Conſtantinople, and not loſing ſight of Paleſtine and Egypt, if convenient opportunities offered of viſiting theſe likewiſe, within the limits of the time above mentioned.

When travellers are of ſuch rank, as to viſit the different courts they may have acceſs to, it ſhould by no means be omitted; and the way of doing it, through the recommendation of the different ambaſſadors or reſidents, in each of theſe, will be very eaſy, if properly planned before they ſet out, and letters of credit obtained, in the uſual way, for getting what ſums of money may be wanted, in thoſe places where their reſidence is like to be longeſt, and from which they can eaſily get bills on other places of leſs general reſort, where they may happen to paſs. Want of foreſight and exactneſs in this way, may occaſion much inconvenience not eaſily remedied afterwards.

Thus have I thrown together ſuch remarks as appear to me moſt material, on the ſubject of

of EDUCATION; they are no more than what experience and common ſenſe ſuggeſt to me, not knowing how far they may agree with thoſe of many others, who have wrote large treatiſes * on the ſame ſubject, of which I ſcarce know any more than their names; nor have I acceſs to ſee any of them at preſent, except Mr *Rouſſeau's Emilius*, a new ſyſtem of Education, which I have peruſed; and cannot help admiring, firſt of all, the author's ingenuity and invention in making out four volumes on the ſubject, animated by ſome lively ſallies of fancy, without any more of real ſolid inſtruction with reſpect to it, than might be contained in four pages. I muſt next admire the liberal diſpoſition of my countrymen, who are friends to literature, in the metropolis of Great Britain, for encouraging and indemnifying a publication of ſuch expence, tranſlated from a foreign language, but affording ſo

* What would be particularly uſeful, and ſeems wanting, is ſome ſyſtem of *Education*, that would enable us to diſcover the different *diſpoſitions* and *geniuſes* of youth, and direct how to treat and regulate them in different ways accordingly; confirming right diſpoſitions and habits, diſcovering and curing, or correcting the contrary; engaging their attention to that which is moſt important, and taking it off from little things; forming or improving their intellectual and moral faculties, and regulating their thoughts and practical opinions as to what ought to be moſt purſued or avoided by them, for, by theſe, their temper and affections, as well as actions, will, of courſe be regulated.

cuſe my paradoxes; there is an abſolute neceſſity for them in making reflections; and, ſay what you will, I had rather be remarkable for hunting after a paradox, than for being miſled by prejudice."

Vol. I. p. 11. "It muſt be obſerved, I do not eſteem as public inſtitutions, theſe ridiculous eſtabliſhments that go by the name of *Univerſities*. I regard, juſt as little, the education acquired by an intercourſe with the world, *&c.*"

Vol. II. p. 58. "I hate books, they only teach people to talk about what they don't underſtand—P. 59, and 60. Since we muſt have books, there is one already, which, in my opinion, affords a compleat treatiſe on natural Education. This book ſhall be the firſt Emilius ſhall read: In this, indeed, will, for a long time, conſiſt his whole library, and it will always hold a diſtinguiſhed place among others, *&c.*

Is it Ariſtotle, Pliny, or Buffon? No. It is Robinſon Cruſoe.

Vol. II. p. 121. "Since our errors thus increaſe with our knowledge, the only method to avoid error is to remain in ignorance."

Vol. II. p. 171. "The common people appear as they really are, and they are not amiable: If theſe in high life were equally undiſguiſed,

diſguiſed, their appearance would make us ſhudder with horrour."

Vol. II. p. 239. When ſpeaking of quarrels. "I do not ſay Emilius ought to fight; that were madneſs: I ſay, he owes himſelf juſtice, and he is the only diſpenſer of it, *&c.* It is not in the power of the braveſt man to prevent his being inſulted; but it is certainly in his power to prevent the perſon inſulting him from long making a boaſt of it."—What the author plainly points out here is *aſſaſſination*.

Vol. II. p. 257. "Emilius hardly knows, at fifteen years of age, whether or not he hath a ſoul; and perhaps it will not be time to inform him of it when he is eighteen; for if he learns it too ſoon, he runs a riſk of never knowing it at all."

Vol. I. p. 137. "Exerciſe his corporeal organs, ſenſes, and faculties, as much as you pleaſe, but keep his intellectual ones inactive as long as poſſible."

Vol. III. p. 96. "I praiſe God for his mercies, but never ſo far forget myſelf as to pray."

Vol. III. p. 123, and 124. "We have three principal religions in Europe: One admits of only one revelation, another of two, and the third of three. That which admits of only one revelation is the moſt ancient, and ſeems the leaſt diſputable; that which admits

of three is the moſt modern, and ſeems to be the moſt conſiſtent; that which admits of two, and rejects the third, may poſſibly be the beſt, but it hath certainly every prepoſſeſſion againſt it; its inconveniency ſtares one full in the face."——Had our author lived among Mahometans (to whom he here gives a preference) the love of ſingularity would probably have made him more a Chriſtian.

DISSER-

DISSERTATION VIII.

ON

DEATH.

TO *write* on any ſubject, is the way of knowing, with ſome preciſion, what *ideas* we have formed with reſpect to it, and to make them more determinate; tho', therefore, I had no view of communicating my *thoughts* to others, I could not avoid having ſome deſire, of conſidering a little, how they ſtand, with reſpect to two ſubjects ſo intereſting as DEATH and IMMORTALITY; ſubjects apparently oppoſite, and yet the one naturally leads to examine what may be ſaid on the other.

It is ſcarcely to be expected that any thing new can be ſaid as to either of the important ſubjects now mentioned; nor can it be thought, that any one man, has light, or means of information with reſpect to them, beyond others, who have had the ſame advantages of reaſon and revelation to inſtruct them; tho' there

there is no doubt, but that ſome have, by reflection, gone greater lengths in improving theſe means or ſources of knowledge, and have been thereby enabled to place them in different lights, or points of view, for the inſtruction and improvement of others.

DEATH puts a period to the manner of our exiſtence in the preſent ſtate; and might, therefore, be thought an argument againſt *Immortality*, was not this to be expected on any other footing than what we ſee at preſent: hence it is that theſe ſubjects ſeem oppoſite; but, admitting another mode of exiſtence to ſucceed, unlimited by time, and requiring ſuch a change of being and faculties as is occaſioned by *Death*, there will then be no doubt of its being not only connected with, but neceſſary to the *other*: and it is the *firſt*, in the order of our ideas, that falls to be conſidered.

After premiſing, therefore, ſome general conſiderations with reſpect to it, I ſhall conſider DEATH, as to its *origin*, its *nature*, and its *effects*; taking each of theſe in a *phyſical*, as well as in a *moral* and *religious* view.——

The

Firſt and moſt obvious conſideration, of a general nature, that occurs with reſpect to *death*, is that of its *univerſality*; the inſtances are ſo few of any exemption from it, even in

the

the way of God's ſovereign and ſupernatural interpoſition, ſince the world began, that, whatever appearance there may be of practical unbelief with reſpect to it; there is none ſpeculatively; very few points, indeed, ſo much againſt the intereſt of many, have paſſed without diſpute, but this will admit of none.

Not to avoid whatever may be the *immediate cauſe*, or rather *occaſion* of *death*, ſo far as we can do it in a conſiſtence with duty, would be unnatural, as well as unjuſtifiable; but to ſuppoſe (as ſome, by their being always ſo poſitive and particular in aſſigning ſecond cauſes, would ſeem to do) that there may be a poſſibility, in ſome caſes, at leaſt, and by ſome lucky conjuncture of circumſtances, to avoid theſe *ſecond cauſes* commonly aſſigned, and the *death* conſequent on them, is to ſuppoſe ſomething that contradicts the univerſal experience of mankind; for, if ſuch a caſe could happen, if it was not againſt the fixed laws of our preſent ſtate, it is ſtrange that it never ſhould have happened, that, by no human power or invention, ſuch *ſecond cauſes* or occaſions of death have ever been eſcaped, and immortality, on man's preſent footing, attained.

What then is the obvious concluſion from this? What? but that it is not conſiſtent with the preſent condition of our being, with the general

diſtinction of characters, as conducive to the greateſt general good.

3. It affords matter of further reflection with reſpect to *death*, that, as it puts a period to our preſent ſtate of being, it does ſo with many before they have well entered upon it; with others before they could anſwer the ends of it (ſo far as we can judge) in the way of much improvement to themſelves, or even, before they are capable of ſuch improvement, and, they are by far the feweſt whom it ſpares, till their capacities are fully unfolded and cultivated.

From the moſt accurate obſervations that have been made, it appears, that, of thoſe who are born into the world, or breathe the breath of life, one third part dies before the expiration of the firſt year; one half, before they finiſh the fourth; and two thirds, before they reach what is commonly reckoned the age of manhood or maturity. In the early ages of the world, in order to its being ſooner peopled, it is probable, that providence ſo ordered it, as to the conſtitution, diet, and other circumſtances relating to the inhabitants, that few died in infancy, or at an age, which we, through ignorance, call untimely; but the caſe is otherwiſe now, as to thoſe who enter of this life; and it ſtands pretty much in the manner we have here repreſented.

From

From this we may conclude, that the Creator has ends in animating, beyond what has reſpect to any enjoyments or improvements attained in the preſent ſtate: Theſe ends, particularly as reſpecting the numerous claſs now mentioned, of ſuch as are removed from this ſtate of being, before they have well entered upon it, it is not poſſible for us to aſſign at preſent, though it is not eaſy to avoid forming ſome general conjectures with reſpect to them; mine ſhall remain with myſelf, till I arrive at the region of certainty, when the connection of the preſent human ſyſtem, with ſomething before and after it, will, probably, clear up many particulars relating to it, that are at preſent involved in impenetrable obſcurity, and fit for being the ſubject of ſilent conjecture, rather than of any noiſy and fanciful ſpeculation.

4. One other general obſervation that naturally occurs in contemplating death, is, that we ſee men ſo univerſally betray an inconſiſtency with reſpect to it; by believing its certainty and approach, and yet acting as if they expected exemption from it; believing the frailty of others, but incredulous as to their own; believing that the ſlighteſt accident may put a period to life, and that it is in the power of the meaneſt aggreſſor; and yet, every moment making light of what endan-

gers that, which (though owned to be ſo precarious) they generally hold ſo dear; valuing nothing more than life, and yet of nothing more prodigal; in ſo much that, ſcarce any paſſion can be named, however inconſiderable, that does not often conquer the fear of death.

All this ſeeming inconſiſtency, however, may be accounted for, and reconciled to his unerring wiſdom who has thus conſtituted us. He would have us active and provident, which requires our laying ſchemes for futurity; but he would put us to the trial alſo, whether we will have this activity and foreſight directed, to a nearer or more diſtant and important futurity; moderating the fear of death was neceſſary to the former, but a firm perſuaſion of its certainty and conſequences to the latter; when we have it ſo much in our power to hurt others, there was the more need of our being impreſſed with a ſenſe of their weakneſs and frailty, and our impreſſion, at the ſame time, of the vanity of their purſuits, moderates envy towards them. The believing our lives to be in every man's power is a reſtraint from injuring and provoking others: And, as our preſent frame is ſuch that life is eaſily cut off, and the hour, though ſtill approaching, concealed, there is the more room for the exerciſe of prudence and fortitude,

in

in the way of expoſing or endangering it, the more incitement to watchfulneſs, and the leſs to iniquitous ſchemes for the ſupport or accommodation of it.

Smith, in his excellent Theory of moral ſentiments, obſerves, that the behaviour of a military man is reckoned to have moſt propriety, when he ſeems to have no thoughts of death, and that of a clergyman when he appears to have, though the former is much more expoſed to it than the latter; and the reaſon he gives for this, from human experience, is, that, to encounter death often, it has been found eaſier to baniſh the thoughts of it, than to combat it by arguments. But, tho' this be ſo much the practice, it muſt be owned, that a proper view of death, and preparation for it, in the way that ſhall afterwards be mentioned, is a much better foundation for real fortitude and intrepidity.

After premiſing theſe general obſervations with reſpect to death, we promiſed to conſider it a little more methodically in reſpect of

I. Its *Origin*;

II. Its *Nature*, and

III. Its *Effects*.

Taking each of theſe in a *phyſical* as well as in a *moral* and *religious* view.

I. To inquire into the *origin* of *death*, is to inquire into the origin of *natural evil*, of which death, and whatever leads to it, is reckoned to make ſo great a part. This again leads to inveſtigate the origin of *moral evil*, as the ſource of the other. Theſe diſquiſitions we ſhall now enter upon, no further than to obſerve, that every account of the origin of evil, will be found either fabulous or unſatisfying, which does not derive it from that one ſource, of man's departure from the law of his creation, by an abuſe of the free powers of action given him: This departure, tranſgreſſion or abuſe, is what, in the language of divines, is called *ſin*, in that of philoſophers or rhetoricians, *vice* or moral turpitude; and of this, death is the *natural*, the *penal*, and the *medicinal* conſequence.

1. The *natural* conſequence. Man's firſt ſin was ſuch, that it poiſoned his nature, the body as well as the ſoul was poiſoned by it. Not to mention, what has, with ſome colour of reaſon, been ſaid, as to the poiſonous quality of the forbidden fruit, it is certain, that ſin has laid the foundation of death, or paved the way to it, in a manner that may be pretty eaſily accounted for by us, in ſo much as, from

from this original ſource of ſin and corruption, many ſtreams have iſſued, each of which have their effect, for haſtening that death, which is the original fruit and demerit of ſin. How many are there whoſe ambition has thus hurried themſelves, and many others, to the period of life? witneſs the cataſtrophes which it occaſioned in Europe not many years ago, and continues ſtill to occaſion: How many again, whom intemperance; or a boundleſs riot after ſenſual pleaſures, hurries to their end? The ſame might be ſaid of the effect of every ungoverned paſſion, of anger, avarice, with all theſe ſecret and open ſins, by which many draw upon themſelves and others, that *death* they ſo much dread, as a natural conſequence of their offences.

2. It may be alſo conſidered as their *penal* or *judicial* conſequence, *i. e.* in the way of judgment, for executing God's juſtice, and teſtifying his diſpleaſure againſt ſin; though we ought not to be raſh in making the application, or determining, in what caſes particular calamities are meant in the way of judgment for particular offences.

If certain treſpaſſes, againſt the laws of men, be puniſhable by death, much more is this due, where the law of GOD, the ſupreme ruler, is tranſgreſſed: Well then might he intimate this, as the penal conſequence of ſin,

to perfection, gives a full deliverance from the bondage of corruption, and opens their way to the regions of purity and joy.

Thus much may be ſaid of death in reſpect of its origin; but,

II. When we make any thing the ſubject of our inquiry or diſcourſe, it is expected that we ſhould, if not explain, at leaſt inquire into the nature of it: How then ſhall this be done as to our preſent ſubject, DEATH? What idea ſhall we form of it? A very imperfect one indeed, as in all caſes of ſenſible impreſſions and perceptions, where experience is wanting, and imagination often employed to ſupply the want of it: Now death cannot be ſpoken of or wrote of, as the ſubject of experience, till we come to a condition of being, in which our thoughts of this and every other ſubject, ſhall be communicated otherwiſe than by writing, or any faculty now made uſe of for this purpoſe.

None of thoſe, who have trode this dark path before us, can return, at our deſire, to tell us their experience with reſpect to it; the laws of their ſtate of ſeparation, do not appear to admit of this, and, till the ſame experience enable us to judge of its nature, we can only form dubious conjectures. The wiſe

Author

Author of our being, has not ſeen it neceſſary for us, to be further informed on this head at preſent.

But though we are not enabled to know and judge of this, in a *phyſical* or *natural* way, yet we are enabled and called to do it, in a *religious* way, which is, to us, of much more importance. All our knowledge of nature, will not enable us, to avoid or ſecure againſt death, but the religion of Jeſus teaches how to ſecure againſt any hurtful conſequences of it. It is not, then, our knowing, that, to burſt this or 'tother veſſel, to break this or 'tother nerve, is death, which, to us, is of moſt importance to know; but our knowing, and being aſſured, that this or 'tother *ſin*, will, moſt certainly, if un-repented of, and un-pardoned, be the *death* of our *ſouls*. The bodily tenement or cottage, muſt, no doubt, have certain breaches made upon it, before the ſoul forſakes it, but, in what part, or from what quarter theſe breaches may come, and, to what preciſe degree it muſt be broken or laid waſte, before it ſhall be thus deſerted of its ſpiritual inhabitant, is beyond the ſkill of the moſt knowing on this head to determine.

When the ſentence of death was denounced againſt our firſt parents, it is very probable they had a much more imperfect idea of it than we have; that they conſidered it however

ever as the period of their ſtate on earth, is highly probable, elſe Cain would not have taken this way to get rid of his brother: The death of Abel is the firſt that we read of, and ſome Jewiſh writers have endeavoured to embelliſh the hiſtory of it by fabulous additions, ſuch as, that when Cain reſolved on killing his brother, he knew not how to accompliſh it, or what would effect it, till the ſame artful enemy of mankind, who had deceived his parents, taught him the art of murder, by bruiſing the head of a bird, while aſleep, with a ſtone; be this as it will, the way to deprive of life has, ſince that time, come to be too well known.

But can any one tell preciſely where the ſeat of animal life lies; is it the head or the heart, the arterial or the nervous fluids, nutrition or reſpiration to which it has reſpect? As to all theſe we are unable to determine; we cannot determine or deſcribe the manner in which the ſoul and body are united, and operate on one another in life, we cannot therefore diſcover or determine, the preciſe manner in which they are ſeparated by death, and as little can we form a determinate idea, of what is felt at diſſolution *, there is no caſe in

* Some have compared the *change* or *tranſition* here, to that of infants at their birth, and reckoned the pain of the

in which more of diverſity takes place, from the agonies with which the furious ſoul of Cataline burſt forth, to the ſeeming gentle ſlumbers or *deliquium* of a Seneca, or even of a Petronius Arbiter.

The ſuſpenſion of our ſenſible powers by ſleeping or fainting, is indeed what beſt enables us to form any idea of death, yet ſtill the *nature* of it, in a *phyſical* way, is inexplicable by us: Its *certainty*, in a *religious* or *moral* ſenſe, as formerly ſet forth, is enough for us to know; I ſhall, therefore, add only one obſervation more, as to its *nature*, which is that

Wherever the *ſeat of animal life* is, or whatever it is that conſtitutes the union between ſoul and body, we find that the continuance of it, depends ſo much upon a certain inward, and I may ſay involuntary, principle of *motion*† of

the latter poſſibly greater; but, though this is what cannot be aſcertained, yet the means of leſſening the pain of natural death, as well as of protracting or averting it often, when occaſioned by violent external cauſes, is juſtly conſidered as one of the *deſiderata* in the Phyſical art.

† Whatever it is that naturaliſts call the *Animal Spirits*, this vital motion has particular reſpect to them; and, until there is an *extinction* of theſe, even the deſtruction of the bodily organs will not cauſe death; this extinction may be occaſioned, not only by too great *compreſſion*, but likewiſe by too great *dilatation* of them; and as their motion at the heart is three times quicker than in the lungs, whatever ſtops the *Syſtole* and *Diaſtole* of the heart, muſt bring on death three times more ſuddenly than whatever ſtops *reſpiration*.

or *circulation*, that, wherever this intirely ceaſes, life ceaſes, whatever puts a period to this ſupreme vital function or energy, (if I may ſo call it) which operates independently on the will, puts a period to animal life; but while this internal principle of motion or circulation continues to operate, be it never ſo languid, life continues, even tho' ſenſation ſhould be interrupted, as is the caſe in deep ſleep and fainting.

Amidſt this ſeeming dependence, however, on matter and motion, for the continuance of animal life, *i. e.* of the ſoul's union with the body, behold the triumphs of the former, of that which in us is ſpiritual and immaterial; that mode of action which is peculiar to it, ſtill continues, when that which has reſpect to matter ceaſes; the action peculiar, but not eſſential, to matter is *motion*, that which is peculiar, and likewiſe eſſential to ſpirit is *thought*, or reflection, which continues amidſt the ruins of all that is material in us, and around us. Hence ariſes its ſecurity and exultation, ſo well deſcribed by Mr Addiſon, in theſe well known but inimitable lines,

The ſoul, ſecur'd in her exiſtence, ſmiles
At the drawn dagger, and defies its point;
The Stars ſhall fade away, the Sun himſelf
Grow dim with age, and Nature ſink in years;
But thou ſhalt flouriſh in immortal youth,
Unhurt amidſt the war of elements,
The wrecks of matter, and the cruſh of worlds.

III. Having ſeen our inability to come at any diſtinct

diſtinct idea of death, from our knowledge of its *nature*, phyſically conſidered, let us ſee, what may be had from a view of its *effects*, the idea of which, we are in this, as in many other caſes, apt to confound, with that of the nature and eſſential conſtitution of things.

What then are the effects or operations of this *King of Terrors*, in all the different views we are now taking of them, phyſical, moral, and religious?

What is it that death *does*? and,

What is it that it *cannot do*?

1. The effect of it that appears moſt obviouſly at firſt view, is, that it puts a period to life, it ſeparates the *ſoul* from the *body*; they had been embarked together on the ſea of life, but, this ſhort voyage being ended, they launch into the ocean of eternity. Very cloſely were theſe two companions united before; many ſtorms, perhaps, they weathered together; but death ſeparates them, and thereby ends the condition in which they at preſent ſubſiſt.

As it was obſerved formerly, that we know not how many ſtrokes our tenements of clay muſt get, before our removal from them, we may now further obſerve, that, though we are uncertain from what quarter theſe may come, or where the attack may be made, yet that this tenement muſt be forſaken at laſt, is undeniable

deniable, you may ſpend as much time and pains as you pleaſe, in adorning, decorating and pampering it; it may poſſibly be the object of your own fond admiration, and you may think it meets with admiration from others, yet ſtill it is but a cottage of clay, which you muſt leave; and how far inferior it is to the *ſoul*, which you perhaps ſhamefully neglect, you may ſee from its condition when forſaken of it; inſtead of being the object of admiration to beholders, it becomes the object of horror and diſguſt, even to thoſe who are moſt nearly connected with us, and muſt lay their account with ſoon following us.

As the firſt and moſt obvious effect of death is its putting a period to life, by ſeparating between the ſoul and the body, we muſt alſo obſerve,

2. As its effect, that it puts a period to all our enjoyments, proſpects and purſuits in this life, it ſeparates from all theſe, from all the objects with which we were connected only through the body, vain are all human efforts to prevent the ſeparation. If we may believe the hiſtories we have of ſome diſtant unenlightened nations, it was no uncommon practice, with thoſe of moſt diſtinction among them, to have their treaſures, and, even ſome of their dependents, interred along with them, as if they could, thereby, prevent that ſeparation from all outward perſons and things,

which we are now ſpeaking of; but the attempt was vain and impotent; they were as much ſeparated from them as if diſperſed to the utmoſt corners of the earth.

All the *diſtinctions* of honour and policy, are likewiſe hereby levelled; all *differences* from humour, intereſt, or paſſion, removed; thoſe who entertained them do all mingle in the ſame duſt; nor can their remains, when there depoſited, be any more diſtinguiſhed one from another. By this the various relations of life are likewiſe diſſolved; death ravages our ſociety upon earth; it ſeparates from thoſe who were moſt cloſely united to us, by the ties of blood or friendſhip; and the laws of their ſtate of ſeparation, do not appear to admit of their returning to mix again in the ſociety of mortals.——We ſhall only obſerve further,

3. As to the effects of death, that, as it puts a period to life and its enjoyments, ſo likewiſe to our time of trial, and means of improvement; they extend no farther; death determines our condition for eternity.——Our

Laſt, therefore, and moſt important enquiry with reſpect to death, ſhall be the *preparation* neceſſary for it; and the firſt ſtep we ſhall mention of this preparation is, the keeping our

our minds *diſengaged* from any immoderate attachment to ſuch things as have reſpect only to this life; and the accuſtoming ourſelves to think ſeriouſly on theſe objects, which muſt be owned to deſerve our moſt ſerious attention; ſuch as, the end for which life, being, and faculties, were given us, the account we have to give of their improvement; how this ſtands, and how, amidſt all our unworthineſs, and miſimprovement, we may, through the merciful offices of our Redeemer, be accepted in the ſight of God.

If any ſubjects deſerve our ſerious attention, it muſt be theſe; we muſt beware, however, of miſtaking this *ſeriouſneſs*, for a *gloomineſs* of diſpoſition, which makes ſome men ſee only the dark ſide of things, and which is neither honouring to God, nor comforting and improving to themſelves: Even death hath its bright as well as its dark ſide; and, tho' the preparation for it be inconſiſtent with levity of ſpirit, yet it by no means conſiſts in that gloomineſs of ſoul ſpoken of, which is rather a bar to ſuch improvement, and ariſes, either from a conſtitutional infirmity of temper, or from a diſtempered imagination, prying too much into dark and awful providences.

What we here mean to point out, as the firſt ſtep of preparation neceſſary for death,

give peace and tranquillity of ſoul, on rational and ſcriptural grounds; but when this is once attained, and a habit of attention and watchfulneſs acquired in conſequence of it, the work goes on eaſily and comfortably, and may all be comprehended in that one exerciſe, ſo often ſpoken of, with particular approbation, in ſcripture, *walking with God*: which indeed includes a variety of exerciſes, according to different circumſtances, duties, and relations; but ſuppoſes, that, in all theſe, an uniform regard to God's will is maintained, and an impreſſion of his preſence and providence, leading to the different exerciſes of loving, fearing, truſting, and ſubmitting to him; the *habitual preparation*, therefore, neceſſary for death, in this light, requires the following particulars:

1. An endeavour to be always found in the *way of duty*, to GOD and *man*, avoiding whatever is contrary to it, whatever wounds the conſcience in life, and adds to the terrors of death, the view of which might be a good mean of combating temptation, and the conſidering what may then add to our hopes, or our fears, a good rule to judge of the nature and fitneſs of our actions.

2. The applying ourſelves to acquire every *habit* or *diſpoſition* that is ornamental to, or perfective of our *ſouls*, and muſt follow them

after death; and, for the ſame reaſon, to watch againſt what deforms, diſfigures, and debaſes them.

3. The conſidering all our duties, ſervices, and diſpoſitions, in a *goſpel light*, as having too great a mixture of imperfection and impurity, to imply merit, or bear the ſcrutiny of unerring wiſdom, and untainted holineſs.

4. On every deviation from duty, the loſing no time in returning to it, in breaking off our ſins by repentance, and getting our *peace* made up *with* GOD, through the merits of his Son, as our Saviour and Interceſſor.

5. In order to have our condition at *death*, not only *ſafe*, but comfortable, it would be our intereſt, even while neceſſarily employed about the things of this life, and endeavouring to have them properly regulated, to endeavour alſo to keep our minds ſo far diſengaged from them, and to have our dependence on divine providence ſo firmly eſtabliſhed, that we may be above being either diſturbed or corrupted by outward things, conſcious that we have choſen God for our portion, and placed our ſupreme happineſs in his favour, the value of which will not be diminiſhed, as that of all outward enjoyments will be, at death; but, on the contrary, a conſciouſneſs of having made him formerly the deliberate choice of our ſouls, will lay a foundation for the higheſt

higheſt comfort, in the more immediate view of appearing before him, and entering on *Immortality*.

IMMORTALITY is the ſubject of enquiry and contemplation, we are next to turn to; it naturally ſucceeds that which we have been conſidering. Would you have immortality on the terms now fixed by the Author of nature, you muſt paſs to it through *death*; dark and gloomy as the vale of death appears, it is the only entrance * to immortality.

By way of *tranſition*, therefore, to this laſt ſubject of enquiry, let us conſider a little how far the power of *death* extends, and how it is limited? this is what was meant when we propoſed, that, after viewing the *effects* of death, or what it does, we ſhould likewiſe conſider what it *does not*, what it has not power to do; the conſideration of this begins to open to our view, ſuch a proſpect of *death* as is comfortable.

1. Then, tho' *death* be *certain*, according to God's appointment, yet it cannot come one moment ſooner than he has ordered; be your diſtreſſes, dangers, and fears, what they will, yet, till the time arrive, which he has appointed for calling you hence, you are immortal.

2. Death

* It is in this view that an eminent Latin Poet calls DEATH, "The Privilege of Human Nature."

2. Death will come *once, but no more;* you may therefore be the more eaſily reconciled to whatever appears in it diſagreeable to nature, that the blow is not to be repeated.

3. Tho' death *changes* us, yet it cannot *deſtroy* us; the ſmalleſt grain, even of that duſt to which it changes the body, will not be loſt or annihilated, but will be found in due time. Much leſs will what appertains to the ſoul be loſt. A change we muſt grant it to be, yea a very great one, and to us at preſent inconceivable; becauſe of the difference betwixt the two ſtates to which it has reſpect, that from which it takes us, and that to which it leads; yet ſtill it is only a *change*, and, to many, a happy *exchange*.

4. Another thing, we may ſay, which death cannot do, is, that tho' it ſuſpends the *ſenſible powers*, yet it cannot ſuſpend the *ſpiritual powers*. Theſe powers that depend, in any meaſure, on the body, we call *ſenſible*; theſe that depend more immediately on the ſoul, *ſpiritual*. That death ſuſpends the firſt of theſe, *viz.* the powers of ſenſation, cannot be denied; the ſenſes can no longer be exerciſed as formerly; in vain ſhall we endeavour to charm the ear with melody, to pleaſe the eye with colours and ſymmetry, to regale the taſte with delicacies, or the ſmell with the moſt fragrant odours,

dours, the powers of diſtinguiſhing or delighting in theſe, are now no more; theſe ſenſes that have particular reſpect to the *body* only, ſuch as the *taſte* and *ſmell*, ſhall, we may well believe, entirely ceaſe, and that of feeling, in a ſenſible way, likewiſe; but as for hearing and ſeeing*, they are ſo neceſſary, to our having any intercourſe with others, that we are naturally led to believe there will be ſome powers of perception analogous to theſe, even after death; and we ſhall ſoon ſee that we have ſufficient grounds to believe, that whatever effect it has on our *ſenſible* powers, it cannot reach our *ſpiritual* powers, of thinking and enjoying; theſe powers that are peculiar to the ſoul, and which we may rather ſuppoſe ſhall be enlarged, enlivened, and improved, as no bodily weakneſs or incumbrance ſhall remain hereafter, to clog or interrupt their exerciſe.

HAVING thus far made *Death* the ſubject of

* Tho' we cannot pretend to follow the celebrated author of "The Elements of Criticiſm," in all his refinements, yet we cannot but approve of his diſtinction betwixt our perceptions by the Ear and Eye, and thoſe of our other ſenſes, as reckoning the former more refined and intellectual, and not ſo much ſeated in the organ of ſenſe, but the latter more corporeal, and, as it were, organic; for our perceptions by them in the way of feeling, ſmelling, and taſting, ſeem to be ſeated more in the bodily organ, and to be thereby leſs refined and permanent.

of my thoughts and contemplation, it is natural for me to look forward, and conſider what view I ſhall have of it when ſpeculation ſhall give place to experience; but, tho' of this I can now have no idea, yet, as I read with pleaſure and approbation what has been wrote on this ſubject by many (who were equally inexperienced) with views of general improvement to others, after their departure from them; one of my ſtrongeſt engagements to add to what has been wrote on it, or, at leaſt to repreſent it in different points of view, is that others may, in the ſame manner, have ſome benefit by my imperfect hints, when my life and my labours ſhall likewiſe have their period.

This conſideration naturally leads to one reflection more upon the ſubject, which is, that

All the ſpeculations, even of a Plato or Seneca, about Death, Immortality, and the Spiritual World, come infinitely ſhort of the intuitive views and perceptions of the meaneſt peaſant or infant, the very firſt moment of their entrance on a diſembodied ſtate. When, eſcaped from the priſon of the body, the ſoul finds its faculties expanded; reviews with pleaſure the toils it underwent, and bad accommodation in its former dark and deſolate abode; takes

takes in new ideas, ranges thoſe it had, in better order; corrects its former views, and, inſtead of the parched Pierian ſprings, ſatiates its thirſt for knowledge, from the exuberant ſources of celeſtial knowledge and intelligence.

DISSER-

DISSERTATION IX.

ON

IMMORTALITY.

DEATH is a *tranſition*; the view now taken of it from *obſervation*, (for ſome judgment of it there may be, in this way, previous to its being the ſubject of *experience*) proves it to be this and no more: It is a tranſition or migration from one ſtate to another, from one mode or condition of being to another: The ſtate or condition, *from which* it removes us, we all know. What that is *to which* it leads, by the ſeparation of ſoul and body, is a queſtion that reſolves itſelf into five different parts or branches, reſpecting

I. The *nature* of the SOUL.

II. The evidences of its *ſurviving the ſeparation from the body*.

III. Its condition while thus *ſeparated*.

IV. The

IV. The reaſons we have to believe that they ſhall be *reunited*.

V. The *conſequences* of this reunion, and its continuance or *duration*.

LET us ſee then what is the amount of our knowledge, as to each of theſe particulars, according to the light that reaſon and revelation give us with reſpect to them.

This will carry us farther in our enquiries, than would perhaps be expected, or at firſt thought neceſſary, in a diſcourſe on IMMORTALITY; which is generally conſidered only according to the reſpect it has to the SOUL; but the other points mentioned are ſo nearly connected with this, and ſo intereſting, that we cannot eaſily avoid offering a few hints with reſpect to them*.

1. As to the *nature* of the SOUL, we are apt to think that we know ſomething of it, when we ſay that it is *ſpiritual* or *immaterial*; but when we conſider the import of ſuch expreſſions, we ſhall find that they carry in them no

* Though *Immortality* be aſcribed particularly to the *ſoul*, being conſidered as the neceſſary conſequence of its ſpiritual nature, or as an original inherent property of it; yet it is alſo to be conſidered as awaiting the *body*; though on a different footing, viz. not as the conſequence of its nature, nor as eſſential to it; but, by virtue of God's poſitive appointment and promiſe with reſpect to it, "that though mortal, it ſhall put on immortality."

idea of any thing poſitive, but only a negative deſcription, as it were, of the *ſoul*, intimating what it *is not*, rather than what it really *is*. The word *ſpiritual*, and that which, in the Hebrew and Greek languages, (as well as in the Latin, from which, properly, it is taken) correſponds with it, is plainly metaphorical, that is, it expreſſes ſomething mental by an image taken from what is ſenſible; for the words from which, in all theſe languages, it takes its origin, *viz.* נֶפֶשׁ רוּחַ, πνευμα, *ſpiritus*, do all expreſs much the ſame as Wind, Air, or Breath, in Engliſh: We would wiſh to expreſs by them ſome high refinement of *matter*, ſomething as remote as poſſible from what is groſsly material, ſomething that has not fleſh and bones as we now have, *i. e.* ſomething *immaterial*; which is the other term, or mode of expreſſion here generally uſed, and indeed the only one that can be uſed, as our knowledge now ſtands with reſpect to the ſubject it relates to.

The plain caſe with us here, then, ſeems to be this: We have ideas of ſome qualities that muſt be aſcribed to matter, ſuch as ſolidity, figure, *&c.* and other qualities, that cannot be aſcribed to it, as thinking, reflecting, *&c.* The *ſubſtance* or *ſubſtratum* itſelf, as diveſted of theſe qualities, we have no idea of in either caſe, and yet we cannot but

believe

believe them to be eſſentially different from one another, in ſo much as the qualities of the one can, with no propriety, be aſcribed to the other. We cannot ſay of a piece of *matter*, with any appearance of propriety, that it is mild, bold, fearful; that it grieves, hopes, rejoyces, *&c.* nor of any *thought* that it is ſquare, round, and the like; or that the ſenſible, the known properties of matter, *viz.* ſolidity, extenſion, figure, *&c.* are any-way applicable to it.

Whatever, therefore, is the nature of that *ſubſtance* (for we have no other name to expreſs it by) to which *thought* belongs, in all its different forms or exerciſes, of underſtanding, willing, *&c.* and however unable we are to conceive of, or deſcribe it, as diveſted of theſe qualities, (even as we are unable to conceive of the *ſubſtratum* of ſenſible qualities) we muſt conclude, *negatively*, with reſpect to it, that it is not *material*, that it is ſomething eſſentially different from *matter*.

But, what the wiſer are we, you will ſay, of knowing this much? What the better of knowing as to any herb, only that it is not graſs, if we know no more? I anſwer, that, even from this it follows, that there is one eſſential property of matter which we cannot aſcribe to the mind, *viz. Diviſibility*; a property that always ſuppoſes *extenſion*, and is therefore incompatible with our idea of theſe *ſpiritual* qualities and exerciſes now mentioned;

but, in a particular manner, incompatible with that idea which the *ſoul* has of itſelf as *one ſingle conſcious* indiviſible principle; whereas the ſmalleſt particle of matter is rather a congeries or multitude of parts, and conſequently of diſtinct *conſciouſneſſes*, if it could be ſuppoſed *cogitative*.

Thus far, therefore, are we come in our enquiry, as to the *nature* of the human *ſoul*, that, from its exerciſes or operations and qualities, it appears to be ſomething very different from *matter*, ſomething *immaterial*; that conſequently it is indiviſible, and, in its own nature, incapable of diſſolution.

This clears, in a great meaſure, our way for eſtabliſhing the evidences of the SOUL'S *immortality*.

But, before we proceed to this, it might poſſibly be expected that we ſhould purſue, a little further, the enquiry we have now entered upon, as to the *nature* of the human *ſoul*, according to the place which it appears to hold in the ſcale of exiſtence and intelligence.

With reſpect to this, then, I muſt firſt of all obſerve, that, I hope, it will not be expected, when we muſt confeſs our ignorance, even of the eſſence and properties of *matter*, that we ſhould be able to inveſtigate, or explain thoſe of *ſpirit*. If our ſenſible powers,

and

and their perceptions fail us as to the *former*, which are their proper objects, much more must they do so as to the *latter*, which are not; and it seems certain, that it is through their perceptions, or the impressions made on them, that we receive our first and simplest ideas, however much they come to be afterwards compounded, compared, differently arranged and improved upon by the *reflex* operations of the mind.

In all our enquiries, as to material and immaterial objects, as to the natural and spiritual world, we would be at *Theory*, and have no small help from it, when it can be had; but, as our sources of knowledge now stand, the progress towards it must be by various accurate and repeated experiments and observations. Without these we may form an hypothesis or conjecture, but no true *theory*; it is by collecting, comparing, and reflecting aright on such experiments and observations, that we are enabled to investigate any general *laws*, causes, and principles, on which such a *theory* may be built; and when once it is, in some measure, established, it gives great advantage in our future enquiries, or scientifick progress (if I may so call it) towards truth.

To take this method, therefore, here, let us see what is the amount and result of our observations, as to *vitality*, *intelligence*, and the

different ranks of beings to which they are found to belong.

1. We ſee a regular *ſeries*, or gradation of beings *below* us, in the animal, vegetable, and mineral world.

2. From *analogy*, founded on ſcripture, as well as reaſon, we conclude that there is alſo a gradual aſcent and continuation, in the *ſcale* of ſpiritual beings above us, from man, who is the loweſt of them, to the higheſt orders in the hierarchy of heaven.

3. In the ſcale of beings below us, what forms the moſt eſſential difference, is *vitality*: in that by which we are related to thoſe above us, the diſtinguiſhing property is *intelligence*.

4. Tho' in reſpect of theſe two, the different claſſes do ſometimes approach very near one another, yet we muſt ſuppoſe there are inſuperable *lines*, by which they are divided.

5. To the accurate enquirers into nature, it may be ſubmitted, whether the three dividing lines as to the * vegetable, animal, and intellectual

* Were we to go farther back here in examining more minutely, and tracing the ſcale of beings below us, we might obſerve, that, as motion or action of any kind, is not eſſential to *matter*, whatever it appears to have of this muſt be derived from ſome other principle operating on it. It is, in itſelf, inert or inactive; in conſequence, however, of the laws impreſſed upon it in the way of gravitation, attraction, coheſion, *&c.* it acquires a tendency to motion, regulated by theſe laws, and diverſified according to

intellectual orders, may not be reckoned *alimentation*, *perception*, and *reflection*; *i. e.* nothing can be called a *vegetable* without a principle of *alimentation*, by which it ſelects, and, as it were, imbibes and circulates its juices and nouriſhment, from ſuch of the elementary homogeneous parts of matter, as beſt correſpond, and are in contact with it. No being can be called an *animal*, or ſaid to be endued with animal life, unleſs it appears to have *perception**; but, if it has this, tho' it has no loco-motive powers, it is more than a mere *vegetable*; it gives and receives impreſſions from a principle of life and action *internal*† to

to the mixture or compoſition of its integral elementary parts; this is the firſt ſtep of its aſcent or improvement; the next is, that which is attained by *minerals*, as diſtinguiſhed from other *foſſils*, by a principle of *acretion* or *aſſimilation*. From *minerals* we riſe to *vegetables*, reckoning *moſſes* intermediate betwixt them, as the *ſenſitive* plants, polypus and *ſhell-fiſh* are between the vegetable and animal tribes; *baboons* and *changelings* between theſe and the rational.

* When Lord Bacon ſpeaks of a *perception* common to all bodies, he certainly means by it the ſame as an *impreſſion*. He affirms likewiſe, that if the law of gravitation did not take place, all bodies would attract what was homogeneous to them, viz. gold attract gold, iron, iron, *&c.* but of this there is not ſufficient proof.

† It ſeems to be chiefly its not having this principle of motion and perception or ſenſation *internal* to it, that excludes the moſt *ſenſitive* plant, even what is called *Venus's Fly-trap*, from the claſs of *animals*.

to it, and not merely from external impulſe or contact.

But what is ſtill more difficult, yet more connected with our preſent ſubject, is to fix the boundary betwixt the *animal* and *intellectual* world, betwixt brutes and men; their near approaches to one another, in reſpect of memory, affection, ſagacity, and the like, have afforded ſubject of much diſpute; but we are not to enter upon this at preſent; we would only wiſh to fix the *line* by which they are divided, ſome where or other; and how can we fix it better than by ſaying, that it is *reaſoning* and *reflecting* which diſtinguiſh them? meaning thereby, the powers not only of receiving and retaining, or recording, but alſo of arranging, examining, and comparing the impreſſions made on ſenſe, ſo as to draw concluſions from them, with reſpect to objects which do not make an immediate impreſſion on it. This power or principle of connecting, reviewing, and operating on its own ideas or perceptions, cannot have any name, more diſtinguiſhing of it, than *reflection;* and, if to this we add *devotion,* or an impreſſion (however faint it may be) of a Deity, we have that which moſt diſtinguiſhes the rational from the brutal, the *intellectual* from the *animal* creation.

6. With

6. With reſpect to the affections of matter, in all caſes where there is none of theſe internal principles, now ſpoken of, operating upon it, we cannot conceive of them in any other way, than as mechanical, *i. e.* one part of matter moving or acting upon another by impulſe or contact: The various laws of motion and gravitation, and the various wonderful phenomena of chymiſtry, electricity, and the like, ariſing from the combination or contest of the different elementary ſyſtems, however ſubtile or refined, muſt be all either aſcribed to the uniform influence and operation of an immaterial principle, or reſolved into the effects of matter and motion, in an infinity (I may almoſt ſay) of different configurations, conjunctions and poſitions.

7. As in the different claſſes of beings, formerly mentioned, there are near approaches to one another, yet inſuperable boundaries betwixt them; we need not wonder if the ſame ſhould be the caſe as to *matter* and *ſpirit*, that they ſhould alſo make near approaches, without ever meeting. But,

8. Notwithſtanding their being eſſentially different, and never meeting, ſo far as to be tranſmutable, yet we ſee they may be cloſely *united*, and operate on one another, with this remarkable difference, that ſpirit can operate on matter, even when it has not an intimate vital

vital union with it, but *matter* cannot be conſidered as operating, *i. e.* as making any impreſſion (for no idea of activity has place here) on *ſpirit*, unleſs it has ſuch an union with it.

9. As *matter* admits of ſo many different elementary principles, combinations, and degrees of refinement, we need not wonder if *ſpiritual* or immaterial principles, ſhould be, at leaſt, equally different; though therefore we ſhould admit ſomething immaterial *, as the cauſe of gravitation, attraction, *&c.* and, much more as neceſſary, wherever there is vitality, *i. e.* an internal principle of life and action, or ſelf-motion; this, by no means, puts a reptile, or even the moſt ſagacious brute animal, on the ſame footing with man, while the reflecting principle, formerly mentioned, is wanting; it is this that diſtinguiſhes man, that makes him an intelligent and accountable being, and conſtitutes him, as it were, the lineal heir of immortality.

10. Admitting ſome principle, very different from matter, to take place wherever there is vitality, even in the inſect and reptile world, no inference can be drawn from it as to their duration, in the manner in which we reaſon with reſpect to the immaterial, and conſequently the indiviſible and immortal principle

* If the cauſe was material and mechanical, it would operate according to the extent or ſuperficies of bodies, and not according to their ſolid contents; as is the caſe in *gravitation*.

principle in man, their natures being eſſentially different; and, whatever changes or migrations ſome may allow them, they ſtill ſeem deſtitute, in a great meaſure, of that fixed and continued conſciouſneſs or recollection which man has, and which is neceſſary for connecting one period or condition of being with another *.

11. It is alſo obſervable, as to the principle of *life* or *vitality*, even in its loweſt degree, that where it is once begun, it does not ſeem to be loſt, through whatever tranſmutations it may paſs, any more than the elementary parts of matter are loſt or annihilated; and if, by ſuch an infinity of tranſmutations and diſſeminations, all nature ſeems, as it were, to be animated, we need wonder the leſs at the generation of animals, in places where only matter was ſuppoſed to operate, as in the caſe of putrefaction, without ſuppoſing that there can, in reality, be any ſuch thing as *equivocal generation*, from the mere influence of *matter*, whatever may be its configuration, motion, or poſition.

After throwing together theſe obſervations, with reſpect to the different orders of beings *below*

* Hence it is that, among brutes, though the *individual* advances from infancy to maturity, yet there is no progreſs or advancement of the *ſpecies*, as there is with man, by one generation's building on the improvements of another. For this obſervation I am indebted to *The Hiſtory of Civil Society*, one of the moſt animated performances in the Engliſh language.

below us, it may next be exp
ſame ſhould be done as to the ſ
ings *above* us, in order to ſee hc
help of analogy where experie
any *theory* can be eſtabliſhed a
any of the laws, by which they
inveſtigated. The amount
ledge, therefore, as to theſe, ſ
more than as follows,

1. We can have no doubt of
the ſpiritual world, *i. e.* of th
ſuch ſuperior intelligences, ho
they may be from one another
enjoyment and perfection: W
doubt the exiſtence of every
and thing, that is not the imme
our ſenſible perception.

2. We have no reaſon to b
any diſtance of place on their
fect of faculties on our's, whic
diſcernment of, and intercourſe

3. This defect of faculties is
ble conſequence of our preſen
being, as it ſeems to ariſe from
nion of the ſpiritual principl
matter, and its powers of per
thereby debilitated or obſtructe
union once be diſſolved, let its
be ſtruck off, and then the ſpi
will, as it were, open to its view

4. If, upon a minute inſpection of the natural world, it may, with reſpect to the prevalence of life in it, be ſaid to be all animated, much more may this be ſaid as to the ſpiritual or intellectual world, in which the human *ſoul* muſt be conſidered as holding the loweſt rank.

5. As we can judge of the circumſtances and actions of inferior irrational animals, though they cannot of our's; in like manner may it be ſuppoſed, that our conditions and actions ly open to the diſcernment of ſuperior intelligences, though their's do not ſo to us.

6. We cannot conceive of them, without ſuppoſing the ideas of ſpace, or extenſion, and ſucceſſive duration applicable to them, but how they really are ſo, or whether our ſuppoſing it ariſes only from an imperfection in our diſcernment or manner of conception, is a queſtion, that will remain ſuch till this imperfection be removed.

In any ſupernatural revelation from God, ſome might be apt to think, that very great diſcoveries would be made as to the ſpiritual world, but we behoved to have new faculties in order to their being communicated to us. With reſpect to the *Angels* who fell from their obedience, and thoſe who ſtood and were confirmed therein, their difference of ſtate and ſervices, ſome hints are given us in ſcrip-

ture; but its ſilence as to many things, nay, almoſt, as to all that reſpects the planetary as well as the angelick worlds, ſeems plainly deſigned for checking all vain curioſity, and confining our thirſt after knowledge to that which is moſt uſeful in this life, and moſt neceſſary for leading us to ampler views and diſcoveries hereafter.

This, however, is not to be underſtood as a reſtraint from inveſtigating and contemplating the works of God, in ſuch a manner as to afford us new grounds of adoring him at preſent, and, I may add, to lay a foundation for greater meaſures of happineſs, in the life to come, from comparing its views and diſcoveries with thoſe of the preceeding: and from having theſe deſires of knowledge fully gratified, which formerly took place: Such as have leſs of theſe at preſent, may have happineſs hereafter, but not that ſpecies of it which ariſes from a completion of theſe reſearches after knowledge, that are now begun: In the ſame manner as a man, who never deſired or attempted much to know any thing of a foreign country and its inhabitants, will not have the ſame pleaſure in his travelling through it, as one who endeavoured to form ſome ideas of them before.

But, to proceed with our obſervations on the ſpiritual world,

8. However

8. However manifeſt our condition and actions may be to ſuperior intelligences, even of the loweſt rank, and however poſſible it may be for them to aſſume corporeal vehicles, when ſpecially impowered and commiſſioned to do ſo, yet the laws of their ſtate, unknown as they are, ſeem to reſtrain them from revealing or manifeſting themſelves to us; and even from communicating impreſſions, in any other way than through the intervention of bodily objects and organs; ſome indeed have allowed them ſuch immediate acceſs to the mind in *dreams* *, when the ſenſible powers are ſuſpended, but this cannot with certainty be affirmed, in any caſes, except ſuch as are preternatural or miraculous, and from which, conſequently, no general concluſion can be drawn. It is in the light now mentioned, that we muſt underſtand Satan's tempting Eve in a dream, if his doing

* To prevent aſcribing the phenomena of *dreams* to matter and motion, or mechaniſm, Mr Baxter has gone rather too far, in the way of aſcribing this, and likewiſe ſome bodily indiſpoſitions, to the influence of inviſible beings. Others ſeem inclined, to go a ſtep farther, and aſcribe to them likewiſe the impreſſions, made upon the mind when awake; but the moſt rational account of the matter ſeems to be what we have here endeavoured to explain. It cannot, however, be denied but that there is much room given for ſpeculation as to dreams, from the mind's ſurpriſing activity in them, its ſeeming diverſity of conſciouſneſs, and familiarity with perſons and objects that might be thought new and ſurpriſing to it.

ſo at all, in this inviſible way, be any more than a poetical embelliſhment; it would rather ſeem probable, that the influence of any ſubordinate ſpiritual beings on the human mind, is not in an immediate way, but by the uſe or application of ſuch means, even ſuch outward objects, as may have the moſt remarkable effect on the bodily organs, and theſe powers of perception, which more immediately depend on, and are connected with them, particularly the imagination and appetites, and, by vitiating and miſleading, or improving and enlivening theſe, impreſſions of pain or pleaſure, fear or hope, comfort or terror, are diffuſed into the ſoul.

9. Upon the whole, it may be ſaid, that the *ſoul* of man, in its preſent ſtate of connection with matter, is the *nexus utriuſque mundi*, the link, as it were, which unites the ſenſual and intellectual, the material and ſpiritual worlds. Its intimate union with matter is diſſolved by death, and, whether it is from this inferred or not, that all manner of connection with inferior objects is thereby intirely cut off, yet it is certain, that the manner of receiving impreſſions or perceptions from them, muſt undergo an unſpeakable change; but, to prove that ſuch a change, even tho' it ſhould be ſuppoſed to infer a total breach of its connection with material objects, to

prove,

prove, I ſay, that ſuch a change, by death, does not deſtroy the vital and active powers of the ſoul; that theſe continue after death is the next thing we propoſed to proceed to, after premiſing one other general obſervation, which is, that,

Our endeavouring thus (as is intended) to collect and ſet forth the principal arguments, from *reaſon*, for the *ſoul's immortality*, does by no means imply, the leaſt dubiety or uncertainty in the teſtimony of *revelation* with reſpect to it: This alone would have been a ſufficient and ſatisfying proof of immortality, as it is of the reſurrection, though there had not been one argument from reaſon or nature to ſupport it*. The authority of the goſpel-revelation, is not the point we are now labouring to eſtabliſh; but every fair and impartial inquirer will find it ſo well eſtabliſhed, that he needs have no more doubt about the certainty of whatever is therein revealed, than about the cleareſt deductions of his reaſon. The allowing our thoughts,

* As the evidences and the authority of the Chriſtian revelation are now ſo well eſtabliſhed, I own it is, with ſome reluctance, and even with a kind of indignation, that I go about to prove, by arguments from Reaſon, any truths that are clearly revealed, and thereby put beyond all reaſonable diſpute; but I know that, by ſuch additional reaſonings with reſpect to them, they come to make a deeper impreſſion upon the mind, even where a general belief of them, as being revealed, formerly took place.

ſome light with reſpect to *life* and *immortality*, even *before* the goſpel revelation, and the word which he uſes here, φωτισαντος, ſignifies properly to illuſtrate, to clear up, or remove doubts and darkneſs, from what was known in part formerly, and not to reveal what was utterly unknown. Let us ſee then,

2. On what footing this evidence of immortality was, *before* the goſpel-revelation, and we ſhall find various proofs of it under the Old Teſtament, which ſhall be afterwards adduced, when we come to ſpeak of the reſurrection. We ſhall find alſo an opinion prevailing univerſally with reſpect to it, among the un-enlightened heathens, even the moſt illiterate of them: How came they by this? Was it from philoſophers or poets they took it? No; philoſophers and poets rather found it with them, they alſo appealed to it, in their proofs of immortality, and exerciſed their genius in accounting for it: Was it by tradition that the illiterate people thus had it? Yes, poſſibly, in part; but the moſt probable ground of their opinion ſeems to have been, ſome ſhort plain reaſoning of their own with reſpect to it; nice philoſophical refinements would be much the ſame thing to them, as no proof at all; but very probably it was an inference they naturally drew in proof of a future ſtate of retribution, from connecting their

their ideas of the divine juſtice, of men's accountableneſs, and of their not being dealt with according to their merits or demerits in the preſent ſtate: Agreeably to this we find, that, wherever the belief of immortality prevailed, there was likewiſe a perſuaſion of different conditions in a future ſtate, in reſpect of happineſs or miſery, conſequent on their different characters and conduct in the preſent.

It muſt indeed be owned, that the general belief of mankind, in favour of immortality, extends to the *whole* man, body as well as ſoul; but, as death plainly deſtroys the former, it accordingly breaks in, as it were, upon the common hopes and ſenſe of men, with reſpect to this; ſo that philoſophers thought it ſafeſt, to give up and even ridicule the argument, ſo far as it reſpected the *body*, by labouring to prove that it is no part of the man, and that, though the hope of the vulgar extended to it, yet, as *death* darkened and deſtroyed this general hope, by evidently deſtroying the *body*, there was a total end of it then made.

Here, therefore, it is, that our Lord, by giving aſſurances of the reſurrection of the body, and its re union with the ſoul, has aboliſhed death, *i. e.* the effects of death, and the doubts and darkneſs ariſing from them, particularly

ticularly in what reſpects the *body*, and brought life and immortality to light; but, when this is aſſerted, it by no means ſuppoſes a want of all evidence in this caſe, formerly from the light of nature, or reaſon, as well as from the Old Teſtament, nor does it ſuperſede the uſe of them now, particularly, with the view that was mentioned, of repreſenting the matter in every light, in which it can beſt ſtrike or impreſs the mind.

We ſhall proceed therefore to what was propoſed, as the

II. Part of our inquiry, *viz.* the evidences we have of the *ſoul's ſurviving* its ſeparation from the *body* by *death*; evidences ariſing from its nature and exerciſes, and from the ideas we have of the divine government and perfections; the

1. And ſtrongeſt rational evidence ariſes from what we were formerly conſidering as to the nature of the ſoul, that, being immaterial and indiviſible, it is alſo incapable of diſſolution; from which it follows, not only that it ſurvives its ſeparation from the body, but likewiſe that it is in its own nature *immortal*, for the being incapable of diſſolution implies this: What the power of God can do, is not the queſtion here; he who gave every thing a being from nothing, can alſo, not only diſ-

ſolve

ſolve but annihilate or reduce to nothing; but as we have no reaſon to believe, that *matter* is, either in itſelf liable to annihilation, or by any act of power, reduced to it, no more have we reaſon to believe, that the *ſoul* or ſpirit is liable to annihilation, or even diſſolution, either at death, or in any period ſubſequent to it.

But, does this imply its ſurviving death? According to the order or union of my ideas it neceſſarily does; for I cannot conceive of the ſoul as exiſting, undiſſolved, and, I may ſay, indiſſoluble in its nature, without ſuppoſing vitality or activity, and likewiſe intelligence, *i. e.* that it acts, operates or is exerciſed, in the various ways formerly mentioned, of underſtanding, willing, reflecting, remembring, *&c.* Activity is of the eſſence of ſpirit, though not of matter, and the action eſſential to it is *thinking*, or operating in ſome of theſe ways now mentioned; ſo *eſſential* is this to the human ſoul, and inſeparable from it, that we cannot conceive its having the ſame at any time ſuſpended, and intirely obſtructed though there is not always a remembrance of its exerciſes; or, at leaſt we may warrantably affirm, that its not thinking always is a thing that can never be proved from any conſciouſneſs or experience of our's in the preſent ſtate for a conſciouſneſs or remembrance of not thinking,

thinking, is one of theſe poſitions that confutes itſelf.

To this argument, from the nature of any cogitative principle, that it muſt be immaterial, and conſequently indiviſible and indiſſoluble, it is objected, that all the ſame concluſions may be drawn, in favour of many *brute* animals, from the evidences of thought and ſagacity that appear with them: but whatever approaches ſome of them may make to men, in theſe reſpects, we have already obſerved that there is an inſuperable boundary betwixt them, though in many caſes, difficult to be fixed; allowing brutes, therefore, ſome kind of immaterial principle, yet, while they want the diſtinguiſhing criterions mentioned, they are on quite a different footing from men; there being no reaſon to ſuppoſe, that all ſpiritual or immaterial principles are of the ſame nature and dignity, but rather, that they admit of much greater diverſity than corporeal beings; and that, according to their order and degree of diſtinction, they are more or leſs immerſed in matter; nay even though we ſhould admit, the animating principles in brutes to be not only immaterial, but likewiſe immortal, and capable, as ſome maintain, of many tranſmigrations from one corporeal ſtate to another; yet while they are incapable, as was formerly obſerved, of reaſoning, reflecting,

ing, and connecting one act of conſciouſneſs and one period of being with another, the continuance of their duration, by no means puts them upon the ſame footing with beings of ſuperior rank; who while ſuperior in reſpect of capacity and perfection, will alſo be ſo in reſpect of happineſs or enjoyment. *A*

2. Argument, to prove that the human ſoul ſurvives the diſſolution of the bodily frame is drawn from this conſideration, that, as it is found to operate, even when the bodily powers are locked up or ſuſpended by ſleep and, often, to exert itſelf then, with much more vigour and activity, we conclude, that it will alſo continue to operate, when theſe powers are ſuſpended or even diſſolved by death.

To this alſo the materialiſts object, that, as the ſoul is ſo much affected by the bodily temperament, and the various changes to which it is liable, in ſickneſs and health; we muſt conclude it to be no more than a material ſyſtem, highly rectified, which cannot ſurvive the diſſolution of the bodily frame. The anſwer to this is eaſy: The mutual influence of ſoul and body on one another, is through the animal ſpirits *, and as theſe depend upon the

* When ſome writers mention a *ſenſitive ſoul* in man, diſtinct from the *rational*, they can only mean by it the *animal*

the ſtate of the body, and objects connected with it, no wonder if the ſoul ſhould be affected accordingly; but there are inſtances enough of its not being always ſo, to prove that this objection is far from being general (without which it cannot here be valid) and that the ſoul may and does ſometimes triumph over the decays and diſtreſſes of the body: Can I, therefore, ever allow myſelf to ſuſpect its being ſimilar to it in its nature and diſſolution? Can I, for inſtance, when juſt now collecting and weighing the arguments, in proof of the ſoul's immateriality and immortality, reſolve all the operations of my mind with reſpect to it (imperfect as they are) merely into the effects of matter and motion, or even imagine myſelf capable of reaſoning on the ſubject at all, and riſing to higher and clearer views of it, without having any other powers or faculties for this purpoſe, but ſuch as depend upon the body, and are therewith diſſolved? My mind recoils at the very thoughts of it; and you, who may happen to review what is here ſaid of immortality, when I am removed from the ſociety of mortals, can you believe that I ceaſe to exiſt, to think, to rea-

animal ſpirits; when ſome diſorder in theſe, therefore, impairs the exerciſe of reaſon, it no more proves there being no immaterial ſpiritual principle in man, than any diſorder in a clock proves that there is no law of gravitation, or that it ceaſes to exiſt and operate.

ſon, becauſe I ceaſe to animate that periſhing material frame, or portion of duſt, with which I am, for wiſe and good ends, ſo nearly connected or united at preſent?

3. The *hope* and *deſire* of immortality are ſo inſeparable from the ſoul, that they have always been conſidered as, at leaſt, affording ſome preſumption, or moral evidence of their not being implanted in vain, with a view to diſappointment, and not to any object commenſurate to them; or if, what is thus the object of hope to ſome, be that of fear to others, the argument loſes none of its ſtrength, in ſo much as it points out ſomething anticipated beyond the preſent life.

This leads us to mention the arguments for immortality, that may be drawn from the *nature* of *God* and his government, which are fully as ſtrong as thoſe which we now found deducible from the *nature* of the *ſoul* itſelf, and its exerciſes.

4. From the *wiſdom* of God, therefore, this is very juſtly argued; as it would be acting very inconſiſtently with it, to endow us with faculties and capacities of improvement, ſo far beyond what is or can be attained, in this ſhort, imperfect, and ſeeming diſorderly ſtate of things, if there was not another ſtate to ſucceed, more perfect and permanent, in which theſe faculties and capacities ſhall have their

their full effect and completion, or riſe to higher ſpheres of action and enjoyment than here they can arrive at.

The ſame alſo is argued from the *juſtice* of God, which requires (as was formerly hinted) his making a greater diſtinction betwixt his friends and his enemies, betwixt the righteous and the wicked, than appears to be made in the common adminiſtration of his providence in this life, in which they ſhare in common the ſame pleaſures and the ſame calamities, and which is often *apparently* more unfavourable to the virtuous, than to the vitious and ungodly.

5. The univerſal belief of the ſoul's immortality, formerly mentioned, is another argument, that has been always urged in proof of it, or rather a conſequence of the arguments from reaſon, now mentioned, as proving it; and, if to this we add the teſtimony of *revelation*, no doubt can remain with reſpect to it. Nay granting, that ſome inſtances of avowed infidels and ſcepticks as to this point, or of whole nations, groſsly ignorant, may be brought in as exceptions from this univerſal belief, they will avail but little to weaken the argument; it rather ſhews that, where this univerſal belief or impreſſion is wanting, there is ſome remarkable defect as to the other principles of our nature; nor

will all the arguments that ha[illegible] been or c[illegible] be adduced, even when the t[illegible]mony of [illegible]velation is added to them, be sufficient to e[illegible]gage or establish the faith of some obstin[illegible] practical unbelievers, with respect to this [illegible] any other doctrine. This testimony of rev[illegible]lation, with respect to it, is so clear, and so [illegible]ten repeated by our Saviour and his apostl[illegible] that nothing needs be said to enforce or il[illegible]strate it, further than may be necessary [illegible] touching a little afterwards at the doctrine [illegible] the resurrection.

But before entering on this, we are nat[illegible]rally led, as proposed, for the

III. Branch of our present enquiry, to co[illegible]sider the condition of the *soul* while *separ*[illegible] from the *body*.

Here, if any where, it may be said, that [illegible] have got into the region of conjecture; whe[illegible] we have so little light, either from scriptu[illegible] or reason, to direct us, that imagination [illegible] taken great liberty in exploring it; nor is [illegible] the unenlightened heathen writers only, b[illegible] likewise the Christian, who are chargeab[illegible] with this.

Were I to recite all their different opin[illegible]ons, with respect to the various receptacle[illegible] exercises, enjoyments, and sufferings of d[illegible]

part[illegible]

parted ſouls, tartarus, elyſium, and the different limbo's of a ſtate of purgation, it would give no rational ſatisfaction to an intelligent reader: Much leſs would it be proper to add to what has been conjectured on this head: There is rather danger, with ſome, that the indulging fancy too much, in the way of being wiſe above what is written, and determining too poſitively even in caſes where ſcripture gives ſome light, but not enough to warrant our being deciſive, and minute in our opinions, there is danger, I ſay, that indulging the flights of fancy and ſpeculation too much, in theſe ways, may make ſome more unեſtabliſhed in their faith as to points of greater importance. We cannot, however, paſs over this part of our ſubject, without taking notice of what in it appears to us of moſt conſequence, either in the way of comfort or of duty.

The opinions moſt neceſſary to be taken notice of, with reſpect to the ſtate of ſeparate ſouls, are theſe three:

1. That of their being in a quieſcent ſtate.
2. Their undergoing further trial and purgation.
3. That death determines their condition for eternity.——The

1. Of theſe opinions is ſo much againſt the whole tenor of ſcripture, and againſt all that has been advanced from reaſon, as evidences

Firſt of all, then, it muſt be acknowledged, that this is a point, in which we can come at no information either by the teſtimony of ſenſe, by reaſoning, or by experience; it is by ſcripture alone, by the Chriſtian revelation, that it muſt be determined. That Plato ſhould give it as his opinion, that men of a middle character were to undergo certain purifications after their death; that Homer and Virgil * ſhould expatiate on this, and poetically deſcribe their complaints in Erebus; or that even the ancient Jews ſhould admit of ſuch purgation for a year after death, tho' they would not admit that any of their nation periſhed finally †; that ſuch opinions, I ſay, as theſe, ſhould take place with ſome, can avail us little, while they are entirely deſtitute of proper authority to ſupport them: They have indeed availed ſo far, as to pave the

* Ergo exercentur pœnis, veterumque malorum
Supplicia expendunt. Aliæ panduntur inanes
Suſpenſæ ad ventos: Aliis, ſub gurgite vaſto,
Infectum eluitur ſcelus, aut exuritur igni.
Quiſque ſuos patimur manes, exinde per amplum
Mittimur Elyſium, et pauci læta arva tenemus:
Donec longa dies, perfecto temporis orbe,
Concretam exemit labem: purumque reliquit
Ætherium ſenſum, atque aurai ſimplicis ignem.
VIRG.

† It was, and is, a common ſaying with them, "Every Iſraelite ſhall have a place in the world to come."

the way for the Popiſh doctrine of *purgatory*, and its different *limbo's*, introduced in the ignorance of the ſeventh century, and, ſince that time, converted into a profitable traffick of maſſes and prayers, for the pardon of ſome particular ſins, or for limiting the time of their expiation.

But, if we conſult ſcripture, which is the only ſure guide here, we ſhall find, that the offers of pardon through a Redeemer, have no ſuch limitations, of ſome ſins reſerved for temporal purgation, that the Old Teſtament, as well as New Teſtament ſaints, looked for an immediate entrance into bleſſedneſs after death, and that, immediately upon leaving the body, they expected to be preſent with the Lord. Our Saviour's words to the penitent thief on the croſs, and his parable, or hiſtory of the rich man and Lazarus, are alſo expreſs to this purpoſe; and if, in ſome paſſages, particularly of Paul's epiſtles, mention is made of a trial by fire, the context makes it plain, that they have reſpect to a fire of perſecution, and to the doctrines, rather than the perſons of thoſe who underwent it.

I know there have been, and ſtill are ſome writers, of ingenuity and acuteneſs, who, without intending to go all the length that the church of Rome has done, as to a future ſtate of trial and purgation, allow their fancy rather

ther too much liberty, in determining as to the receptacles of departed ſouls; and, were they to go no farther than to maintain their paſſing into a middle ſtate, in reſpect of enjoyment and perfection while diſunited from the body, *i. e.* that the happineſs of the whole man, ſoul and body, is not compleat till their reunion, we would eaſily fall in with them; but all their ſpeculations as to a middle place, give it what name they will, either on the right or left ſide of Hades (as Biſhop Campbell diſtinguiſhes them) are, we ſee, without foundation in ſcripture, and generally carried (as Origen's opinions of future tranſmigrations were) ſo far as to approach very near the doctrine of purgatory now mentioned; a doctrine of ſuch pernicious influence on practice, that every approach to it muſt be dangerous; for let it be only allowed, that the time of our trial is protracted after death, we find moſt men diſpoſed to truſt to it, rather than ſubmit to the exerciſe of ſelf-denial, mortification, or any painful acts of repentance at preſent; being ready enough to ſuppoſe the ſtrength of temptations (even tho' often ſuch as are courted by themſelves) ſufficient to extenuate the guilt of theſe acts or habits of ſin, which they are moſt unwilling to part with, and to make them of the venial kind; or, at leaſt, ſuch as may hereafter be ſoon expiated

expiated, or compounded for; in view of this, it is too natural for them, to venture the truſting to ſuch a future trial, and thereupon to reckon it of leſs conſequence, how they may acquit themſelves in that which they undergo or are called to at preſent.

Theſe conſiderations ſeem ſufficient to eſtabliſh the truth of the

3. Opinion mentioned, with reſpect to the ſtate of the ſoul, immediately on its ſeparation from the body, *viz.* that death, which occaſions this ſeparation, determines its condition for eternity. There remains no more ſacrifice for ſin, no more protraction of the day of trial, no more room for repentance, nor any ſuch opportunities of improvement as in an earthly ſtate: Death puts a period to theſe; it determines our final ſtate as to the divine favour, and conſequently as to happineſs or miſery.

Laying aſide, therefore, all ſuch groundleſs and imaginary ſuppoſitions as we have been mentioning, let us ſee what may warrantably be ſaid, with reſpect to the ſtate of the *ſoul* when diſunited from the *body*.

In the general it may be obſerved, and will eaſily be admitted, that we muſt have higher powers of conception and utterance than we have at preſent, before we can ſay much of the nature of this ſtate, either as to its exerciſes

ciſes or enjoyments; for thoſe with which we are now verſant, while connected with the body and things ſenſible, muſt be ſuppoſed very different from ſuch as are purely ſpiritual, and have reſpect to a diſembodied ſtate.

We may, however, affirm, with certainty, that it is a ſtate not only of *exiſtence* but *intelligence*, *i. e.* that the ſpiritual and active powers of the ſoul, ſhall remain and continue to be exerciſed; and we muſt further conclude, that their exerciſe will not be liable to theſe defects, weakneſſes, and decays, which ariſe from bodily connections and incumbrances.

We are not to ſuppoſe, that a total ſubverſion of the preſent human conſtitution ſhall take place, but only the higheſt rectitude or improvement of it, in the way of conformity to the nature and will of the ſupreme Being; a conformity that has reſpect both to the intellectual and moral faculties of the ſoul, whoſe condition, as then determined, ſhall ly open *before him*, in a way very different from any of which it had experience in its former ſtate.

To be a little more particular as to this, therefore, what ſhould

1. Be obſerved, and is of moſt importance to be attended to with reſpect to it, is what was juſt now ſuggeſted, that, immediately upon

on the ſoul's diſunion or ſeparation from the body, its ſtate of trial is finally determined; it *appears before God*, ſtripped of all thoſe outward advantages and acquiſitions, which diſtinguiſh us in the ſight of men; *before him*, who looks not on the outward appearance, but on the heart, its diſpoſitions and affections, not on outward degrees of greatneſs, but on inward meaſures of holineſs; *before him*, in whoſe ſight humility is of more value than empire, ſincerity of more value than the moſt refined earthly wiſdom and policy.

The ends or principles from which we acted muſt *appear*; the full effects or conſequences of our conduct ſhall *appear*; the improvement or miſimprovement of our time, talents and advantages, as now put to the trial, ſhall *appear*; the reality of our profeſſion, and the motives of our obedience, muſt all *appear before him*.

Not but that all theſe are as manifeſt to him at preſent, as at any future period, but, when the curtain of nature is drawn, he will make the manner of their *appearance* to him, more manifeſt to ourſelves; hence it follows, that,

2. Tho' the *general judgment* is always ſpoken of in ſcripture as a ſolemn and public proceſs, accompanied with ſuch circumſtances as make the view of it moſt awful and alarming

ing, but not to take place 'till the reunion of ſoul and body, that is, 'till the final conſummation of all that reſpects the preſent human ſyſtem, when the whole effects or conſequences, which actions have drawn after them, ſhall be manifeſted; tho' the *general judgment* (I ſay) be thus ſpoken of as deferred, yet we muſt conſider every *individual*, as undergoing a *particular judgment*, and entering upon their *final ſtate* of enjoyment or ſuffering, immediately on death's concluding their trial in the *preſent*.

3. The *ſoul*, when diſembodied, tho' diveſted of ſenſible organs and powers of perception, connecting it with material objects, retains theſe habits or diſpoſitions, as well as impreſſions, received in ſuch a ſtate of connection with them; but in ſuch a manner as ſuits the ſuperior perfection of its ſpiritual or diſembodied ſtate.

4. In a future diſembodied ſtate, we are taught, both by reaſon and revelation, to believe that there will remain ſuch a *conſciouſneſs* and *remembrance*, as is neceſſary to connect it with the preſent, and to enhance its enjoyments or ſufferings; but not ſuch as implies, or infers a continuance of this connection, by a communication of ſentiments and offices, or by continuing to receive impreſſions of *pleaſure* and *pain*, from what is here tranſ-

acted, however much they ſhall ariſe from that remembrance now mentioned, which implies a recollection of perſons, events, and tranſactions, in the preceeding ſtate.

5. The *ſoul*, when diſembodied, cannot be ſaid to receive ideas or perceptions by any ſenſible faculty, but by ſuch faculties as are purely ſpiritual; retaining, however, as was now mentioned, and reflecting on the ideas, that had been formerly conveyed to it by ſenſe, and having, poſſibly, ſtill ſome powers ſimilar thereto; ſo as that, in many caſes, where long deductions of reaſon are now neceſſary, its knowledge may be by intuition, or by faculties of perception analogous to theſe which it has at preſent.

6. The enjoyments of the *ſoul* in a diſembodied ſtate, will bear proportion to its powers, both intellectual and moral; according as theſe are more or leſs enlarged and improved, ſo will be the enjoyments ſuited to them; even while the happineſs of any individual is compleat, it will be proportioned to its capacity, and conſequently admit of different degrees, and of progreſſion from one degree of perfection, and thereby of happineſs, to another, in a way analogous to what we here ſee of the divine proceedings; and, as to which, we have no other grounds to go upon, in our reaſonings, but *analogy*.

From

From conſidering the amount of our preſent knowledge, as to the condition of the ſoul, while ſeparate from the body, we proceed, as propoſed, in the

IV. Place, to conſider what reaſon we have to believe that they ſhall be reunited, tho' appearances make ſo ſtrongly againſt it, when the *Body* undergoes ſuch a total change and diſſolution.

Whatever belief the immortality of the ſoul gained among the unenlightened heathens, they had no belief of the *reſurrection* of the body, as thinking it impoſſible; they thought creation out of nothing impoſſible likewiſe, it being a maxim with the ancient philoſophers, "*A privatione totali ad habitum non datur regreſſus;*" their reaſon for this was, that they eſtimated things poſſible or impoſſible, according as they ſaw any effects ſimilar to them in nature: But we are taught to judge of things as poſſible or impoſſible, by the power of God; ſo that we admit nothing to be *impoſſible*, unleſs it can be proved to be beyond his power, in one of two ways; either *1ſt*, by implying a contradiction in itſelf, which infers a natural impoſſibility; or *2dly*, by implying a contradiction to ſome of the

divine perfections, which infers a moral impoſſibility.

The laſt of theſe is never alledged here; and, as to the firſt, it cannot be affirmed in any other way, than by ſuppoſing a tranſition of the parts of one body into another, after death; ſo as that a queſtion might ariſe, To what body they ſhould belong at the reſurrection? a queſtion ſimilar to that of the Sadducees, with reſpect to the marriage of one woman to ſeven huſbands; and as eaſily anſwered, by diſtinguiſhing betwixt the ſolid, ſubſtantial, or permanent parts of the human body, and ſuch as are accidental or adventitious. How theſe may circulate, from one body to another, does not ſignify, as they are not conſtituent, eſſential parts of any of them; but the former, thoſe parts that are ſolid or conſtituent of the body, ſuch as bones and nerves, may, by certain laws, unknown to us, be ſo ordered, as not to be transferable into the conſtituent parts of another body, even tho', as is told us of ſome Cannibals, one man ſhould devour another.

As therefore this is the only ſenſe, in which a contradiction or impoſſibility can be argued here, and that it can be ſo eaſily taken out of the way, it follows, that the reſurrection is, at leaſt, a thing *poſſible*; and, without its being ſo, it would be vain to attempt proving it from

from any authority, or from the conſideration of Almighty power interpoſed; becauſe it would not be the proper object of any power, nor would it be any limitation of infinite power, not to work impoſſibilities.

But, a *poſſibility* being once admitted, no idea of *difficulty* in this caſe can make the reſurrection of the body more *incredible*, than the firſt creation of it out of nothing; the ſame power that firſt created, formed, and animated it, can alſo with, at leaſt, equal eaſe, reſtore or raiſe it up:—And,

Beſides its being neither *impoſſible* nor *incredible*, ſome have argued its not being, in a natural or rational view of it, *improbable*; in ſo much as there are not wanting, even in nature, ſome variations and revolutions ſimilar to *reſurrection*: Thus there is a diurnal reſurrection of the day, from the ſilence and darkneſs of the night; and an annual reſurrection of the ſummer, from the ſeemingly dead and torpid ſtate of nature in winter, when the juices deſcend, and are buried, as it were, in the roots, while the earth is covered over with ſnow, or congealed by froſt. The grain is buried in the ground and corrupts; then revives and multiplies: Thus all things revive from death, and riſe from the grave; and ſhall we ſuppoſe, that even the *body* of *man*, who is made the LORD of all, ſhall be detained there?

The conſideration of God's remuneratory ju ſtice, may likewiſe be mentioned, as makin ſuch a *reſurrection* of the body *probable*, in o der to its being aſſociated or united to th ſoul hereafter, in a ſtate of retribution, as is at preſent in a ſtate of trial and probatio

But, it muſt be owned, that all this amour to no more than a proof of its being neith *impoſſible*, *incredible*, nor *improbable*: It do not prove the reality or *certainty* of it. F a certain proof of the reſurrection, we mu have recourſe to *revelation*; we muſt kno the ſcriptures, how far they intimate Go will or promiſe with reſpect to it, and we mu ſolve all the difficulties that appear, by th conſideration of his power to accompliſh it.

In the *Old Teſtament*, the two moſt remar able paſſages to this purpoſe are, *firſt*, Jo declaration of his faith, "Chap. xix. ver. 2 26, I know that my Redeemer liveth, *&c* Thoſe who underſtand this declaration, as r ſpecting only Job's hope of a temporal reſt tution, ſeem not to conſider his preface to i in the two verſes immediately preceeding, which there is expreſſed, a ſolemnity and r ſpect to a diſtant futurity, which makes it u likely, that the declaration following then was meant *only* of a reſtitution to his form temporal ſtate.

Th

The only other paſſage we ſhall mention in the Old Teſtament is, "Daniel xii. 2. And many (*i. e.* according to the original, the multitude or all) of them, who ſleep in the duſt of the earth, ſhall awake, *&c.*"

Porphyry, and likewiſe the Socinians, (who deny the reſurrection of the wicked) would have this paſſage to refer to a ſudden victory, that was to be obtained by thoſe who groaned under the oppreſſions of Antiochus; but this will not explain the laſt part of the verſe, *viz.* that ſome ſhall riſe to ſhame and everlaſting contempt.

We might alſo mention another plain paſſage from the Old Teſtament, in proof of the reſurrection, "Iſaiah xxvi. 19. Thy dead men ſhall live, *&c.*"

The proofs of this doctrine, from the *New Teſtament*, are ſo many, and ſo clear, that they admit of no diſpute, from any who believe the goſpel-revelation. Our Saviour is explicit on this head, Matth. xxii. 31. from the argument of God's being the God of Abraham, of Iſaac, and of Jacob; and again, John v. 28. 29. "The hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves ſhall hear his voice, *&c.*" Now we know that all that is in the grave is the *body*.

The Socinians find the ſame difficulty, in reconciling the whole of this declaration to their

their opinion; they would apply it to a ſpiritual reſurrection, from the graves of ignorance and impiety, thro' the preaching of the goſpel: But the laſt part of this declaration, likewiſe, will not ſuit their purpoſe, *viz.* that they who have done evil, riſe to the reſurrection of damnation.

What has been moſt the ſubject of diſpute here, is, what the apoſtle Paul takes notice of, at great length, "1 Corinth. xv. 35. *&c.* But ſome men will ſay, How are the dead raiſed up? and with what body do they come, *&c.*" If we look only at the ſtate of the body, in its diſſolution, and various preceeding changes, we may form many objections of this kind, from what they call the *identity* *, or ſameneſs

* With reſpect to the *ſoul*, it ſeems plain, that, what conſtitutes perſonal *identity*, is conſciouſneſs and remembrance; but, with reſpect to the *body*, we know not ſo much of the eſſence of matter or refinements it is capable of, as to determine, wherein ſuch corporeal identity conſiſts; whether it is the original ſtamina, or ſome ſeminal principle, of which our preſent body is but the *exuviæ*; and which the Apoſtle Paul compares to the like principle in corn, which unfolds itſelf, when the reſt of the grain is corrupted. The Jews ſpoke of ſuch an incorruptible part of the body; and it may, at preſent, be the ſeat of the ſoul, whoſe operations ſeem confined to narrow bounds. In reſpect of the animal or ſenſitive principle, indeed, we feel over all; but in reſpect of the rational, ſpiritual, or cogitative principle, our idea of that part of the body, which appears to be its ſeat or reſidence, carries in it ſomething extremely refined, and approaching, as it were, as near as poſſible to the nature of its ſpiritual inhabitant. The Apoſtle's ſpeaking, therefore, of

ſameneſs of the body which ariſes. But all this ſhows only our ignorance of what is not neceſſary to be underſtood by us here, namely, the *manner* of the body's reſurrection: Now it is not the *manner*, but the *certainty* of this, that is the object of our faith; for, even in the preſent ſtate, we cannot explain the *manner* of the exiſtence of many things, which we firmly believe to exiſt; and, in what reſpects the reſurrection of the *ſame body*, the conſideration of God's power and of his promiſe, may ſilence all objections as to the *manner* of it.

We ſhall only further conſider the argument for it from *Chriſt's reſurrection*, which has a twofold reſpect,

1. A *general* one to all men, righteous and wicked, for as the dominion over them is given him, and the judgment of them committed to him; (of both which we are fully aſſured in ſcripture) there muſt be a reſurrection of them, to be ruled and judged by him.

2. Chriſt's

of a ſpiritual body at the reſurrection, will, in this ſenſe, imply no abſurdity or contradiction: Conſider only what refinement matter is capable of, in the caſe of the rays of light, from one ſmall taper, extending to, and illuminating many miles around, though the minuteſt particle of it is ſtill conſidered as material, and you'll not be ſo much ſurpriſed, at the mention made of the *reſurrection-body*, as carrying in it an idea of purity, ſpirituality, and refinement, beyond deſcription.

2. Chriſt's reſurrection has a *particular* reſpect to his people, as their head or repreſentative, from whoſe reſurrection, the Apoſtle Paul infers that of all who are united or related to him.

His reſurrection is alſo ſet forth, as having the ſame relation to that of his people, that the offering of the firſt fruits, under the ceremonial law, had to the harveſt, being conſidered as a pledge of it. And finally, the reſurrection of the body, is a neceſſary conſequence of Chriſt's having obtained the victory over death. "Death (ſays the Apoſtle, 1. Cor. "xv. 54,) is ſwallowed up in victory;" now it cannot be ſaid, that death is fully conquered or deſtroyed, and the effect of Adam's ſin fully taken away, without inferring the *reſurrection* of the body, and the reſtitution of all that death had diſſolved or demoliſhed.

V. *Laſtly*, The conſequences, therefore, of this re-union, and its continuance or duration, is all that remains to be further conſidered, as the concluſion of our preſent inquiry: A concluſion indeed infinitely intereſting, and having, ſo far as any light or information we have, leads us to ſpeak of it, reſpect to theſe two awful and important ſubjects, the general judgment, and the different conditi-

ons

ons awaiting us in conſequence of it*, with reſpect to which, as well as other ſubjects formerly mentioned, it muſt be remembered, that it is the *certainty* of theſe great events, that

* There is another remarkable event or period, that much has been wrote of, and which, in the order in which it is commonly introduced and conſidered, ſhould be mentioned before the reſurrection, and that is the *Millennium*, the doctrine of which (ſo far as I can recollect what I have read on the ſubject) ſeems to be this.

In the prophecies of Ezekiel, Daniel and others, mention is made oftimes of great felicity, beyond any thing hitherto experienced, which were to take place before the conſummation of all things, and ſenſible images or reſemblances are uſed for deſcribing them. This the *antient Jews* underſtood of the temporal reign and glory of the Meſſiah, and an opinion prevailed with many of them, that the earth was to contiuue in its preſent ſtate for ſix thouſand years, and after that a ſabbatical period to follow for a thouſand years more, in which this temporal reign was to take place, and therewith the higheſt enjoyments, both ſpiritual and corporeal, that a terreſtrial ſtate will admit of.

In the firſt century of Chriſtianity, ſome hereticks, particularly Cerinthus, adopted this notion, in the groſſeſt and moſt literal ſenſe, and arguments were brought in proof of it from the New Teſtament, particularly the xxth Chapter of the Revelations.

In the ſecond century, the ſenſual notion of a millenary reign ſpread ſtill more, and Papias Biſhop of Hierapolis, an honeſt, but credulous man, is mentioned as the principal abettor of it, and ſaid to have had it from the Apoſtle John himſelf, and the diſciples of the other Apoſtles.

From general ſpeculations of this kind with reſpect to it, the Chiliaſts or Millenarians (for ſo they were called who eſpouſed this doctrine) came, in a century or two more, to be very particular with reſpect to it, 'till Jerom and Auguſtine began to expoſe the fallacy of ſome of their conceits, and, ever ſince that time, they have generally been more refined and ſpiritual in their apprehenſions of it, but ſtill, in many particulars, extravagant and inconſiſtent.

They

that is the object of our faith, and not the *manner* of them; even as to this indeed, the Chriſtian revelation gives ſome account, which ſhall be afterwards taken notice of; but

They would bring the ſaints and martyrs from heaven, to paſs a thouſand years more upon earth, as if it would add to their happineſs, yea and they would make them liable to another change ſimilar to death and reſurrection, and even to another conteſt with enemies among men; for the times of *Gog* and *Magog*, mentioned in the Revelations, are acknowledged to be after the Millennium. Doctor Burnet is ſo inconſiſtent on this point, that he would have, both the Millennium and the appearance of theſe enemies of Chriſt's kingdom, to be after the general conflagration: And Mr Mead is no leſs extravagant in deferring them till after the general judgment.

The only account of the matter, that ſeems to be moſt rational and ſcriptural is as follows.

The paſſages of ſcripture which we mentioned, and ſome others, cannot poſſibly be accounted for, or explained, without ſuppoſing, that, before the final conſummation of what reſpects the preſent human ſyſtem, there will be a period of order and felicity, far beyond any that has been hitherto experienced. Nor is it unreaſonable to believe, that, even on this earth, where ſo much impiety and immorality, diſcord and miſery have long prevailed, God ſhould, ſome time or other, even in a way that may appear natural and gradual, without any miraculous interpoſition, bring about ſuch a change of circumſtances, ſentiments and conduct among men, as will more illuſtriouſly diſplay his perfections, in the government of the world, and make the operations of his providence and grace to be more attended to, and have more efficacy, than hitherto they ſeem to have had.

For theſe purpoſes, however, no preternatural cauſes need be called in aid; no more ſeems neceſſary but that the doctrines and precepts of Chriſtianity ſhould, by the powerful operation of the divine ſpirit, have their full effect on the hearts and lives of men; that the Chriſtian church ſhould be raiſed to the higheſt purity, proſperity and perfection it is here capable of, and whatever oppo-

ſes

but as to their *certainty*, it is a doctrine of natural as well as of revealed religion.

If it be certain that God rules the world, it is as certain that he will judge it; judgment

ſes the progreſs and influence of true religion removed.

For this reaſon, therefore, many great events are mentioned in ſcripture, as previous to the happy period we are now ſpeaking of; ſuch as, beſides the happy change now mentioned on the hearts and lives of Chriſtians themſelves, a converſion alſo of the Jews to Chriſtianity, and (according to ſome) the reſtoration of their city and their return to it; the converſion of all the Gentiles likewiſe; the fall of Antichriſt, whether underſtood of Popery or Mahometaniſm, or both; an univerſal language and intercourſe among nations (which was originally broke off by ſin) univerſal peace and righteouſneſs.

But as to other extravagant ſuppoſitions, ſuch as Chriſt's viſible reign upon earth; the reſurrection of thoſe very ſaints and martyrs who were once upon it; corporeal delights and the like, we have not ſufficient authority to aſſert them, but rather the contrary: Nor can we even determine, as to the preciſe time, when this happy period mentioned ſhall commence. Such as begin it with Conſtantine the Great in the fourth century, or Gregory the ſeventh in the eleventh century, and others later in their calculations have been all ſo far miſtaken, and ſome of them ſo much diſappointed and expoſed, by living to ſee the falſehood of their own calculations, that, though we are not to be incredulous, we may learn alſo not to be incautious, in our judgment, with reſpect both to the time of commencement and other circumſtances; let us be ſatisfied with knowing, in general, as we are told, Revelations xi. 15. that it ſhall commence when the ſeventh angel ſounds his trumpet, re-echoed by the heavenly hoſts, ſaying, "The kingdoms of this world are become "the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Chriſt, and he "ſhall reign for ever and ever." The ancient Jews thought that they had as good reaſon for expecting the temporal reign of their Meſſiah, as the Milleneries can have for their extravagant expectations; but the effect of that belief on the Jews, in marring their reception of him, when he appeared, gives no great encouragement to us,

of things conſummated; then ſhall ſuch a judgment be paſt, as will bear witneſs, to the whole rational creation, of the adorable perfections of the ſupreme Governor, his unerring wiſdom, his uncontroulable power, his unbounded goodneſs, his unſpotted holineſs, and his inflexible juſtice, mixed with patience and mercy.

As the conſideration of God's government and perfections, leads us to the belief of ſuch a future general judgment, ſo does alſo the conſideration of what paſſes within ourſelves, in reſpect of the hopes of the righteous and terrors of the wicked, ariſing from the workings of conſcience within them, and foreboding ſome degree of happineſs or miſery hereafter, far beyond what can be enjoyed or ſuffered in the preſent ſtate. Of this we have inſtances enough to ſhew, that, as by the intimations God makes of his favour in the conſciences of his people, he teſtifies, in ſome meaſure, his regard to them at preſent, and gives earneſts of what is to be beſtowed hereafter, ſo alſo, the intimations of his wrath and diſpleaſure againſt the wicked, in the natural workings or impreſſions of their own conſciences, the ſtings of guilt, and horrors of impending puniſhment, are ſuch as the worſt of men cannot entirely baniſh, however

much they may ſeem for a time to ſmother or ſilence them.

But if ſuch be the dictates of reaſon and conſcience, if, from our natural apprehenſions of God and of ourſelves, we have ſuch evidences of a future judgment, the teſtimonies with reſpect to it in ſcripture, are ſtill more clear and expreſs, and the ſolemn nature and proceſs of it in ſome paſſages particularly deſcribed, as Dan. vii. ix. *&c.* Mat. xxv. 31. *&c.* alſo Acts xvii. 31. From theſe and numberleſs other paſſages we learn the univerſality of this future judgment, both in reſpect of perſons, actions, and principles of action.

We learn alſo, and are called to give particular attention to it, that the ſecond perſon of the adorable Trinity, he who, in reſpect of his ineffable relation to the firſt, is called the ſon of God, and who appeared and ſuffered in our nature, as mediator betwixt God and man, that he, I ſay, is appointed the ſupreme Judge of the world; being, by his aſſumption of our nature, peculiarly qualified for this office, and, by his ſufferings on our account, intitled to it. The Saviour of the world ſhall be finally acknowledged, manifeſted, and reverenced as the judge of it, and, by his irreverſible decree, fix our condition for eternity.

This

This is the *other* branch mentioned of the concluſion of our inquiry, *viz.* What are the different conditions of being held forth, as conſequent on the general judgment now ſpoken of, and what their continuance or duration?

With reſpect to the different conditions of being that await us hereafter, we are warranted to make only one grand diſtinction, *namely*, that of the *righteous* and the *wicked*; the nature and ends of our preſent ſtate require their being intermixed here, both for their mutual improvement and trial: They ſhare in common the ſame outward comforts and calamities, nor could they be kept ſeparate without a continual miracle; but the reaſons for their being thus intermixed, ſhall ceaſe with their preſent ſtate, and there will be a much ſtronger reaſon, from the wiſdom and juſtice of God and honour of his government, to make an awful and publick ſeparation betwixt them.

It is the condition of the wicked and diſobedient, in conſequence of this ſolemn ſeparation, that has been the ſubject of moſt diſpute. It is plain that they muſt then be ſtript of all thoſe outward and tranſient diſtinctions, which do now dazzle and intoxicate them, ſtripped alſo of all thoſe maſks and ſhadows by which they may have formerly

impoſed on men, and ſtand naked and guilty before the divine tribunal, to be tried by that law, by which they now refuſe to be ruled, and condemned by that judge whom they now reject as their Saviour.

Their being condemned, ſo far as to be excluded from the divine favour, and from poſitive happineſs, will not probably be diſputed, nor any queſtion made of its reconcileableneſs to our ideas of the divine goodneſs, as well as juſtice; but there muſt be ſuppoſed ſomething more than this; for ſinners would even run the riſk of it, rather than forſake the preſent delights of ſin and ſenſe; yea more, though to this you add ſomething in the way of poſitive ſuffering, through the feelings of conſcience, and even ſome puniſhment of *ſenſe*, or analogous to the perceptions of *ſenſe*, (compared in reſpect of its ſeverity to the operations of *fire*) though (I ſay) not only *negative* puniſhment in the way of *loſs*, but even *poſitive* puniſhment, in the way of *ſenſe*, ſhould be admitted, yet, if you limit its duration, ſinners will ſtill hazard it, and graſp at the preſent enſnaring delights of ſin and ſenſe, in hopes of a ſaving bargain; and much more ſo if *annihilation* be ſuppoſed the conſequence, a conſequence inconſiſtent not only with ſcripture, as we ſhall afterward ſee, but likewiſe with all our former reaſonings as to the

nature

nature of the ſoul, and which would make the puniſhment of all crimes equal.

Theſe conſiderations prepare the way for our belief of a doctrine which meets with no ſmall oppoſition of late, and yet appears to be plainly founded on ſcripture, *namely*, that the *future ſufferings* of the wicked ſhall be endleſs in their duration.

The paſſages on which this is founded are many, particularly theſe two, Mat. xxi. 41, *&c.* and Mark ix. 43. *&c.* I know there has been much ſaid to explain away the force of theſe and other paſſages to the ſame purpoſe, as if the original words might be underſtood, either of a limited duration, or of a total deſtruction; but it is certain, that words more expreſſive of an unlimited duration, could not be found; they are the ſame by which the duration of the ſupreme Being, and that of the happineſs of his people is expreſſed; and they carry in them the idea of feeling, in as plain language as could be uſed, and which cannot be underſtood of any annihilation or deſtruction, nor admit of an after-reſtitution.

As this, therefore, is one of the moſt awful and alarming doctrines that ever was revealed, and yet our authority for aſſerting and believing it, however unpopular, beyond all queſtion, we beg leave to add an obſervation

tion or two, for obviating the objections that are commonly brought againſt it, and ſhewing that it is more reconcileable, than is commonly imagined, to the dictates of reaſon, and to our natural notions of the divine government and perfections.

The whole ſtrength of the objections here commonly adduced, will be found to depend on the two following ſuppoſitions.

Firſt, That the juſtice and goodneſs of God requires, that the degree or meaſure of crimes ſhould be the only meaſure of their puniſhment, or exactly proportioned to it. And,

Secondly, That there is no proportion between the ſins of men, and endleſs puniſhment.

Now though, by the imperfection of our views and reaſonings, in this, as in all caſes where the ideas of eternity or infinity enter, we ſhould be unable plainly to ſhew the falſehood of theſe two ſuppoſitions; yet, if we can even ſhew their doubtfulneſs and uncertainty, it will follow, that the doctrine we are conſidering, is not ſo contrary to the divine perfections, as to imply a moral impoſſibility, and thereby become an improper ſubject of proof; but that, on the contrary, it is capable of ſuch proof, ſo that it is not neceſſary to wreſt ſcripture, as ſome do, for reconciling it to theſe ſuppoſitions. To the

Firſt

Firſt of them, therefore, it may be replied, that the rule or meaſure of puniſhment is not the meaſure or degree of guilt only, but that likewiſe, the end for which puniſhment (or rather we may here call it ſuffering) is inflicted is the rule of it, and that, if this end be juſt and good, no puniſhment or ſuffering can be reckoned unjuſt or improper, which is neceſſary for promoting it.

Let us ſee then what may be aſſigned, as the end of future puniſhment; it is not ſuppoſed by any to be reclaiming the offenders, for the view of this ceaſes with their preſent ſtate of trial; it muſt therefore be, to ſupport the authority of the divine laws and government, as extending to the whole rational creation, and to retain them in their duty and obedience.

If, indeed, we confine our views to the human ſyſtem alone, it may perhaps be ſaid, that no future puniſhment is at all neceſſary for this end, as its influence can avail nothing to men, when once their different ſtates are immutably fixed: But, if infinite wiſdom required the creating many different ſyſtems of free agents, whoſe beauty and perfection behoved, in a great meaſure, to ariſe from being retained in their duty, by motives of this kind, rather than by any that would imply violence and conſtraint to their faculties, although

altho' it would be a moral abſurdity or co
tradiction, to ſuppoſe that the ſufferings
good men ſhould be neceſſary or conducive
this end, there is no extravagance in ſuppo
ſing it the end for which the eternal puniſh
ment, or rather the ſufferings of wicked me
ſhould be appointed, and the ſame intimate
to other ſyſtems of free intelligent beings, f
a warning to them, as thoſe of the fallen a
gels are to us in ſcripture; and, if this ſupp
ſition is allowed to be conſiſtent with wiſdo
and goodneſs, it will in ſome meaſure accou
for the appointment of ſuch ſufferings, witho
any impeachment of juſtice, more than in t
caſe of human laws, when capital puniſhmen
are inflicted for ſlight tranſgreſſions of the
in order to be a warning to others.

For, in this view of future puniſhment,
regulated by the end of inflicting it, as mu
as by the meaſure or degree of the offende
guilt, we ſee it is not God's juſtice alo
that is concerned, but likewiſe his wiſdo
and holineſs, in deſigning and promoting t
end; and if theſe require ſuch puniſhmen
we cannot ſuppoſe they will be counteract
by his *juſtice*, much leſs by his *goodneſs*, wh
conſidered as extending to his univerſal g
vernment, or requiring that, by his laws a
their ſanctions, he ſhould conſult, not the go
of a few only, but of all his ſubjects; ev

t

tho' thereby, ſome of them ſhould ſeem to be treated with ſeverity.

In a word, if the glory of the ſupreme Governor, (taking it, not in the partial and corrupt ſenſe in which glory is often taken among men, as unconnected with, or oppoſed to the general good) and the perfection of his univerſal kingdom, required his creating various ſyſtems of intelligent and fallible beings, endowed with free powers of acting; and likewiſe required his appointing them laws, ſuited to their natures, and fit for the trial and exerciſe of theſe powers; whatever is neceſſary for ſupporting the authority of theſe laws, muſt be conducive to God's glory, and the general good; and therefore it is, from its relation or tendency to this end, and not from the order or meaſure of offences, that the meaſure of future puniſhments or ſufferings may be deduced.

Thus may the firſt ſuppoſition mentioned be, at leaſt in a great meaſure, diſproved.

2. *Again*, as to the other ſuppoſition, *viz.* that the ſins of men bear no proportion to endleſs puniſhment; ſome have argued, that the guilt of ſin muſt be infinite, becauſe committed againſt a being of infinite perfection; but, tho' this may be queſtioned, as making the guilt of all ſins equal, yet there is ſome reaſon to maintain, that there is in ſin of any kind

kind, an infinite pravity or malignity, in much that the ſinner would continue or pe ſiſt in it, was his life here to be infinitely pr longed, unleſs a ſupernatural aid (to which has no title or right in himſelf) be afford for reclaiming him.

Tho', therefore, infinite puniſhment ſhou ſeem diſproportioned to the guilt of ſin, y it may bear ſome proportion to this infini evil or pravity of it; and that there is in ſi or moral evil, ſomething more virulent a detеſtable * in the ſight of God, than is co monly imagined, may be concluded from t awful and tremendous puniſhment of it in t caſe of the Antediluvian world, of Sodom a Gomorrah, and even of the Jewiſh natio but ſtill more from the infinite value of t ſatisfaction or atonement required for it, the ſufferings of his own ſon, the ſecond pe ſon of the Godhead, in our nature and ſtead ſo that the offers of grace made us throug him, are ſufficient to vindicate the divine ju ſtice and goodneſs, with reſpect to us.

To this we may add, that, tho' the futu puniſhment of ſinners, in a privative way, b their exclusion from the bliſsful preſence an favo

* This is admirably well ſet forth by one of the moſt ra tional and acute philoſophers of this *philoſophical age*, i his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*.——The concluſion o Part II. Sect. 2.

favour of God, be, on all hands, acknowledged eternal, and the teſtimony of ſcripture ſo expreſs, as to an addition of poſitive ſufferings or puniſhment, infinite (and which even the ancient Platoniſts ſuppoſed indefinite) in duration; yet while the ſcriptures have no where determined the degree of its intenſeneſs, nor aſſerted this to be infinite, but ſuppoſe it accommodated to the circumſtances and guilt of offenders, there is room enough left for vindicating the divine juſtice and goodneſs, without limiting the duration of their ſufferings, which may be conſidered as a point of fact, ſo plainly aſſerted in ſcripture, that, whatever liberty we may have to account for it, and ſhew its reconcileableneſs to the divine perfections, it is vain to attempt the diſproving it, without ſubverting the authority on which it is aſſerted.

Admitting, therefore, only a poſſibility of the truth of the fact now mentioned, what can be more dangerous than to weaken the belief of it, (as ſome do) by maintaining, that what is ſaid of it in ſcripture, is only a commination or threatning, and that the juſtice of God does not require the fulfilling his threatnings as it does his promiſes? whereas, in the paſſages quoted, and various other parts of ſcripture to the ſame purpoſe, the account given of future ſufferings, is in the way of deſcription

or narration of a matter of fact, and not in the way only of commination or threatning. Would we indeed wiſh to have the matter ſo expreſſed, as to put it beyond all reaſonable doubt, words could not be deviſed more plain and indiſputable.

Nor is the influence of this doctrine on practice, a matter of ſo little importance, that we can, either with ſafety or innocence, labour to weaken the belief of it; for, tho' the fear of puniſhment be not a proper motive or teſt of virtue, becauſe it does not rectify the heart, yet it is of no ſmall uſe to ſociety, as a reſtraint from vice; and, the more you limit its duration it weakens this reſtraint, even more than any limitation as to the degree, or intenſeneſs of it, of which we cannot ſo eaſily form any diſtinct ideas.

We ſhall conclude what at preſent appears neceſſary to be ſaid, on this much diſputed ſubject, with obſerving, that tho' there are ſuch difficulties now, in reconciling the origin of evil to God's holineſs, and the duration of the puniſhment denounced againſt it to his juſtice and goodneſs, yet, when the awful period arrives, that this puniſhment muſt be inflicted, it ſhall be done in ſuch a way as that the conſcience of the ſufferer (in regard particularly of the offers of grace now made him through a Saviour) ſhall juſtify every ſtep of

the

the divine proceedings with reſpect to him, as all reconcileable to theſe adorable perfections now mentioned.

From conſidering what has been moſt the ſubject of diſpute, with reſpect to the future condition of the wicked and impenitent, we would now wiſh to carry our enquiry to the bright ſide of our proſpect, in view of *immortality*; by conſidering what further may be ſaid, as to the future condition of the righteous, and the eternity of bliſs or happineſs which awaits them, on that re-union of ſoul and body, already ſpoken of, which ſhall take place at the final conſummation of all that reſpects the preſent ſyſtem of things.

Let us carry our ideas of immortal felicity, of the pureſt and moſt perfect bleſſedneſs, as high as we are capable, yet ſtill they muſt fall infinitely ſhort of the reality of things, as they ſhall afterwards appear: *Heaven* would not be *heaven*, if it was within the reach of our preſent comprehenſion or deſcription.

It may, however, be of no ſmall advantage to us, to have our attention ſometimes turned to this: If it be the great, the ultimate end *now* propoſed to us, it is proper to enquire a little, What may be known or ſaid, with reſpect to it? An object may, indeed, be propoſed to us as a prize or end to be purſued, even tho' it is not known, or comprehended;

If there is only a certainty that it is very precious and deſireable; but if it is ſuch as we know in ſome meaſure the nature and value of our deſires after it will be ſtill the more inflamed, and the bad effects of any groſs or corrupt apprehenſions of it prevented.

With reſpect, therefore, to the *nature* of that eternal life and happineſs, which, both by ſcripture and reaſon, we are aſſured to be awaiting the righteous. One of the firſt views, in which we are apt to conſider it, is that of *reſt*, or deliverance from all the miſeries and diſtreſſes of this life; but this is only a mere *negative happineſs*, and applicable to the wicked as well as to the righteous. Let us ſee, therefore, what it is that may poſitively be aſſerted with reſpect to the prize here ſet before us, to that IMMORTAL HAPPINESS reſerved for the people of God.

Firſt of all, we may ſay of it in general, that it is *very great*; yea unſpeakably great. This appears from all the accounts we have of it in ſcripture, it is called "an exceeding and eternal weight of glory;" and compared to every thing that may raiſe our eſteem or value of it to the greateſt height; to a kingdom, an inheritance, rivers of pleaſure, fulneſs of joy, and a crown that fadeth not away: In a word, we are told, "That eye hath not ſeen, "ear hath not heard, neither hath it entered "into

"into the heart of man to conceive" of it, as it is in itſelf.

This is the language of ſcripture, concerning the heavenly happineſs, and is very conſiſtent with what natural reaſon itſelf leads us to think of it. We may eaſily believe what God has in ſtore for his people hereafter, to be ſuch as will abundantly compenſate all the toils they can undergo in purſuit of it. This we may naturally infer from our ideas of his all-ſufficiency, and of his intimate acceſs to our minds, which will then ſtill more ſenſibly be felt, in the way of diffuſing ſerenity and joy through all its faculties. Any faint experiences we have of this at preſent, and even the evidences of his bounty in the natural world, lead us, in the way of analogy, to draw concluſions, with reſpect to the greatneſs of that future bleſſedneſs he has in reſerve for his people hereafter.

2. Its ſuitableneſs to their nature and capacities, is another general character that muſt be aſcribed to it; for the ſubverſion of theſe is by no means ſuppoſed neceſſary to it, but their higheſt improvement, and that in ſuch a way as will appear *natural*. Our *natural* ſtate here, may be ſaid to be a ſtate of imperfection and corruption; but then holineſs and happineſs ſhall be natural; they ſhall appear, as it were, to be the natural conſe-

quence of our former progreſs, and the divine methods with reſpect to us; like a building, whoſe foundation was, in ſome meaſure, laid before, but looked like ruins, and ſhall then be reared up to the higheſt ſpiritual perfection it is capable of.

Here we have, as it were, only the ruins of human nature, yet it is more agreeable both to ſcripture and reaſon, to think that theſe ſhall be repaired or built upon, than quite ſubverted; tho', with God, this alſo would be equally eaſy; for it would have been as eaſy to him to have created a new ſet of beings, on man's fall, as to bring about our recovery; nay, (according to our ideas of things) rather eaſier, as having no obſtacle or oppoſition to it.

Thus, in a ſtate of higher improvement, there will appear to have been a gradual progreſs towards it. From this, however, it muſt not be ſuppoſed, that there ſhall be no change ſo great, as to appear new and ſurpriſing; for this is what may be naturally expected, on a tranſition from one ſtate to another, ſo very different from it; ſuch ſurpriſe, new appearances and diſcoveries may become occaſions of the higheſt pleaſure and happineſs; and may very well take place, without ſubverting or counteracting the original powers implanted in the human mind. A

Third

Third thing that may be obſerved, in general, with reſpect to the future eternal happineſs of the righteous, is, that as it will be unconceivably great, yet ſuited to their nature, capacities, and preceeding progreſs, ſo likewiſe, it will bring them *nearer* to God, the Author of their exiſtence and happineſs.

Not that they can be ſaid, ſtrictly ſpeaking, in reſpect of God's eſſential preſence, to be any nearer him in one ſtate or period than another, but they will be nearer, in reſpect of reſemblance and acquaintance, they will have nearer and clearer views of him. Here, tho', in reſpect of his natural preſence, he always ſurrounds and ſupports his people; and, in reſpect even of his gracious preſence, ſometimes ſhines upon them, yet ſin often clouds and darkens their views. Hereafter, this obſtruction ſhall be removed; there ſhall be nothing to interrupt the beams of his love, the full communications of his favour.

To this it may be added, that, as we are taught in ſcripture to imagine ſome particular part of nature, in which God gives more ſtriking manifeſtations of his preſence, and the effulgence of his divinity; we may reaſonably ſuppoſe, that, upon the removal of the veil of ſenſe, God's people ſhall be admitted to a nearer view of his glory in this reſpect, to nearer acceſs and communion with him,

him, particularly in the exercises of praise, worship, and divine contemplation.

It is, in respect of these views and exercises, that it may well be supposed, they shall be brought *nearer* to GOD, and reap the sublime fruits of *his mediation*, who was made *Man*, and dwelt among men, that he might in the end advance them to such a *nearness* to God, to the presence-chamber of the MOST HIGH.—But,

To be more *particular*, in giving some account of that future eternal state of happiness we are speaking of, we may presume to consider it as a state of the highest *perfection*, and of the highest *enjoyment*, our natures are capable of, *perfection* and *enjoyment* being the two great requisites to *Happiness*.

1. In respect of *perfection*, true happiness cannot be supposed to subsist without it; and, the greater the happiness is, the higher must be supposed the perfection of that being, or of those powers and faculties, to which such happiness belongs. With regard to that perfection, therefore, of the human nature and faculties, thus requisite to happiness, we may reasonably conclude, that, wherever any degree of it is found in this life, it shall be consummated in the next, or advanced to the highest degree that the human capacity will admit of; for the human capacity must always

ways be ſuppoſed the proper meaſure of human perfection.

The ſame may alſo be ſaid of ſuperior beings; ſo that, as the powers and capacities of *angels*, or ſuperior ſpirits, differ from thoſe of *men*, their happineſs differs likewiſe; and, as the capacities, even of men among themſelves, differ, ſo muſt alſo their perfection and happineſs, as was formerly hinted; each may have as large a ſhare as he can receive or deſire, and yet not the ſame, in *degree*, with that of other beings like himſelf; nor, perhaps, the ſame in *kind* with that of other beings, of a different nature from himſelf.

That higher *perfection*, therefore, which may be ſuppoſed the foundation of the human happineſs in a life to come, will beſt be underſtood from conſidering it, as it relates to the different parts or principles of the human conſtitution, which being, in a more general ſenſe, compoſed of MIND and BODY, we ſhall conſider,

1. That *future perfection* which the human *mind* may be thus endued with, or capable of hereafter: This is by far the higheſt of the two, according to our ideas of ſpiritual and corporeal natures, and the purer any ſpirit is, ſo much the more perfect and nearer to God, whom we are taught to conſider, as that ſpirit which is of all the pureſt and moſt perfect, penetrating,

penetrating, and pervading every other ſubſtance, material or intellectual.

Since, therefore, we muſt conſider the perfection of the ſoul as the higheſt that man is capable of, the cleareſt view we can have of it is, from conſidering its relation to the various powers and faculties of the ſoul; for tho', properly ſpeaking, what we call *mind*, *ſoul*, or *ſpirit*, (which, ſo far as regards our preſent ſubject, have all the ſame ſignification) be but one ſingle indiviſible principle, yet, as it is variouſly exerciſed or actuated, we conſider it as having ſo many different powers or capacities of action, each of which is ſuppoſed to have its diſtinct province, office, and degree of perfection.

Of theſe, therefore, we may here conſider three or four claſſes: *Firſt*, The *intellectual powers*, of reaſon and underſtanding. *Secondly*, The *recollecting* and *reſembling powers*, of memory and imagination. *Thirdly*, The *moral powers*, of will and affections. And *fourthly*, The *reflex governing principle* of conſcience, as ſupreme over all.

1. As to our *intellectual powers*, of reaſon and underſtanding, we may ſuppoſe, that any degree of theſe we are endued with in this life, ſhall be advanced to the higheſt perfection we are capable of, in the life to come.

Now,

Now, by *reaſon* and *underſtanding* are meant, the powers of diſcerning and diſcovering truth. This we muſt often do, in the preſent ſtate, by a long chain of intermediate proofs, or tedious deduction of conſequences from cauſes, ſo far as we can find out their nature and relation, or connection with one another. But, in the life to come, it may be ſuppoſed, that ſuch diſcoveries ſhall be rather intuitive; that is, theſe truths, whoſe certainty or connection we cannot now ſee, without a long chain of diſcurſive reaſoning, ſhall then be ſeen at once, or with one glance.

The underſtanding is, as it were, the eye of the mind, and may then be ſo ſharpened, as to pierce into the moſt abſtruſe corners of ſcience, with as great eaſe, as it now ſees that two and three make five, or any of the plaineſt axioms.

In this life, our reaſon is often clouded, by thoſe miſts, which ſenſe and bodily attachments ſpread before it; but, in the life to come, none of theſe ſhall obſtruct its views, nor impair its exerciſe. In this life, our reaſon is often diſturbed by the prevalence of diſorderly paſſions, ſo that it cannot conſider many things calmly and attentively; but, in the life to come, it ſhall recover its empire over the paſſions, and have nothing to diſturb or diſcompoſe it. In a word, we may ſuppoſe, that,

that, in the life to come, reaſon ſhall have its free and perfect exerciſe, without all theſe clogs and incumbrances, by which it is weakned and obſcured, in this ſtate of imperfection.

2. *Again*, As to what we call the recollecting and reſembling powers, *viz.* thoſe of *memory* and *imagination*, it may be ſuppoſed, that hereafter they ſhall likewiſe receive as much perfection as they can admit of. By the memory we mean, the power of recording and recollecting paſt events and perceptions; and by the imagination, as diſtinguiſhed from this, the power of connecting, aſſembling, or aſſociating theſe, ſo as to form to ourſelves repreſentations of what we have not actually felt or perceived:

Now that theſe powers are, in this life, very much impaired or corrupted, the experience of every one will ſufficiently evince. How ready are we, to let the moſt important truths ſlip out of our memory, and to retain thoſe that are vain, ſinful and trifling? How ready to exclude or avoid all repreſentations of ſpiritual and divine things, and to dwell in our imaginations, on thoſe that are corrupt and ſenſual?

But, though this be ſo much the caſe with us here, yet, in the life to come, it may be expected, that theſe powers ſhall be raiſed to a purer and more perfect exerciſe; and, that their exerciſe ſhall be ſuch, as will give the moſt

moſt refined pleaſure, yet without any mixture of diſorder and corruption. A

3. Claſs of powers which we mentioned, as belonging to the human mind, and which ſhall receive a much higher degree of perfection hereafter, is that of its *moral* and determining powers, or, what we commonly call the *will* and the *affections*, which are all but ſo many determinations of the mind, towards the different objects preſented to it; and whoſe imperfection in this life ariſes from their being either determined to improper objects, or in an undue degree; *i. e.* from their not being exerciſed according to the direction of reaſon and conſcience:

But, in the life to come, we may ſuppoſe, that this imperfection ſhall be removed, the divine will ſhall be the rule of our's, and every thought and affection brought into obedience to it. But, that which we may ſuppoſe, will moſt remarkably ſhare in the future perfection of the human mind, is the

4. *Laſt* faculty we mentioned, by the name of *conſcience*, or that principle within us, which neceſſarily determines us in our judgment of our own actions, by ſometimes approving and ſometimes condemning ourſelves, reckoning one action good and another evil.

With thoſe who ſhall be happy in the life to come, it may naturally be ſuppoſed, that its condemning power ſhall ceaſe; being (as

with our *bodies*, a thing not to be expected or desired, after the dissolution of our present frame, nor necessary for recovering and perfecting it;

But, as the life and immortality of the SOUL are brought to light by the gospel, so also is the resurrection of the BODY; we have already considered the proofs which we have of both these points from scripture and reason, and have endeavoured to solve the various difficulties, that may occur with respect to them: So that, what falls properly under our notice further, when considering the *perfection* of a future state of happiness, is, how far not only the *soul* (in the manner now described) but likewise the *body* may share in such *perfection*; and, as to this, we have no further light to direct us in our inquiries, but what arises from some hints with respect to it in the scriptures of the New Testament.

"We look (says the Apostle Paul, Philip. "iii. 20. 21.) for the Saviour the Lord Jesus "Christ, who shall change our vile body, "that it may be fashioned like unto his glori-"ous body." And 1 Cor. xv. 35, *&c.* we have this more particularly foretold and described; "It is sown (says the Apostle) in cor-"ruption, it is raised in incorruption; it is "sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory: It "is sown in weakness, it is raised in power,

"it is ſown a natural body, it is raiſed a ſpi-
"ritual body. And as we have born the i-
"mage of the earthy (*i. e.* the firſt Adam)
"we ſhall alſo bear the image of the heaven-
"ly" (*i. e.* Chriſt the ſecond Adam) in reſpect of the *body* he aſſumed.

This is the only way in which we can form any notion of this future *perfection*, ſo far as it reſpects our *bodies*, by conſidering them as more ſpiritualized and refined, and thereby nearer the ſtate of our Saviour's on his reſurrection and aſcenſion, and agreeing, in ſome meaſure, with what we are told of thoſe ætherial vehicles, aſſumed by angels and departed ſpirits, when, for delivering any meſſages from heaven, it was neceſſary that they ſhould become viſible to the eyes of mortals.

It is ſuch a degree of refinement, and approach to the nature of ſpirits, that will make the *body* nomore a clog to the operations of the ſoul, but entirely ſubſervient to, and harmonizing with it: It is this ſpiritual and glorified texture, that will render it any further incapable of corruption, and relieve it from the many infirmities, diſeaſes and decays, to which, by its preſent groſſer compoſition, it muſt neceſſarily be liable.

From conſidering the future condition of the righteous, as a ſtate of the higheſt PER-

FECTION

RRECTION both of *ſoul* and *body*, we proceed to conſider it as

II. A ſtate of the higheſt ENJOYMENT, that is, a ſtate where the human faculties, when thus perfect (according to their nature, or ſphere of perfection) ſhall be exerciſed on objects agreeable and commenſurate to them, for it is from ſuch an exerciſe of our faculties, on objects ſuitable to them, that enjoyment or happineſs of any kind, may be ſaid to ariſe.

The *enjoyments* of the heavenly ſtate might be conſidered, in the view now taken of its perfection, according to the reſpect they may be ſuppoſed to have to the different *faculties* mentioned; *viz.* the *underſtanding*, by its being employed in exploring and contemplating the moſt ſublime *truths*, with new diſcoveries or meaſures of knowledge pouring in upon it; the *memory*, in recording and recollecting, and the *imagination*, in dwelling with delight, on ſuch diſcoveries; the *will* and *affections* harmonizing, or operating in entire conformity to the *will* of the *Supreme Being*, the ſovereign Author of all bliſs and happineſs; and the over-ruling faculty of *conſcience*, reviewing, regulating and approving the whole.

But, that we may vary our view a little here, we ſhall rather conſider this future hea-

verily *enjoyment*, as it reſpects the different SOURCES from which it may be ſuppoſed to ariſe.

With reſpect to any *new powers* of action and perception, or any *new ſource* of enjoyment that may take place hereafter, we are utterly unable to judge; and our comprehenſion muſt be acknowledged very imperfect, even of ſuch as are analogous or ſimilar to what we have at preſent; but, ſo far as it extends to theſe *future ſources* of *pleaſure* or *enjoyment*, we may ſuppoſe

Firſt of all, That no ſmall pleaſure ſhall ariſe to thoſe who are admitted to ſhare in the heavenly happineſs, from a *review* of what they ſuffered and ſurmounted in an earthly ſtate, in ſuch a manner, as that all pain ariſing from ſuch a *review* of paſt miſeries, ſufferings and follies, or apprehenſion of future liableneſs to the ſame, ſhall be removed, and the pleaſure unſpeakably increaſed, by the diſcovery of many ſnares and dangers formerly unknown, yet eſcaped, and many corruptions and temptations conquered; by ſeeing the end and effect of diſpenſations, formerly unfathomable; by tracing God's various dealings with their *ſouls*, and their conſequent improvement or progreſs in every good habit or diſpoſition, in every branch of virtue and devotion; how their truſt in God was eſtabliſhed,

their

their love to him kindled, their humility increaſed, and their patience under many infirmities and afflictions confirmed, ſo that, the more of theſe they laboured under formerly, their complete deliverance and freedom from them ſhall be the more ſenſibly felt, and afford an unſpeakable addition to their happineſs.

Other *ſources* of enjoyment may be ſuppoſed to take place by faith's views being perfected, promiſes fulfilled; hope compleated; fear removed; new objects of enjoyment preſented; and, above all, by the *ſoul's* being admitted into the more immediate preſence, and *enjoyment* of GOD, returning, as it were, and being re-united to him, who is the primary *ſource* of all *perfection* and *beatitude*.

The *enjoyment* of GOD, therefore, as conſtituting the ſupreme felicity of the *ſoul*, though far above any thing that we can at preſent conceive or deſcribe, may be conſidered as conſiſting in theſe two exerciſes,

1. Contemplation, and

2. Communion.

1. *Contemplation, i. e.* The exerciſe of our intellectual faculties, when perfected, on divine and heavenly objects; if, even here, ſuch exerciſe is often pleaſant, though ſoon interrupted by ignorance, and the intruſion of things trivial or hurtful, how much more delightful

height it can admit of; the more of it they have here, ſo much the happier are they, and nearer heaven; and it ariſes from a lively ſenſe of God's love or favour, manifeſted to the ſoul, engaging its ſupreme affection to him, and giving a near acceſs to him in every religious exerciſe and branch of devotion. If we extend this, therefore, to the life to come, we may conclude, that the *communion* with God which ſhall then be attained, and which muſt be conſidered as having reſpect to the different perſons of the adorable Trinity, may be ſuppoſed to conſiſt,

1. In thoſe acts of *worſhip* paid him, where men and angels ſhall join in celebrating his perfections and works; the heavenly exerciſe of *praiſe* ſhall have new cauſe for it preſented, and new pleaſure annexed to the performing it.

2. *Obedience*, or executing the divine commands, not in the way of trial, as at preſent; but in ſuch a way as will adminiſter the higheſt pleaſure and happineſs; *God's will* ſhall ſtill be the rule, but ſuch as ſhall then be naturally and delightfully complied with.

3. *Converſe*; By a nearer admiſſion to the divine preſence, to receive his law, as it were, from his own mouth, and to ſee him as he is.

4. Mutual

4. Mutual *complacency* or *delight*; God taking pleaſure in his people, and they bleſſed with a ſenſe of this; whatever were their doubts of it formerly, their evidences of it ſhall then be unqueſtionable. When God is thoroughly reconciled and pleaſed, he can and will make it known, he can command a lively ſenſe of it in the ſoul, and bid every thing around to ſpeak harmony and peace.

All that remains further to be ſaid, with reſpect to the different *ſources* of *enjoyment*, that await the virtuous and happy hereafter, is, that they ſhall have all the happineſs that can ariſe,

From *reflection*, on what they feel within themſelves, and

From the *ſociety* of all around them.

1. From their *own review*; or reflection on what paſſes within themſelves. So great is the pleaſure ariſing from this, even in our preſent ſtate when the mind can calmly bear its own review (which is far from being always the caſe with any) that ſome call it *heaven* in the ſoul, and it is ſo far true, that there can be no heaven or happineſs without it:

By this is meant, a conſciouſneſs of the ſoul's being in a right ſtate, all well ordered or regulated within, its various powers and principles in due ſubordination to one another,

and

We may, therefore, suppose, that such were united upon earth, by the purest ties [illegible] and affection, shall be [illegible] hereafter; rejoicing in the happi[illegible] of one another: Yea, and those who had [illegible] same views of glorifying God, and carryi[illegible] [illegible] and merciful designs among [illegible] upon earth, yet differed in their manner [illegible] those great ends, and had the [illegible] perhaps, but little relish for one anoth[illegible] [illegible] formerly, may rejoice together, w[illegible] better acquainted with one another's vie[illegible] and both landed at the same ha[illegible] looking back on any former [illegible] opinions and [illegible] as on the [illegible] of childhood, succeeded by the [illegible] amity and f[illegible] ip; when all, [illegible] heart, and one [illegible] e, shall join in ad[illegible] celebrating their Maker; and when [illegible] praise of free g[illegible] e, of [illegible] bounded goodness be it [illegible] of their preceeding tri[illegible] an eternity of blessedne[illegible]

It is this that will crow[illegible] blessed above, their being [illegible] millions of ages are elapsed, [illegible] speak of their *duration* as fu[illegible] shall be no diminution or interrup[illegible] happiness: it shall continue, with[illegible] impaired, in every condition of hei[illegible]

this life to support the soul*? That desire
security and perfection, which is, in some
gree, natural to every one of us, must h
remain unsatisfied: But, if our views are
tended to an *eternal state*, all these discou
ging prospects evanish, and new scenes of bl
harmony, and perfection, open on the so
such as may well reconcile us to all these
stresses and disorders, which we here feel,
are liable to; wi satisfied (as often we m
be) of their con any way, to rip
us for these hig in our view.

2. *Another* in e may ve
naturally draw a of our f
ture *perfection*, know
sin, must be very
of it.

The
knowi
sistent
and w.
ges hit

Wha
degree o
present stat

* If any
rather too
ture blessedness, let th
for assisting a little the
in need of comfort from the
stances as are here set forth, a
perience of so many in the pr

To be ſold by Meſſrs *Kincaid* and *Bell*, Ed
burgh; and *E.* and *C. Dilly*, London,

A ſhort VIEW of the HUMA
FACULTIES and PASSIONS; w
Obſervations and Directions reſpecting th
Nature, *Improvement*, and *Government*.

By the Author of the preceeding *Eſſays*
Diſſertations.

The above VIEW, *&c.* is likewiſe prin
on two Sheets of large Paper, in the form
a *Map* or *Plan*.

Alſo four ſhort DISCOURSES, with POE
by the ſame.

H